91 research outputs found
Meaning Relativism and Subjective Idealism
The paper discusses an objection, put forward by - among others - John McDowell, to Kripkeās Wittgensteinās non-factualist and relativist view of semantic discourse. The objection goes roughly as follows: while it is usually possible to be a relativist about a given domain of discourse without being a relativist about anything else, relativism about semantic discourse entails global relativism, which in turn entails subjective idealism, which we can reasonably assume to be false. The paperās first section sketches Kripkeās Wittgensteinās ideas about semantic discourse and gives a fully explicit formulation of the objection. The second section describes and briefly discusses the formal apparatus needed to evaluate the objection - which is basically equivalent to John MacFarlaneās recent development of David Kaplanās classic semantic framework. Finally, the third section explains in detail why the objection fails. I show that even though relativism about semantic discourse does entail a form of global relativism, the relativism in question does not entail anything like Berkeleyan or Fichtean idealism. This particular kind of relativism holds that which character (in Kaplanās sense) is associated to a given utterance depends on what MacFarlane calls āthe context of assessmentā
Yet Another Skeptical Solution
The paper puts forward a new skeptical solution to Kripkeās Wittgensteinās rule-following paradox, a solution which revolves around the idea that human communication does not require meaning facts - at least as defined by Kripke. After a brief discussion of the paradox, I explain why I think that Kripkensteinās solution needs revision and argue that the main goal of a skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox should be that of showing that communication does not require meaning. After that, I offer two arguments for the thesis that communication does not require meaning. The first argument instantiates a rather direct strategy and focuses on the description of a concrete case of communication without meaning. The second one is more indirect in that I start by describing a world in which, although there are meaning facts, communication does not depend on them. The paperās last section deals with the issue of meaning talk
Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms
Even though he is not very explicit about it, in āWittgenstein on Rules and Private Languageā Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses ā the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called āNormativity Argumentā against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemological in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language
Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality
Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agentās normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Streetās own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of this incompatibility
Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of meaning and argues that Saul Kripkeās well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on Lewisā work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call "Actuality Constraint". The third section of the paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by "+" do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian). This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show (1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by "+" do not exist
The Argument from Normativity against Dispositional Analyses of Meaning
In his well-known essay on Wittgenstein, Saul Kripke maintains that dispositional
analyses of meaning cannot work mainly because the concept of
disposition is descriptive, whereas that of meaning is normative. Unfortunately, neither
Kripke nor his followers have ever spelled out this āargument from normativityā
in full detail. As a result, the argument does not have good press. This paper
offers an explicit version of the argument. In particular, (1) I try to explain
what the claim that meaning is normative amounts to, (2) I try to clarify what
supports it, and (3) I sketch a valid version of the argument
Is Meaning Normative?
According to Paul Boghossian, the claim that the concept of linguistic meaning is normative has no plausibility whatever. In this paper, I criticize Boghossian's argument for this conclusion and maintain that there is a strong case for saying that the concept of meaning is normative. First, I sketch an easy to handle version of the argument in question. Then, I use MacFarlane's work on the significance of "true" to maintain that the argument relies on an illicit assumption. Finally, I show what supports the claim that meaning is normative by reflecting on the structure of an explanation of a case of successful communication in terms of meaning
Che cosa ĆØ soprannaturale?
L'articolo discute "A Midsummerās Night Sex Comedy", film del 1982 di Woody Allen, concentrandosi sulla dialettica tra i personaggi di Andrew (Woody Allen) e Leopold (JosĆ© Ferrer) e in particolare sul loro atteggiamento nei confronti del soprannaturale. Sostengo che per comprendere appieno questa dialettica ĆØ necessario abbracciare una concezione in senso lato wittgensteiniana di che cosa vuol dire che qualcosa ĆØ soprannaturale
La teoria della memoria di Reid in contesto
Un'introduzione ad alcune delle idee principali della filosofia di Thomas Reid, scritta per la traduzione italiana del saggio sulla memoria, dai "Saggi sui poteri intellettuali dell'uomo"
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