Protections for Juveniles in Self- Incriminating Legal Contexts, Developmentally Considered

My comments use a developmental perspective on adolescents’ capacities as a way to supplement the conclusions of three previous articles in this volume (Tepfer, Nirider and Drizin;1 Frumkin;2 and Heilbrun et al.3) that discuss policies to protect juveniles in legal contexts in which they are asked to make self-incriminating statements. The Tepfer and Frumkin articles provide ample reason for concern about adolescents’ responses to police interrogation. They argue adolescents are at greater risk of making false confessions (as they are more susceptible to police interrogation strategies) and are more likely to waive their rights due to poor understanding or acquiescence. Tepfer and his coauthors point out that we have entered an era of juvenile justice reform that recognizes that “adolescents are different,” a perspective that has received special emphasis by the U.S. Supreme Court in several recent cases.4 Age, the Court says, must be taken into consideration when weighing the validity of a confession.5 Frumkin describes some of the things that mental health examiners can do to assist courts in weighing youths’ capacities and vulnerability—especially their suggestibility—in individual cases that challenge confessions. Both articles refer broadly to differences between adolescents and adults. My comments add some complexities that arise when we go beyond these differences to address diversity among young people across the adolescent age span. This leads me to suggest some refinements in our thinking about the types of protections needed for juveniles in police interrogations

Guidance for Improving Forensic Reports: A Review of Common Errors

This study employed a national sample of forensic reports that had been critiqued by a panel of advanced forensic mental-health practitioners serving as reviewers for the American Board of Forensic Psychology. The study describes all of the discrete types of faults that reviewers encountered in the reports, and then converts them to prescriptive statements to guide forensic report writing. The study also identifies the most frequent report-writing problems in this sample. The results were not intended to describe the quality of forensic reports in the U.S., but rather to offer guidance for improving the quality of forensic reports

Developmental Research and the Child Advocacy Process

This text is excerpted from Grisso, T., & Steinberg, L. (2005). Between a rock and a soft place: Developmental research and the child advocacy process. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 34, 619-627

Impact of Mental Health Screening with the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument (MAYSI-2) in Juvenile Detention

Introduction: Recent evidence suggests that the prevalence of mental health disorders among youth entering juvenile pretrial detention centers is two to three times higher than youths in the general population (Teplin, Abram, McClelland, Dulcan & Mericle, 2002). Within the past five years, mental health screening upon entry to a juvenile justice facility has become standard practice across the nation. We know more about the validity and reliability of mental health screening tools used in this context than we do about the factors that facilitate their implementation. If tools are not implemented properly, their adequate validity is virtually lost. Effective screening procedures require attention to how screening instruments are put into place and how they actually function within juvenile justice facilities. Introduced in 2000, the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument—Second Version (MAYSI-2; Grisso & Barnum, 2006) is now the most widely used mental health screening tool in juvenile justice secure facilities in the United States

Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy

In 2003, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the murder conviction and life sentence imposed on Lionel Tate, who was twelve years old when he killed his six-year-old neighbor. Since Lionel was reported to be the youngest person in modern times to be sent to prison for life, the case had generated considerable debate, and the decision was appealed on several grounds. What persuaded the appellate court that the conviction could not stand, however, was the trial court\u27s rejection of a petition by Lionel\u27s attorney for an evaluation of his client\u27s competence to assist counsel and to make a decision about the state\u27s plea offer. This case highlights an issue that has hovered almost unnoticed in the background of the recent punitive juvenile justice reforms that have resulted in criminal prosecutions of young teens and. adult-like sentences in juvenile court. This legal trend has been the subject of intense political and academic debates, focusing on whether the reforms fulfill the criminal law goals of public protection, individual accountability, and proportionate punishment – and generally, whether imposing harsh punishment on young offenders ultimately serves the public interest. By comparison, whether youths who face serious legal jeopardy have the developmental capacities to function adequately as criminal defendants has received little attention. And yet, even a cursory examination of constitutional doctrine in this area and its application to the recent reforms make clear that this issue cannot be ignored. It is well established in American law that a defendant cannot be subject to criminal adjudication if he is incompetent to stand trial because he is unable to understand the charges against him or the nature of the proceedings, or to assist his attorney in his defense. The Supreme Court has emphasized that these requirements are essential for fundamental fairness and are mandated by the Due Process Clause because they protect the accuracy and integrity of criminal proceedings. The conventional standard by which competence is evaluated focuses on adults\u27 cognitive deficiencies caused by mental illness or mental retardation. Beginning in the 1970s, courts and legislatures have extended this protection to mentally impaired youths adjudicated in juvenile proceedings. However, few lawmakers have addressed the impact of developmental immaturity on competence

Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy

In 2003, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the murder conviction and life sentence imposed on Lionel Tate, who was twelve years old when he killed his six-year-old neighbor. Since Lionel was reported to be the youngest person in modern times to be sent to prison for life, the case had generated considerable debate, and the decision was appealed on several grounds. What persuaded the appellate court that the conviction could not stand, however, was the trial court\u27s rejection of a petition by Lionel\u27s attorney for an evaluation of his client\u27s competence to assist counsel and to make a decision about the state\u27s plea offer. This case highlights an issue that has hovered almost unnoticed in the background of the recent punitive juvenile justice reforms that have resulted in criminal prosecutions of young teens and. adult-like sentences in juvenile court. This legal trend has been the subject of intense political and academic debates, focusing on whether the reforms fulfill the criminal law goals of public protection, individual accountability, and proportionate punishment – and generally, whether imposing harsh punishment on young offenders ultimately serves the public interest. By comparison, whether youths who face serious legal jeopardy have the developmental capacities to function adequately as criminal defendants has received little attention. And yet, even a cursory examination of constitutional doctrine in this area and its application to the recent reforms make clear that this issue cannot be ignored. It is well established in American law that a defendant cannot be subject to criminal adjudication if he is incompetent to stand trial because he is unable to understand the charges against him or the nature of the proceedings, or to assist his attorney in his defense. The Supreme Court has emphasized that these requirements are essential for fundamental fairness and are mandated by the Due Process Clause because they protect the accuracy and integrity of criminal proceedings. The conventional standard by which competence is evaluated focuses on adults\u27 cognitive deficiencies caused by mental illness or mental retardation. Beginning in the 1970s, courts and legislatures have extended this protection to mentally impaired youths adjudicated in juvenile proceedings. However, few lawmakers have addressed the impact of developmental immaturity on competence