Matching frictions and the divide of schooling investment between general and specific skills

This paper examines the impact of labor market frictions and institutions on the divide of schooling investment between general and specific skills. We offer a simple matching model of unemployment in which individuals determine the scope and intensity of their skills. In partial equilibrium, we show that the severity of market frictions distorts the schooling allocation towards more general skills. Then, we endogenize job creation and argue that changes in labor market institutions may well originate a non-monotonous relationship between unemployment and the divide of skills between specific and general human capital. We also investigate more carefully the impacts of unemployment compensation, minimum wage and firing costs. We suggest that unemployment compensation has an ambiguous impact on the skill divide, while minimum wage and firing costs are detrimental to general skill acquisition.Matching frictions; education; general and specific skills; labour market institutions

Réduction de la durée du travail, chômage et croissance

Cet article présente une analyse des conséquences d’une réduction du temps de travail sur le chômage et la croissance dans un modèle à générations imbriquées avec salaire négocié, accumulation du capital et entrée d’entreprises. À l’équilibre partiel, une diminution de la durée du travail peut être favorable pour l’emploi. Par contre, à l’équilibre général, la réduction de la durée du travail entraîne une diminution du nombre d’entreprises qui induit une hausse du taux de chômage. En outre, il existe une durée du travail « optimale », fonction décroissante du degré de monopole sur le marché des biens, qui maximise le taux de croissance.In this paper, we analyse the consequences of reducing working time on unemployment and growth in an overlapping generations model with negotiated wages, capital accumulation and firms creation. A partial equilibrium analysis shows that a lower working time can raise employment. However, a general equilibrium analysis implies a very different result: a lower working time, by decreasing the number of firms, induces an increase in the unemployment rate. Moreover, there is an "optimal" working time, which maximizes the growth rate. This optimal working time increases with the firms' monopoly power on the goods market

A microfoundation for adaptability returns to schooling and technological complexity

In a frictional environment, technological complexity creates adaptability returns to schooling. This paper provides microfoundations to such an argument, and revisits the impacts of worker heterogeneity and risk aversion. In our model, firms and workers are located on a knowledge space. Education widens the measure of the knowledge subset that the worker embodies, while technological complexity expands the measure of the knowledge subset that is required to operate on the job. We find uncertainty with regard to the type of the future partner motivates schooling, while it inhibits technological complexity. When workers differ in scholastic ability, the welfare of a given group increases with the proportion of workers of this group. Finally, risk aversion motivates a precautionary demand for education, which in turn creates income risk through firms' technological choices.Education; Multi-dimensional skills; Frictions; Heterogeneity; Risk aversion

Réduction de la durée du travail, chômage et croissance

In this paper, we analyse the consequences of reducing working time on unemployment and growth in an overlapping generations model with negotiated wages, capital accumulation and firms creation. A partial equilibrium analysis shows that a lower working time can raise employment. However, a general equilibrium analysis implies a very different result: a lower working time, by decreasing the number of firms, induces an increase in the unemployment rate. Moreover, there is an "optimal" working time, which maximizes the growth rate. This optimal working time increases with the firms' monopoly power on the goods market. Cet article présente une analyse des conséquences d’une réduction du temps de travail sur le chômage et la croissance dans un modèle à générations imbriquées avec salaire négocié, accumulation du capital et entrée d’entreprises. À l’équilibre partiel, une diminution de la durée du travail peut être favorable pour l’emploi. Par contre, à l’équilibre général, la réduction de la durée du travail entraîne une diminution du nombre d’entreprises qui induit une hausse du taux de chômage. En outre, il existe une durée du travail « optimale », fonction décroissante du degré de monopole sur le marché des biens, qui maximise le taux de croissance.