Simple Stabilized Radio-Frequency Transfer with Optical Phase Actuation

We describe and experimentally evaluate a stabilized radio-frequency transfer technique that employs optical phase sensing and optical phase actuation. This technique can be achieved by modifying existing stabilized optical frequency equipment and also exhibits advantages over previous stabilized radio-frequency transfer techniques in terms of size and complexity. We demonstrate the stabilized transfer of a 160 MHz signal over an 166 km fiber optical link, achieving an Allan deviation of 9.7x10^-12 Hz/Hz at 1 s of integration, and 3.9x10^-1414 Hz/Hz at 1000 s. This technique is being considered for application to the Square Kilometre Array SKA1-low radio telescope.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures, submitted to Optics Letter

High-precision optical-frequency dissemination on branching optical-fiber networks

We present a technique for the simultaneous dissemination of high-precision optical-frequency signals to multiple independent remote sites on a branching optical-fiber network. The technique corrects optical-fiber length fluctuations at the output of the link, rather than at the input as is conventional. As the transmitted optical signal remains unaltered until it reaches the remote site, it can be transmitted simultaneously to multiple remote sites on an arbitrarily complex branching network. This technique maintains the same servo-loop bandwidth limit as in conventional techniques and is compatible with active telecommunication links.Sascha W. Schediwy, David Gozzard, Kenneth G. H. Baldwin, Brian J. Orr, R. Bruce Warrington, Guido Aben and Andre N. Luite

RA-MAP, molecular immunological landscapes in early rheumatoid arthritis and healthy vaccine recipients

Rheumatoid arthritis (RA) is a chronic inflammatory disorder with poorly defined aetiology characterised by synovial inflammation with variable disease severity and drug responsiveness. To investigate the peripheral blood immune cell landscape of early, drug naive RA, we performed comprehensive clinical and molecular profiling of 267 RA patients and 52 healthy vaccine recipients for up to 18 months to establish a high quality sample biobank including plasma, serum, peripheral blood cells, urine, genomic DNA, RNA from whole blood, lymphocyte and monocyte subsets. We have performed extensive multi-omic immune phenotyping, including genomic, metabolomic, proteomic, transcriptomic and autoantibody profiling. We anticipate that these detailed clinical and molecular data will serve as a fundamental resource offering insights into immune-mediated disease pathogenesis, progression and therapeutic response, ultimately contributing to the development and application of targeted therapies for RA.</p

Vulnerability of Satellite Quantum Key Distribution to Disruption from Ground-Based Lasers

Satellite-mediated quantum key distribution (QKD) is set to become a critical technology for quantum-secure communication over long distances. While satellite QKD cannot be effectively eavesdropped, we show it can be disrupted (or &lsquo;jammed&rsquo;) with relatively simple and readily available equipment. We developed an atmospheric attenuation and satellite optical scattering model to estimate the rate of excess noise photons that can be injected into a satellite QKD channel by an off-axis laser, and calculated the effect this added noise has on the quantum bit error rate. We show that a ground-based laser on the order of 1 kW can significantly disrupt modern satellite QKD systems due to photons scattering off the satellite being detected by the QKD receiver on the ground. This class of laser can be purchased commercially, meaning such a method of disruption could be a serious threat to effectively securing high-value communications via satellite QKD in the future. We also discuss these results in relation to likely future developments in satellite-mediated QKD systems, and countermeasures that can be taken against this, and related methods, of disruption

Vulnerability of Satellite Quantum Key Distribution to Disruption from Ground-Based Lasers

Satellite-mediated quantum key distribution (QKD) is set to become a critical technology for quantum-secure communication over long distances. While satellite QKD cannot be effectively eavesdropped, we show it can be disrupted (or ‘jammed’) with relatively simple and readily available equipment. We developed an atmospheric attenuation and satellite optical scattering model to estimate the rate of excess noise photons that can be injected into a satellite QKD channel by an off-axis laser, and calculated the effect this added noise has on the quantum bit error rate. We show that a ground-based laser on the order of 1 kW can significantly disrupt modern satellite QKD systems due to photons scattering off the satellite being detected by the QKD receiver on the ground. This class of laser can be purchased commercially, meaning such a method of disruption could be a serious threat to effectively securing high-value communications via satellite QKD in the future. We also discuss these results in relation to likely future developments in satellite-mediated QKD systems, and countermeasures that can be taken against this, and related methods, of disruption