Germany’s Power and the Weakening of States in a Globalized World: Deconstructing a Paradox

It is somewhat ironical to ponder Germany’s power at a time when radical changesdue to globalisation vastly limit the efficiency of state actions worldwide. Certainly,Germany’s resources increased with reunification – though the country has to bear the costsof reunification. An enumeration of the – possible – resources of German power provides ushowever with little understanding of the nature of German power, embedded as the country isin a European system from which it derives its strength. Hence only an analysis of this systemfully renders the picture, contrarily to what neo-realists and liberals might assume. WhileGermany did exercise a semi-hegemony over Western Europe in the monetary area up toEMU, the further integration of the EC has altered the European structure and diffusedGermany’s power. I will argue here that only a particular configuration allowed Germany todevise one-sidedly the rules of EMU, which is absent from other schemes, such as defense,enlargement etc. This does not mean that power is absent from Germany’s tool box : politicalcredit in particular is abundant. Yet in a larger Europe, where coalitions are more issueoriented,hence volatile than formerly, Germany’s power will turn out to be more limited thanits demands for recognition may lead us to believe.Germany; power analysis

Ambitions et frilosités allemandes

Si la réunification de l’Allemagne suscita l’enthousiasme de l’opinion française en particulier, les élites, les générations plus âgées notamment, ne cachèrent pas leur crainte de voir une Allemagne réunifiée, avec Berlin pour capitale, se recentrer au cœur de l’Europe et nourrir des rêves de puissance. Les Cassandre évoquèrent le poids économique et démographique de l’Allemagne réunifiée. Le mot même de réunification, employé partout sauf en Allemagne, réveillait des échos bismarckiens. En Allemagne pourtant, on parla d’unification – précisément pour se démarquer du passé. Quel est le bilan de la réunification, vingt ans après ? Y a-t-il encore deux Allemagne ou l'unification est-elle une réussite ? Et surtout quelle est cette Allemagne réunifiée ? Plus nationale ? Moins européenne ? Exportatrice aux dépens de ses partenaires ? Sommaire : - Ambitions et frilosité allemandes. Anne-Marie Le Gloannec - Vingt ans après la chute du mur, existe-t-il une ou deux Allemagne ? Boris Grésillon - Le régime allemand de croissance tirée par l’exportation : vers une remise en cause durable ? Rémi Lallement - L’Allemagne et l’Europe. Remarques sur la décision de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale relative au traité de Lisbonne. Marie-Laure Basilien-GaincheGermany : Ambitions and Self-Restraint - The reunification of Germany was greeted with enthusiasm by the French public. However, the elite, in particular the older generation, did not hide their concern that a unified Germany with her capital in Berlin would seek to become the heart of Europe and would nourish dreams of power. The Cassandras noted the economic and demographic weight of a reunified Germany. The very word "reunification", used everywhere except in Germany, brought back memories of the Bismarck era. The Germans themselves preferred to use the term "unification", precisely to break free from the past. Twenty years on, how do we assess the German reunification ? Are there still two Germanys or has unification been achieved ? And, most importantly, what are the characteristics of this unified Germany ? Isit more nationalistic ? Less European ? Is it becoming a major exporter at the expense of its European partners

La République fédérale d'Allemagne et l'industrialisation du Tiers monde : discours et politique

-La politique allemande vis-à-vis de l'industrialisation du Tiers monde s'inscrit entre deux pôles, apparemment antagonistes mais néanmoins complémentaires: d'un côté, l'absence de liens historiques avec le Tiers monde explique un certain désintérêt alors que, de l'autre, la République fédérale affiche un parti pris internationaliste. D'où peut-être une approche des relations avec le Sud à la fois plus internationale et plus «économiciste», moins géographiquement sélective et moins historique que celle de la France : l'Allemagne doit se placer en position de force dans la division internationale qui se dessine entre pays industrialisés et pays moins développés. Il existe toutefois des réticences et des résistances, matérielles et psychologiques, économiques et sociales qui menacent le succès de cette stratégie allemand

EU Global Strategy. Expert Opinion

At the turn of the millennium, the European Union deluded itself with a false sense of security. It had sought to build a ring of friends that were supposed to become prosperous and more democratic, and to filter migrants coming to Europe. By doing so, Europeans made a twin mistake: they believed that their neighbours would emulate their example, and they outsourced their migration and border policies. This, in turn, had two consequences

