Just a Taste: Lectures on Flavor Physics

We review the flavor structure of the Standard Model and the ways in which the flavor parameters are measured. This is an extended writeup of the TASI 2016 lectures on flavor physics. Earlier versions of these lectures were presented at pre-SUSY 2015 and Cornell University's Physics 7661 course in 2010.Comment: 138 pages, includes problems and solutions. To be published in the proceedings of TASI 201

Holding Fast: The Persistence and Dominance of Gender Stereotypes

This paper investigates the persistence of gender stereotyping in the forecasting of risk attitudes. Subjects predict the gamble choice of target subjects in one of two treatments. First, based only on visual clues and then based on visual clues plus two responses by the target from a risk-preference survey. Second in reverse order: first, based only on the two responses then on the two responses plus visual clues. In isolation the gender stereotype and survey responses both inform predictions about others’ risk attitudes. In conjunction with one another, however, the stereotype persists and dominates the survey response information.Experiment, Gender, Risk, Stereotype

The use of drug calendars for the diagnosis of cutaneous drug eruptions in the age of electronic medical records

A morbilliform drug eruption is the most common condition leading to a dermatology consultation for a patient in the hospital. Timing is an important diagnostic tool since the onset of a skin rash usually takes place within days-to-weeks of the start of the implicated drug. A comprehensive, thorough, and reliable drug history by the clinician is essential. Therefore, to assist in the task of determining the causative medication of a new skin rash in a hospitalized patient, the creation of a drug calendar is recommended. The development of an electronic version of the drug calendar offers several benefits over the manual version. As the use of electronic medical records continues to become the standard in medicine, the electronic drug calendar will serve as an invaluable tool for the diagnosis of drug hypersensitivity

Leadership and Gender: An Experiment

We present an information based model of leadership in a setting that exhibits the familiar problems of free riding and coordination failure. Leaders have superior information about the value of the project in hand and can send a costly signal to their uninformed followers to persuade them to cooperate in the project. Followers voluntarily choose whether or not to follow the better informed leader. We provide experimental evidence that, when the leaders� gender is revealed to their followers, female subjects hesitate to lead (send a costly signal) while followers� behavior does not indicate any gender discrimination. Such behavior is not observed among the male leaders.Leadership, Information, Gender, Free Riding, Coordination Problem

Are Claims Of Transparency All They Are Cracked Up To Be?

The current “buzzword” among leaders is “transparency.” Hardly a day goes by that a group leader (politician, manager, or administrator) doesn’t state that he values transparency and will provide full disclosure of his information and actions. This project tests experimentally whether or not leaders, when given a choice, actually reveal a preference for transparency. Our experiment is based on a theoretical model by Komai, Stegeman, and Hermalin (2007). Fifteen subjects are randomly assigned to five groups of three. Each group separately participates in an investment game with three possible return scenarios (high, average, and low) that are equally likely to happen. Investing in the low-return scenario is not profitable to either individual group members or the whole group. In the average-return scenario, group well-being is maximized if all the group members invest in the project, but full cooperation may not be achieved simply because the dominant strategy of the individuals is to free ride on others. In the high-return scenario full cooperation is also optimal for the group, but subjects may or may not coordinate on full cooperation because they may fail to coordinate their efforts with the others. We consider a leader-follower setting. Only one member of the group (the leader) observes the scenario. The leader moves before the rest of the group members and first decides whether or not to invest in the project. The leader then chooses between two information regimes: revealing his decision and the return scenario to the rest of the group or revealing his decision but not the return scenario. Absent any information provided by their leader, followers know only the possible return scenarios and their likelihoods. They do not know which scenario is assigned to their group. Given the leaders’ information choices and investment decisions, the relevant information will be conveyed to the followers. The followers then will separately and simultaneously decide whether or not to invest in the project (followers do not know anything about the different information regimes). This is realistic in many real-world circumstances because in many business or political environments the leaders have exclusive access to critical information and are in charge of deciding whether or not to reveal the details of their information and actions to their potential followers; in many circumstances it is practically difficult for the followers to verify the real information or the leaders’ actions.Transparency, leading by example, free-riding, cooperation.

Leadership and Gender: An Experiment

We present an information based model of leadership in a setting that exhibits the familiar problems of free riding and coordination failure. Leaders have superior information about the value of the project in hand and can send a costly signal to their uninformed followers to persuade them to cooperate in the project. Followers voluntarily choose whether or not to follow the better informed leader. We provide experimental evidence that, when the leaders’ gender is revealed to their followers, female subjects hesitate to lead (send a costly signal) while followers’ behavior does not indicate any gender discrimination. Such behavior is not observed among the male leaders

Loving the Longshot: Risk Taking with Skewed Gambles

To examine the effect of increased skewness on risk taking, we conduct controlled laboratory experiments. Our instrument is an adaption of the Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) risk measure (with six gamble choices). The Eckel and Grossman measure is a simplest, easy to understand, exercise that gives sufficient heterogeneity in choices while at the same time minimizing errors. Its simplicity also makes it easy to adapt. The adapted gamble choices are designed to have the same expected payoffs and risk as the original gamble choices, but to exhibit increasing degrees of right skewness. The adapted instrument is used to address the question; does skewness encourage greater or less risk taking? Does the possibility of winning a high-earnings, long shot encourage people into greater or less overall risk taking? It also permits us to confirm, in a controlled environment, that people prefer positive skewness

Incentivizing Experiments: Monetary Rewards versus Extra Credits

We use laboratory experiments with different salient rewards (monetary rewards versus extra credits) to study collective decision making behavior under different informational structures. The results show that even though subjects’ behavior follows a similar pattern in both cases, subjects tend to act more efficiently when they are compensated with extra credits rather than money

Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab

In the United States, there is widespread antipathy toward taxation, yet at the same time there are substantial voluntary donations to nonprofit organizations with missions that are parallel to those of many government agencies. In this paper we compare giving in the form of voluntary taxes paid to government agencies with giving in the form of voluntary donations to nonprofit organizations that have similar missions. In a laboratory experimental setting, subjects are given an endowment, and are given the opportunity to donate any part of the endowment to a government agency or to a nonprofit organization. We compare levels of giving to private and government organizations for four different causes (cancer research, disaster relief, education, and parks and wildlife) at three levels of government (federal, state and local). Within a session, subjects make 12 decisions: they complete all six separate decisions for each of two causes, selected randomly from the four listed above. We find that people are not averse to giving to government. On average, they give 22 percent of their budget to government when anonymity is ensured and giving is completely voluntary. However, they do show a preference for nonprofit charities by giving higher amounts for most causes and levels of government. The willingness to give is influenced by the cause and level of the organization, as well as perceptions of the organization