473 research outputs found
Holding Fast: The Persistence and Dominance of Gender Stereotypes
This paper investigates the persistence of gender stereotyping in the forecasting of risk attitudes. Subjects predict the gamble choice of target subjects in one of two treatments. First, based only on visual clues and then based on visual clues plus two responses by the target from a risk-preference survey. Second in reverse order: first, based only on the two responses then on the two responses plus visual clues. In isolation the gender stereotype and survey responses both inform predictions about othersâ risk attitudes. In conjunction with one another, however, the stereotype persists and dominates the survey response information.Experiment, Gender, Risk, Stereotype
Leadership and Gender: An Experiment
We present an information based model of leadership in a setting that exhibits the familiar problems of free riding and coordination failure. Leaders have superior information about the value of the project in hand and can send a costly signal to their uninformed followers to persuade them to cooperate in the project. Followers voluntarily choose whether or not to follow the better informed leader. We provide experimental evidence that, when the leaders� gender is revealed to their followers, female subjects hesitate to lead (send a costly signal) while followers� behavior does not indicate any gender discrimination. Such behavior is not observed among the male leaders.Leadership, Information, Gender, Free Riding, Coordination Problem
Are Claims Of Transparency All They Are Cracked Up To Be?
The current âbuzzwordâ among leaders is âtransparency.â Hardly a day goes by that a group leader (politician, manager, or administrator) doesnât state that he values transparency and will provide full disclosure of his information and actions. This project tests experimentally whether or not leaders, when given a choice, actually reveal a preference for transparency. Our experiment is based on a theoretical model by Komai, Stegeman, and Hermalin (2007). Fifteen subjects are randomly assigned to five groups of three. Each group separately participates in an investment game with three possible return scenarios (high, average, and low) that are equally likely to happen. Investing in the low-return scenario is not profitable to either individual group members or the whole group. In the average-return scenario, group well-being is maximized if all the group members invest in the project, but full cooperation may not be achieved simply because the dominant strategy of the individuals is to free ride on others. In the high-return scenario full cooperation is also optimal for the group, but subjects may or may not coordinate on full cooperation because they may fail to coordinate their efforts with the others. We consider a leader-follower setting. Only one member of the group (the leader) observes the scenario. The leader moves before the rest of the group members and first decides whether or not to invest in the project. The leader then chooses between two information regimes: revealing his decision and the return scenario to the rest of the group or revealing his decision but not the return scenario. Absent any information provided by their leader, followers know only the possible return scenarios and their likelihoods. They do not know which scenario is assigned to their group. Given the leadersâ information choices and investment decisions, the relevant information will be conveyed to the followers. The followers then will separately and simultaneously decide whether or not to invest in the project (followers do not know anything about the different information regimes). This is realistic in many real-world circumstances because in many business or political environments the leaders have exclusive access to critical information and are in charge of deciding whether or not to reveal the details of their information and actions to their potential followers; in many circumstances it is practically difficult for the followers to verify the real information or the leadersâ actions.Transparency, leading by example, free-riding, cooperation.
