The Negligence Issue

It would be futile for the law to attempt to deal in detail byway of precise anticipatory rule with each of the infinite numberof cases which can be classified as negligence cases., Thenumber of such situations in which the quality of conduct can bemeasured by standards stated in terms *of conduct is relativelysmall. The torrents of pertinent factors incident to any wholesaleattempt along this line are beyond classification and statement. The qualities of personality are themselves numerous;their shadings are countless; the conduct of individuals is incalculableat present in its variety; the possible combinations ofthese are literally infinite, as infinite as space and time. Thenumber of instances of conduct which could be labelled eitheras negligent or non-negligent is beyond the limits of any catalog the law can make. So it is not surprising that in the face of infinitythe law does exactly what other sciences do in like situations.It adopts a formula; a formula in terms which will permitits problems to be reduced to a graspable size. This formula,like many other formulas, tends quickly to become ritual andit would seem that it is only this ritual which holds the law\u27sinterest. This much it insists upon rigorously, but this is asfar as the law\u27s science goes in this direction

The Regenerative Process in Law

Addison C. Harris Lecture Serie

No-Fault: A Perspective

At the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, December 27, 1974, the Torts Section sponsored a panel discussion of Professor Jeffrey O\u27Connell\u27s proposal that no-fault insurance be expanded beyond the field of automobile accidents. The proposal, as presented in O\u27Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973), advocates enterprise liability for any entity or person that systematically creates risks of personal injury. It would be no-fault liability, blind to the fault of either party, and paid by the enterprise\u27s insurer or by the enterprise as a self-insurer. Payments would be limited to out-of-pocket losses not compensated from collateral sources, and no recovery would be allowed for pain and suffering. The plaintiff would have the option of asserting his claim either under regular tort liability or under enterprise liability, unless the defendant elects in advance to be covered exclusively by enterprise liability. Enterprise liability would not apply to injuries intentionally caused by the enterprise or intentionally inflicted by the victim upon himself. The following is Professor Green\u27s response to the O\u27Connell proposal. These remarks were delivered in acknowledgement of the William Lloyd Prosser Award for outstanding contribution to the development of the law of torts presented to Professor Green at the meeting

The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II

In the part of this paper published in an earlier number of the REVIEW, I sought to develop the idea that legal duties are determinedby factors outside any legal theory which has yet crystallized. Thesefactors were designated: (1) The administrative factor; (2) the moralor ethical factor; (3) the economic factor; (4) the prophylactic factor;(5) the justice factor. The first was briefly discussed. Spacelimitations require that the others be dealt with in gross rather thansingly, and in view of this I hastily point the direction taken by eachof them

Causal Relation in Legal Liability

The composition of a case in tort is more complex than hasbeen generally supposed. The assumption by courts and legalwriters that a tort is made up only of the elements of wrongdoing,causal connection and damage has led to no end of confusionin the development of this branch of the law. While thecausal relation and damage elements are acceptable and usableterms, the so-called wrongdoing element is too comprehensive,and tends to obscure the real process to which a supposedly tortcase must be subjected before responsibility can be determined.The stubborn unity of a tort case demands a more searchinganalysis than this term affords, and as desirable as simplicitymay be, it is disastrous to clear thinking and the law\u27s developmentto crowd too many concepts into an expansible catchword

No-Fault: A Perspective

At the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, December 27, 1974, the Torts Section sponsored a panel discussion of Professor Jeffrey O\u27Connell\u27s proposal that no-fault insurance be expanded beyond the field of automobile accidents. The proposal, as presented in O\u27Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973), advocates enterprise liability for any entity or person that systematically creates risks of personal injury. It would be no-fault liability, blind to the fault of either party, and paid by the enterprise\u27s insurer or by the enterprise as a self-insurer. Payments would be limited to out-of-pocket losses not compensated from collateral sources, and no recovery would be allowed for pain and suffering. The plaintiff would have the option of asserting his claim either under regular tort liability or under enterprise liability, unless the defendant elects in advance to be covered exclusively by enterprise liability. Enterprise liability would not apply to injuries intentionally caused by the enterprise or intentionally inflicted by the victim upon himself. The following is Professor Green\u27s response to the O\u27Connell proposal. These remarks were delivered in acknowledgement of the William Lloyd Prosser Award for outstanding contribution to the development of the law of torts presented to Professor Green at the meeting