Concert or Cacophony? In Search of a New International Order. Report on the Trilateral Practitioners Workshop “Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System”, Berlin, July 7-8, 2011

The global order has been in flux since the end of the Cold War. Two fundamental trends are reshaping the international system: Power shifts at the global level are creating a more diverse international order, in which emerging and resurgent players pursue and assert their own interests. While it is not clear whether Western economic, political, and cultural dominance is coming to an end, there is no mistaking the world’s growing pluralism. At the same time, the emerging international concert – or cacophony – is characterized by deepening interdependence. All major (and minor) powers are facing challenges of economic growth, energy security, and environmental sustainability, all of which are intimately interconnected and which no nation can successfully confront on its own. Moreover, the pace at which change is occurring is accelerating, requiring decision makers to move faster at the very time that problems are becoming more complex. This creates a fundamental dilemma as managing this interdependence through multilateral cooperation demands enlightened self-interest when established means of interaction are being undermined. Thus, the interaction of shifting power and increasing interdependence is transforming global politics, pushing it towards an unprecedented configuration of international relations

Unlocking the Japan-ROK Relationship: the Key is National Identity

In 2015 the Japan-ROK relationship seems at near rock-bottom. This presents fundamental challenges to the US rebalance strategy and threatens to undermine the security and stability US allies rely on. This new COG paper by two of America's leading Asia scholars is drawn from their newly released book on the relationship. The authors offer policy insights and suggestions for how all regional partners of the ROK and Japan can help mend this vital relationship

A Conference Report from the US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue

Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMDDefense Threat Reduction Agency, under Grant/Agreement No. N00244-15-1-0027 awarded by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Dieg

Building Toward Trilateral Cooperation on Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia: the First US-ROK-Japan Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue

This publication results from research supported by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) via Assistance Grant/Agreement No. N00244-13-1-0023 awarded by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUPFLC San Diego)

"The Lynchpin" Grapples with Frustration and Distrust / The Fourth US-ROK Strategic Dialogue, February 2012

PASCC Report Number 2012 006, Pacific Forum CSISThe Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), hosted the fourth US-ROK Strategic Dialogue in Maui, Feb. 9-10, 2012

Peak Japan and its implications for regional security

Examines Japanese security policy under Abe, identifies the constants and constraints that frame that policy, and attempts to project where Japan will go in the near-term future. Executive Summary Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is determined to restore the shine to Japan and ensure that it remains a ‘first-tier’ country. Central to that objective are aggressive diplomacy and a forward-leaning security policy and posture. The first three years of his second administration have been marked by a series of initiatives to that end: the creation of a National Security Council, the production of a National Security Strategy, a state secrecy law, changes to arms exports and overseas development assistance policies, new National Defense Program Guidelines, a new Mid-Term Defense Plan, and new US–Japan Defense Guidelines. While all these programs are valuable and welcome, Japanese security policy is rightfully characterised more as continuity than as change. The Abe government has dramatically accelerated Japan’s adaptation to the evolution in security challenges, but those efforts are still an adaptation and an evolutionary process. Worryingly, even those successes are likely to prove temporary—and his overarching goal of Japanese renewal will remain out of reach—if his Abenomics economic program doesn’t succeed. Two problems in particular threaten Abe’s objectives. First, there are structural problems in the Japanese economy, its demographic trajectory in particular. The second is the increasingly inward focus of the Japanese public. Two ‘lost decades’ have downsized Japanese horizons: there’s not only a diminishing inclination to compete with China but a reluctance to embrace the ambition that characterised two generations of postwar Japanese. It’s doubtful whether most Japanese share their government’s ambitions and whether they are prepared to make the adjustments and sacrifices necessary to achieve and maintain that status. The Abe administration could well be ‘Peak Japan’. While the ultimate responsibility for the success of Abe’s agenda rests on the shoulders of his government and the public, Japan’s partners must try to counter the tendency among Japanese to step back or disengage. Tokyo must be drawn out, given a stake in regional outcomes and pushed to play as prominent a security role as possible. This necessitates the striking of a balance between the push for contributions and accepting (or at least acknowledging) the inclination to focus inwards. One important way to accomplish this objective is to conceptualise security broadly and to identify ways for Japan to contribute that don’t focus on purely military means. Japan has championed comprehensive security for over three decades; this should provide a framework for efforts that are congenial to Japanese resources, capabilities and thinking. Calibrating this tension is difficult but essential. Japan must be pushed to do more even while its partners remain conscious of the domestic circumstances that create resistance to such initiatives. Australia can play a key role in this effort. Canberra has emerged as Tokyo’s preferred security partner (after the US). The two governments have overcome a bitter and difficult history to forge a ‘special strategic partnership’ that reflects shared values and interests and includes an expanding institutional infrastructure with regular meetings of the two top leaderships, an array of security instruments and coordination with their alliance partner, the US.Australia should continue to press Japan to work with it across a spectrum of security and foreign policy issues. There should be diplomatic coordination bilaterally and in regional and international forums; of special importance is outreach to third parties throughout East Asia to press for respect for the rule of law, human dignity and the peaceful resolution of disputes. They should be planning, along with the US, for various regional contingencies. The two militaries should be expanding their cooperation, including joint exercises

