Maxwell's Demon at work: Two types of Bose condensate fluctuations in power-law traps

After discussing the key idea underlying the Maxwell's Demon ensemble, we employ this idea for calculating fluctuations of ideal Bose gas condensates in traps with power-law single-particle energy spectra. Two essentially different cases have to be distinguished. If the heat capacity remains continuous at the condensation point in the large-N-limit, the fluctuations of the number of condensate particles vanish linearly with temperature, independent of the trap characteristics. If the heat capacity becomes discontinuous, the fluctuations vanish algebraically with temperature, with an exponent determined by the trap. Our results are based on an integral representation that yields the solution to both the canonical and the microcanonical fluctuation problem in a singularly transparent manner.Comment: 10 pages LaTeX and 3 eps-figures, published versio

Forecasting E-Substitution and Mail Demand

Based on historical data from 1980 to 2004 the paper analyzes the main drivers of mail demand and the impact of e-substitution by using time-series techniques. We find strong evidence for e-substitution. In the second part of the paper we provide forecasts for future mail volumes.Regulation, Liberalization, Universal Service, Worksharing

The Sugar Daddy's Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports

Professional sports leagues have witnessed the appearance of so-called "sugar daddies" - people who invest enormous amounts of money into clubs and become their owners. This paper presents a contest model of a professional sports league that incorporates this phenomenon. We analyze how the appearance of a sugar daddy alters competitive balance and social welfare compared to a league with purely profit-maximizing club owners. We further show that the welfare effect of revenue sharing in a sugar daddy league is ambiguous and depends on the degree of redistribution and on whether the sugar daddy invests in a small or large club.Competitive balance, contest model, social welfare, sports leagues, sugar daddy

Competitive Balance and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues with Utility-Maximizing Teams

This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weighted sum of profits and wins (utility maximization). The model analyzes how more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs affects talent investments, competitive balance and club profits. Moreover, in contrast to traditional models, we show that revenue sharing does not always reduce investment incentives due to the dulling effect. We identify a new effect of revenue sharing called the "sharpening effect". In the presence of the sharpening effect (dulling effect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and improves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league.Competitive balance, contest, invariance proposition, objective function, revenue sharing, team sports league, utility maximization

Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in a Dynamic Contest Model

This paper presents a dynamic model of talent investments in a team sports league with an infinite time horizon. We show that the clubs' investment decisions and the effects of revenue sharing on competitive balance depend on the following three factors: (i) the cost function of talent investments, (ii) the clubs' market sizes, and (iii) the initial endowments of talent stock. We analyze how these factors interact in the transition to the steady state as well as in the steady state itself.Contest, Sports Economics, Competitive Balance, Revenue Sharing

Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

In parallel contests, the contest organizer controls the entry of heterogeneous contestants by regulating access to the contests and determining the prize allocation across contests. The organizer can prevent a contestant from entering more than one contest. I show that the organizer allows entry to multiple contests and uniquely sets identical prizes across contests to maximize aggregate effort in all contests. Independent of the entry regulation, I find no sorting effects. Thus, a contest with a relatively high prize does not necessarily attract contestants with higher abilities. Furthermore, I discover interesting spillover effects of prizes between contests in the case of restricted entry regulations. For instance, the individual (aggregate) effort increases (decreases) in a contest if the prize in another contest increases. The endogeneity of contestants’ participation drives many of these results

Asymmetric Opportunities After an Unsuccessful Sports Career

Contestants enter a risky contest when pursuing a sports career or choose a secure outside option. If contestants enter this contest but their sports career fails, they may have asymmetric career opportunities outside of sport. Greater opportunities reduce the risk of entering this contest. However, contestants’ incentives to exert effort decrease. Two types of equilibria exist if the initial pool of contestants is large. Either only types with high opportunities or only types with low opportunities enter the sports contest. If the initial pool of contestants is low, both types of contestants participate in the contest

Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports

This paper outlines how the theory of contests is applied to professional team sports leagues. In the first part, we present the traditional Tullock contest and explain some basic properties of the equilibrium. We will then extend this static contest to a two-period model in order to analyze dynamic aspects of contests. In the second part, we will present applications of contest theory in sports. In particular, we will show how the Tullock framework is applied to models of team sports leagues. For this purpose, we will first explain the value creation process in team sports leagues and show how club revenues are related to the contest success function. Then, we present some basic modeling issues; for instance, we show how the assumption of flexible vs. fixed talent supply depends on the league under consideration and how it influences the equilibria. Furthermore, we explicate the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance in the different models. Then we address the relationship between competitive balance and social welfare. Finally, we illustrate why many clubs tend to "overinvest" in playing talent in many team sports leagues.Contest theory, Tullock contest, sports leagues, competitive balance, revenue sharing, social welfare, overinvestment

Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints

We consider two bidders with asymmetric valuations competing to win an exogenous prize. Capital markets are imperfect, such that the contestants possibly face a liquidity constraint. We show that aggregate investments are lower if at least one bidder has a liquidity constraint, even if the low-valuation bidder possibly increases his/her investments. Furthermore, the effect of the high-valuation bidder's liquidity constraint on competitive balance is ambiguous. However, if the low-valuation bidder is constrained, greater wealth unambiguously increases competitive balance. Surprisingly, if the low-valuation bidder has a constraint, a tighter constraint can increase his/her profi

Geranien nach biologischen Grundsätzen pflegen

Das Merkblatt informiert über die richtige Pflanzerde, die Bewässerung, die Düngung, die Überwinterung und die Krankheiten von Geranien