Itâs not you (well, it is a bit you), itâs me: Self- versus social image in warm-glow giving
Attempts by charities to motivate giving tend to focus on potential donorsâ altruistic tendencies. However, prior research suggests that approximately 50% of individuals are to some extent motivated by warm glow, the satisfaction received from the act of giving. The satisfaction derives from looking good to themselves (self-image) and/or to others (social image). We conduct an online experiment on MTurk participants (n = 960) with a more realistic simulation of being watched to determine the importance of self- and social image to warm-glow giving. We find evidence that suggests that social image concerns do not increase the likelihood that someone will give but they do increase the amount given; average giving is significantly higher in the treatments when feelings of being watched are stimulated. Our results suggest that charities looking to increase their donor bases might effectively do so by focusing on self-image concerns. Charities wishing to increase the amount donated might effectively do so by focusing on the social image concerns of the donor
Subsidizing Unit Donations: Matches, Rebates, and Discounts Compared
An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to âunit donationâ schemes, a popular alternative form of soliciting donations. There, the donorsâ choices are about the number of units of a charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: The three subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregate level, rebates lead to a higher likelihood of giving while matching and discount subsidies lead to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors
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Gender differences in giving and the anticipation regarding giving in dictator games
Research on altruistic behaviour and associated anticipatory beliefs, as well as related gender differences, is limited. Using data from Chowdhury and Jeon, who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to anticipate the amount given in a dictator game, we find that the show-up fee has a positive effect on dictator-giving for both genders. While female dictators are more generous than males, male recipients anticipate higher amounts than the amount male dictators give. As the show-up fee increases, the female dictators become a more generous social type, whereas males do not show this effect. There is no gender difference in anticipation about dictator social type by the recipients
Coupling spectral and resource-use complementarity in experimental grassland and forest communites
Reflectance spectra provide integrative measures of plant phenotypes by capturing chemical, morphological, anatomical and architectural trait information. Here, we investigate the linkages between plant spectral variation, and spectral and resource-use complementarity that contribute to ecosystem productivity. In both a forest and prairie grassland diversity experiment, we delineated n-dimensional hypervolumes using wavelength bands of reflectance spectra to test the association between the spectral space occupied by individual plants and their growth, as well as between the spectral space occupied by plant communities and ecosystem productivity. We show that the spectral space occupied by individuals increased with their growth, and the spectral space occupied by plant communities increased with ecosystem productivity. Furthermore, ecosystem productivity was better explained by inter-individual spectral complementarity than by the large spectral space occupied by productive individuals. Our results indicate that spectral hypervolumes of plants can reflect ecological strategies that shape community composition and ecosystem function, and that spectral complementarity can reveal resource-use complementarity
Bostonia: The Boston University Alumni Magazine. Volume 12
Founded in 1900, Bostonia magazine is Boston Universityâs main alumni publication
Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing
We extend the protection for sale framework by modelling non tariff barriers. Explicitly introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the theoretical Grossman and Helpman (1994) model and its empirical implementation, where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection. Our econometric analysis supports the augmented specification and leads to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model
Tolerance and rebound with zafirlukast in patients with persistent asthma
<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The potential for tolerance to develop to zafirlukast, a cysteinyl leukotriene (CysLT) receptor antagonist (LRA) in persistent asthma, has not been specifically examined.</p> <p>Objective</p> <p>To look for any evidence of tolerance and potential for short-term clinical worsening on LRA withdrawal. Outcome measures included changes in; airway hyperresponsiveness to inhaled methacholine (PD<sub>20</sub>FEV<sub>1</sub>), daily symptoms and peak expiratory flows (PEF), sputum and blood cell profiles, sputum CysLT and prostaglandin (PG)E<sub>2 </sub>and exhaled nitric oxide (eNO) levels.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>A double blind, placebo-controlled study of zafirlukast, 20 mg twice daily over 12 weeks in 21 asthmatics taking β<sub>2</sub>-agonists only (Group I), and 24 subjects treated with ICS (Group II).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>In Group I, zafirlukast significantly improved morning PEF and FEV<sub>1</sub>compared to placebo (p < 0.01), and reduced morning waking with asthma from baseline after two weeks (p < 0.05). Similarly in Group II, FEV<sub>1 </sub>improved compared to placebo (p < 0.05), and there were early within-treatment group improvements in morning PEF, β<sub>2</sub>-agonist use and asthma severity scores (p < 0.05). However, most improvements with zafirlukast in Group I and to a lesser extent in Group II deteriorated toward baseline values over 12 weeks. In both groups, one week following zafirlukast withdrawal there were significant deteriorations in morning and evening PEFs and FEV<sub>1 </sub>compared with placebo (p ⤠0.05) and increased nocturnal awakenings in Group II (p < 0.05). There were no changes in PD<sub>20</sub>FEV<sub>1</sub>, sputum CysLT concentrations or exhaled nitric oxide (eNO) levels. However, blood neutrophils significantly increased in both groups following zafirlukast withdrawal compared to placebo (p = 0.007).</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Tolerance appears to develop to zafirlukast and there is rebound clinical deterioration on drug withdrawal, accompanied by a blood neutrophilia.</p
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