The Management of High Seas Fisheries

A new and acute management problem, now the focus of a major U.N. conference, has arisen in recent years in international fisheries. The problem concerns the management of transboundary fishery resources, in the form of resources to be found in both the coastal state EEZ and the adjacent high seas. The resources are commonly referred to as "straddling" stocks. This article provides a preliminary exploration of the management issue. It reviews the historical and legal background and asks how far the now well developed economic analysis of the management of transboundary fishery resources in the form of resources "shared" by two or more coastal states will take us in examining this second and more recent transboundary fishery management problem. The answer is a very limited distance only. The article concludes by pointing to questions arising from this resource management issue demanding further research.Transboundary fishery resources, straddling stocks, theory of dynamic games, Environmental Economics and Policy, Public Economics,

CLIMATE AND COOPERATION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SHARED FISH STOCKS

Climate regime shifts occur at irregular intervals and have profound and persistent impacts on ocean temperature and circulation patterns and on the dynamics of marine fish populations. Despite a growing scientific literature and some attention to the implications of such regime shifts for domestic fisheries, the issue has received little attention in the context of international fishery management. This paper presents evidence for the significance of climatic regime shifts, and draws upon the recent history of conflict between Canada and the United States over Pacific salmon management to illustrate the dangers that unpredicted, unanticipated environmental regime shifts pose for efforts to maintain international cooperation. This suggests a need for greater attention to this issue. Fishery agreements can be made more resilient to the impacts of such environmental changes by explicitly building in flexibility — for example, by allowing the use of side payments. In addition, pre-agreements on procedures to be followed in the event of sustained changes in fish stock productivity or migration patterns, and cooperation on developing common scientific understandings, can help to prevent destructive conflicts. Finally, the literature employing game theoretic shared-fishery models could be further developed to focus on providing practical guidance for maintaining cooperation in the presence of unpredictable and persistent environmental changes.climate regimes, shared fisheries, potential conflicts, uncertainty, Q21, Q22, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Irreversible Investment and Optimal Fisheries Management: A Stochastic Analysis

In recent years, attention has been devoted to fishery management problems that arise because capital embodied in fishing fleets is often nonmalleable. having few if any alternative uses. This problem of irreversible investment was analyzed by Clark et al. (1979), using a deterministic model. In reality, however, most investment decisions must be made within an uncertain environment. This paper describes recent efforts to account for uncertainty in analyzing the problem of optimal fishery investment, where the uncertainty is caused by stochastic variability in the resource stock from year to year.Environmental Economics and Policy, International Development, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty,

Coastal States and Distant-water Fishing Nation Relations: An Economist's Perspective

The widespread implementation of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ) has confronted coastal states with several resource management problems. One of these consists of the economic relations, if any, that the coastal state should establish with distant-water fishing nations (DWFN's) seeking access to the coastal state's 200-mile zone. Several of the other papers presented here deal with specific aspects of the issue. This paper, on the other hand, will concern itself with the question of the analytical framework to be used by economists in studying this issue. It will offer some suggestions with respect to possible components of the framework. In doing so, the paper will restrict itself to the coastal state's perspective of EFJ and the management issues arising therefrom. It goes without saying, of course, that an enlightened coastal state will attempt to acquaint itself with the DWFN view of the world

Climate, Competition and The Management of Shared Fish Stocks

Long-term climate regime shifts have profound and persistent impacts on ocean temperature and circulation patterns, and on the dynamics of marine fish populations -- affecting abundance, growth and migratory behavior. Such shifts are a particularly important source of uncertainty for marine fisheries. Here, we argue that climate regime shifts can disrupt otherwise satisfactory international fishery management agreements. Game theory provides a powerful analytic perspective on the difficulty of maintaining effective, cooperative management of shared fishery resources in the face of such natural environmental changes. This paper draws upon two case studies of shared fishery management -- Pacific salmon and Norwegian spring-spawning herring -- to demonstrate that a climate regime shift can alter the distribution and productivity of fish stocks in ways that change the comparative advantages of the competing fleets. When that happens, the optimal cooperative solution to the fishery game will change. If the fishery agreement in place is not sufficiently flexible to adjust to the changed opportunities and incentives, it will likely break down. Fishery agreements can be made more resilient to such environmental changes by explicitly building in flexibility - for example, by allowing the use of side payments. In addition, pre-agreements on procedures to be followed in the event of sustained changes in fish stock productivity or migration patterns, and cooperation on developing common scientific understandings can help to prevent destructive conflicts.Keywords: Fisheries Economics, uncertainty, International: Cooperation in Fisheries and Aquaculture, shared fisheries, climate regimes, potential conflict

Candida albicans Hypha Formation and Mannan Masking of β-Glucan Inhibit Macrophage Phagosome Maturation

Received 28 August 2014 Accepted 28 October 2014 Published 2 December 2014 This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Janet Willment, Aberdeen Fungal Group, University of Aberdeen, for kindly providing the soluble Dectin-1-Fc reporter. All microscopy was performed with the assistance of the University of Aberdeen Core Microscopy & Histology Facility, and we thank the IFCC for their assistance with flow cytometry. We thank the Wellcome Trust for funding (080088, 086827, 075470, 099215, 097377, and 101873). E.R.B. and A.J.P.B. are funded by the European Research Council (ERC-2009-AdG-249793), and J.L. is funded by a Medical Research Council Clinical Training Fellowship.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Recognition and blocking of innate immunity cells by Candida albicans chitin

Peer reviewedPublisher PD