Key issues in Asia Pacific security : Senior Policy Seminar 2001

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/Participants considered a wide variety of issues affecting a region that possesses a diversity of cultural, political, and economic traditions, that is being battered by an array of forces, and that is struggling with fundamental transitions. Geographically, the discussion spanned the entire region, from the seeming stalemate in dialogue between North and South Korea to the hope that there may at last be some solution to Indonesia's woes. There were debates over the guiding principles of international order as well as scrutiny of the problem of localized conflicts and the role of multilateral institutions. Major themes that emerged from the discussions include: U.S. power is preponderant in both the Asia Pacific region and the world and is likely to continue to be so in the short- and medium-term. There are questions about how the United States will exercise this power and to what ends. Paradoxically, despite the overwhelming disparity between its power and that of any other nation, the United States' ability to influence outcomes appears to be diminishing. Washington's willingness to accept the limits of its influence will be a key factor in its relations with Asia Pacific governments. Globalization continues to erode the power of governments within the region as external forces play an increasing role in national decision making. The future success of regional governments will depend on their ability to take advantage of the opportunities created by globalization rather than be exploited by it. Similarly, governments need to be prepared to accommodate the new political pressures from below that are created by globalization. China's emergence as a regional power poses a daunting challenge for the Asia Pacific order. Chinese participants maintained that their country is often misunderstood. Playing up a Chinese military threat is mistaken, they argued, because China's focus over the short- and medium-term will continue to be its own development and modernization. Nonetheless, China's rise will continue to strain the existing structure of relations within the region. While the odds of military conflict between states are low, conflict within states is rising. The region faces a wide spectrum of threats. Security planning must adjust accordingly. There is no alternative to international cooperation and coordination. Many of the new security challenges are transnational in origin and nature, and no nation can combat them alone. The Asia Pacific region's diversity requires that it develop its own security architecture; it cannot import solutions, such as an Asia Pacific NATO. Any successful mechanism will respect that diversity and the distinctively Asian way of resolving disputes that has emerged. A geographic survey revealed little immediate prospect of an outbreak of hostilities in the region, but there are still grounds for concern over time. A substantial portion of the Seminar discussions was devoted to the gap between hopes for institutions in the region and their performance. The consensus view was that expectations should be scaled back. It is still early in the regime-creation process in the Asia Pacific region. Pacific Islands issues were raised at several points during the discussions, both because some of the islands share many of the problems of political fragmentation and instability as in Southeast Asia and because they appear to be uniquely vulnerable to a variety of global challenges ranging from global warming to money laundering. The islands' problems are compounded by the fact that the island countries have little voice in regional, much less global, affairs. Another issue that has dogged the region is the question of the balance between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. For ASEAN, the dilemma is especially acute due to the importance attached to the doctrine of noninterference in the affairs of member states that has guided the organization since it was formed. Seminar discussions noted movement away from absolute sovereignty and the principle of complete noninterference, but here, too, practitioners stressed the need for patience. Regional governments must be allowed to move forward at a pace with which they are comfortable. Participants stressed the importance of a multilayered security architecture for the region, compensating for the failure of regional institutions to meet the high expectations invested in them. The network of bilateral security alliances centered on the United States still undergirds regional security, and a continued U.S. presence is generally considered to be an essential element of Asia Pacific security and stability. Several participants pointed out that one of the real changes over the past decade has been the elimination of doubts about the U.S. commitment to the Asia Pacific region, although somewhat paradoxically some questions are now being raised about the continuing need for a forward-deployed U.S. military presence

Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh China-US Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics and The Inaugural China-US Dialogue on Space Security

from Issues and Insights, vol. 13:

Trilateral Cooperation to Strengthen Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia

Performer: Pacific Forum CSIS Project Leads: Brad Glosserman Project Cost: $207,000 FY15-16Objective: Building on the results of previous trilateral meetings among the U.S., Japan, and Republic of Korea (ROK), this initiative will continue to explore each country’s specific questions about the U.S. extended deterrent in a changing regional security environment. This strategic dialogue will investigate opportunities and obstacles to U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation that could enhance or hamper extended deterrence among the U.S. and its two allies in Northeast Asia. This initiative will explore ways the three countries could work together to secure their national interests and reinforce the U.S. extended deterrent. The dialogue will build upon existing multilateral engagements to improve U.S. understanding about current thinking in Japan and Korea on topics such as the global disarmament movement, U.S.-Russian arms control measures, the U.S. nuclear weapons posture, China’s nuclear modernization efforts, and the growing threat of proliferation from North Korea.PASC