The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Croatia 1991-2006

After the collapse of ex-Yugoslavia, Croatia inherited a ‘premature’ socialist pay-asyou-go pension system. During the early 1990s, it was used more extensively than elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe to ease the pains of the country’s transition to a market economy, thereby leaving Croatian pensions in dire need of reforms. This article will try to meticulously describe the reform process during the period 1991-2006, which was characterised by three relatively independent phases: the first, a retrenchment phase, which condemned a majority of pensioners to old-age poverty; the second, a restructuring phase, which led, under the aegis of international financial institutions, to the legislation of radical reforms; and the third, a populist phase, which undid most of the previous efforts. The article will conclude that this concoction of poverty, agency capture and crony capitalism had a common denominator, that is the struggle for power during the country’s democratic consolidation.Croatia, institutional change, multipillar pension systems, pension reforms, populist measures

Welfare State Retrenchment in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Pension Reforms in Poland and Slovenia

This paper endeavours to shed some light on the mechanisms that led to the divergence of welfare state arrangements across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In particular, pension system reforms displayed a great deal of variance, which surprised both institutionalists and convergence theorists. The Polish and Slovenian cases are thus presented and compared in a political economy perspective. Theories of retrenchment, recent studies on the dynamics of CEE pension reforms and consultations with some of the relevant actors, were employed in order to account for the divergence of reform outcomes in the two countries. The study focused on three main explanations: partisan competition, the interaction between relevant external (World Bank) and internal actors (Minister of Labour and Minister of Finance) and the trade-off. between power concentration and accountability concentration. The latter yielded the best explanation. While Polish reformers managed to internalise most veto actors’ reservations, Slovenian politicians excluded from consultation the country’s main trade union. Its opposition determined the rejection of radical reforms recommended by the World Bank.

The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Croatia 1991-2006

After the collapse of ex-Yugoslavia, Croatia inherited a ‘premature’ socialist pay-asyou-go pension system. During the early 1990s, it was used more extensively than elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe to ease the pains of the country’s transition to a market economy, thereby leaving Croatian pensions in dire nee of reforms. This article will try to meticulously describe the reform process during the period 1991-2006, which was characterised by three relatively independent phases: the first, a retrenchment phase, which condemned a majority of pensioners to old-age poverty; the second, a restructuring phase, which led, under the aegis of international financial institutions, to the legislation of radical reforms; and the third, a populist phase, which undid most of the previous efforts. The article will conclude that this concoction of poverty, agency capture and crony capitalism had a common denominator, that is the struggle for power during the country’s democratic consolidation

Slovenia:The End of a Success Story? When a Partial Reform Equilibrium Turns Bad

During the Great Recession, Slovenia recorded one of the worst economic performances within the EU. Such a decline is surprising as the country was the most stable among the post-socialist states. The article individuates the root cause for the downfall in protracted reform gradualism, which resulted in an inefficient privatisation process. This locked the country into a partial reform equilibrium' where economic elites extracted rents. Following accession to the EU, the unsustainable lending practices of state-owned banks to corporate organisations and the gridlock in policymaking pushed the country into an economic and political bad equilibrium'. Even though the Slovenian export sector proved to be surprisingly resilient, a massive debt overhang and a huge reform backlog are still weighing down on a healthy recovery

Organising and Representing Hard-to-Organise Workers: Implications for Turkey

none2mixedMolina, Oscar; Guardiancich, IgorMolina, Oscar; Guardiancich, Igo

Formal independence of regulatory agencies and Varieties of Capitalism: A case of institutional complementarity?

The Varieties of Capitalism literature posits that national economic institutions reflect the mode of coordination of a country's market actors. Despite the importance of this claim and a rich literature on the emergence of regulatory capitalism, few studies test such prediction for Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). This article connects the two fields of research by analysing the impact of economic coordination on the formal independence of IRAs. The results show that, beyond issues of credible commitment and policy stability, the collective action capacity of market actors matters. In particular, regulators in Coordinated Market Economies enjoy less independence than in Liberal Market Economies, while intermediate regimes grant IRAs the least autonomy. The policy implications are nontrivial. Similar to other macroeconomic institutions, inappropriate combinations of economic coordination and IRA independence may engender Pareto-suboptimal regulatory solutions. In such cases, policymakers should reconsider the rules governing national regulators

Institutional Underpinnings of the Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery: The Role of Social Dialogue

none2mixedGuardiancich, Igor; Artale, Wilko MattiaGuardiancich, Igor; Artale, Wilko Matti

The Effectiveness of national social dialogue institutions : from theory to evidence

Social dialogue has been challenged in some countries in the wake of the Great Recession. In particular, National Social Dialogue Institutions (NSDIs) have sometimes been charged with having limited effectiveness in policymaking. This paper evaluates how and when NSDIs prove less effective than they should in performing their tasks, how to measure such effectiveness, and how to improve their operational capacity and impact. The effectiveness of social dialogue crucially depends on combinations of the problem-solving capacity of the NSDI, an encompassing mandate to deal with relevant socioeconomic issues and an enabling environment that grants the inclusion of social dialogue into decision-making. Combining the results from a 2017 ILO-AICESIS survey of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions around the globe with the analysis of four case studies (Italy, South Korea, Brazil and Tunisia), the study shows substantial evidence that two sub-dimensions are key to enhance the policy effectiveness of NSDIs: enjoying political support and having an 'effective mandate' as opposed to relying on just a formal remit to deal with socioeconomic issues of interest

Organising and representing hard-to-organise workers : Implications for Turkey

This report was prepared as a background paper for an international conference on "Organising Hard-to-Organize Groups" held in Ankara, Turkey on 8 May 2018. It was commissioned by the ILO under a project entitled "Improving Social Dialogue in Working Life", funded by the European Union and the Government of Turkey. The report documents and analyses international experience and good practice in organizing and representing the diverse groups of "hard-to-organize" workers. While, by definition, serious challenges are encountered by trade unions in reaching and organizing workers in the informal economy, the self-employed, undeclared, agency and platform workers, there is an increasing number of positive experiences in doing so, which can be of interest for many institutions and persons working in this field

Politička ekonomija mirovinskih reformi u Hrvatskoj 1991-2006.

Nakon raspada bivše Jugoslavije Hrvatska je naslijedila “nezreli” socijalistički mirovinski sustav međugeneracijske solidarnosti i tekuće raspodjele. Početkom 1990-ih taj je sustav, više nego bilo gdje drugdje u Srednjoj i Istočnoj Europi, služio za ublažavanje prijelaza na tržišno gospodarstvo, čime je uvelike pojačana potreba za reformom mirovinskog osiguranja. Autor u članku nastoji podrobno opisati reformski proces tijekom razdoblja 1991-2006. godine, što su ga obilježile tri razmjerno odvojene faze: prva – faza ograničavanja prava zbog nastalih teškoća tako da je većina umirovljenika bila osuđena provesti starost u siromaštvu; druga – faza restrukturiranja, koja je pod budnim okom međunarodnih financijskih institucija vodila ozakonjivanju radikalnih reformi; treća – populistička faza, u kojoj je najveći dio prije provedenih aktivnosti vraćen u početno stanje. Članak završava zaključkom da je ta mješavina siromaštva, zarobljenosti nadležnih ustanova (agency capture) i neslobodnoga ortačkog (crony) kapitalizma imala zajednički nazivnik – bila je to borba za moć tijekom demokratske konsolidacije zemlje