Coordination in closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns

This paper proposes two Closed-loop Supply Chain (CLSC) games in which a manufacturer sets some green activity programs efforts and a retailer sets the selling price. Both strategies influence the return rate, which is a state variable. The pricing strategy plays a key role in the identification of the best contract to achieve coordination as well as in achieving environmental objectives. The pricing strategy influences the return rate negatively, as consumers delay the return of their goods when the purchasing (and repurchasing) price is high. We then compare a wholesale price contract (WPC) and a revenue sharing contract (RSC) mechanism as both have interesting pricing policy implications. Our result shows that firms coordinate the CLSC through a (WPC) when the sharing parameter is too low while the negative effect of pricing on returns is too severe. In that case, the low sharing parameter deters the manufacturer to accept any sharing agreements. Further, firms coordinate the CLSC when the sharing parameter is medium independent of the negative impact of pricing on returns. When the sharing parameter is too high the retailer never opts for an RSC. We find that the magnitude of pricing effect on returns determines the contract to be adopted: For certain sharing parameter, firms prefer an RSC when the price effect on return is low and a WPC when this effect is high. In all other cases, firms do not have a consensus on the contract to be adopted and coordination is then not achieved

Recovery decisions of a producer in a legislative disposal fee environment

Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.The main objectives of the environmental legislation originating from extended producer responsibility (EPR) principle are to lead producers to undertake recovery initiatives for their end-of-use products and to promote environmentally desirable product design. It is still controversial whether current implementations of EPR principle are effective in attaining these objectives. This study seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What is the impact of EPR legislation on the product recovery decisions of producers? (2) How do the redesign opportunities (i.e., design for disassembly) affect the willingness of producers for product recovery? (3) How do the investment needs to start recovery practices and the reluctance of producers to allocate sufficient funds for this purpose affect the optimal recovery decisions? We use stylized economic models to represent the implementation in practice and solving our models we obtain closed form and numerical solutions that help us to see the impact of various parameters on the optimal decisions of a producer. Our findings indicate that redesign opportunities encourage producers for more recovery, however the reluctance of producers to cover the initial investments may substantially reduce the effectiveness of the legislation and the recovery amounts.TÜBİTA