Inequality in researchers’ minds: Four guiding questions for studying subjective perceptions of economic inequality

This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this recordSubjective perceptions of inequality can substantially influence policy attitudes, public health metrics, and societal well-being, but the lack of consensus in the scientific community on how to best operationalize and measure these perceptions may impede progress on the topic. Here, we provide a theoretical framework for the study of subjective perceptions of inequality, which brings critical differences to light. This framework—which we conceptualize as a series of four guiding questions for studying subjective perceptions of economic inequality—serves as a blueprint for the theoretical and empirical decisions researchers need to address in the study of when, how, and why subjective perceptions of inequality are consequential for individuals, groups, and societies. To lay the foundation for a comprehensive approach to the topic, we offer four theoretical and empirical decisions in studying subjective perceptions of inequality, urging researchers to specify: (1) What kind of inequality? (2) What level of analysis? (3) What part of the distribution? and (4) What comparison group? We subsequently discuss how this framework can be used to organize existing research and highlight its utility in guiding future research across the social sciences in both the theory and measurement of subjective perceptions of inequality.Tobin FoundationInternational Association for Research in Economic Psychology (IAREP)Department of Economics, University of Exeter Business Schoo

More Onerous Work Deserves Higher Pay

When asked whether some people deserve more income than others, Milton Friedman responded: “I don’t think desert has anything to do with it. Desert is an impossible thing to decide. Who deserves what? Nobody deserves anything. Thank god we don’t get what we deserve!” To defend his skepticism about desert, Friedman points out that how hard people work, and how large of a productive contribution they make, is ultimately a matter of luck. We argue that Friedman’s luck challenge to desert can be resisted. In particular, it seems to us that one particular conception of desert can plausibly justify unequal pay: compensatory desert. Salaries should compensate workers for the relative reduction of welfare opportunities compared to other types of work that exist in society