Holding the borders, holding the centre: the EU and the refugee crisis

What has come to be called the ‘refugee crisis’ is the latest in a series of crises bedevilling the European Union – the four-fold monetary, budgetary, economic and financial ‘Euro-crisis’; a geopolitical security challenge posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war in Syria and incursions into NATO airspace, and a looming Brexit, combined with the possible fragmentation of old EU member states like the United Kingdom and Spain. The ‘refugee crisis’ is the most serious of all. It encapsulates the EU’s failings and failures that other crises laid bare: the lack of long-term prevision and strategy, an overburdened decision-making system, and an outmoded conception of sovereignty. It goes to the very heart of the EU, for three reasons: Firstly, the cleavages it creates between member states add to those that have been dividing the EU since the early days of the Euro-crisis; secondly, the massive displacement of populations gives rise to complex problems, sparking controversies that weaken the social and political fabric of individual member states and feed into populism and xenophobia; and, thirdly, the German Chancellor, who has played a crucial role in alleviating, if not solving, other crises, is facing domestic and European rebellions for her handling of the refugee issue. Will the agreement that the EU and Turkey concluded on 18 March 2016 manage to limit the influx of refugees, patch up differences, and re-establish Angela Merkel’s authority in Germany and in the Union

La montée en puissance de la République fédérale d'Allemagne

L'expression de « modèle allemand » est sur toutes les lèvres et, à vrai dire, l'économie ouest-allemande fait preuve d'un extraordinaire dynamisme, en dépit de vulnérabilités incontestables. L'emprise structurelle que la RFA exerce sur d'autres économies ouest-européennes autorise-t-elle toutefois à parler d'une « montée en puissance » de la RFA sur le plan politique ? Les contraintes politiques qui limitent la marge de manœuvre de Bonn sont en effet nombreuses ; bien plus, la proximité de la puissante voisine soviétique, les incertitudes qui obèrent l'alliance germano-américaine n'incitent-elles pas la RFA à rechercher une forme de gaullo-germanisme, voire de finlandisation ?THE MOUNTING POWER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - The expression « the German model » is very much in vogue, and it is true that the West-German economy is proving extraordinarily buoyant, although it has undoubted weaknesses. Does Germany's structural ascendancy over the other West European economies imply, however, that the Federal Republic is becoming increasingly powerful in the political sphere ? The political constraints restricting the Federal Republic's room for manœuvre are in fact numerous ; more important, the proximity of its powerful Soviet neighbour and the uncertainties weighing on the German-American alliance must surely encourage the Federal Republic to seek some form of Gallo-Germanism, or even Finlandization

La nation retrouvée. De la RDA à l'Allemagne

Le temps interallemand bouscule les calendriers diplomatiques. C'est que la RDA n'existe plus parce qu'elle n'a jamais existé : il n'y eut jamais d'Etat libre et indépendant, au contraire une interpénétration de deux sociétés ou plutôt un échange inégal. Si l'influence de la RFA en RDA fut prépondérante, la société ouest-allemande n'échappa pas entièrement à certaines influences orientales. L'Allemagne réunifiée ne sera donc pas simplement une grande République fédérale. Si la chute des régimes communistes et la réunification des Allemagnes apportent à l'Allemagne et à l'Europe plus de souveraineté mais non nécessairement plus de sécurité, elles entraînent aussi Bonn et Berlin-Est — et plus tard Berlin — dans des turbulences économiques et politiques. L'Allemagne parviendra-t-elle à tenir ses engagements vis-à-vis de l'étranger ?The Nation Lost and Found. From GDR to Germany, by Anne-Marie Le Gloannec - The inter-German time upsets diplomatie calendars. The GDR exists no more because it never existed : there was no free and independent state but interpenetration of two societies or rather an unequal exchange. Though the influence of the FRG in the GDR was stronger, West German society did not remain entirely without some Eastern influence. Therefore the reunified Germany will not be merely a big Federal Republic. Though the fall of communist regimes and the reunification of the two Germanies bring more security to Germany and Europe, they also lead Bonn and West Berlin — and later Berlin — into economie and political turbulence. Will Germany be able to stand by its pledges to the outside world

The EU, Russia and Ukraine: a double track with no end?

In March 2014, Russia took over the Crimean Peninsula by stealth. Having annexed it on 18 March, Russia made further forays in the eastern part of Ukraine, principally in Donetsk and Luhansk, where it provided secessionists with manpower and know-how, weapons (including heavy weapons), information technology and propaganda, as well as political support. Discarding the idea that territory or history alone can explain Russia’s grab, we assume that, besides increases in gas prices and demands for changes in the constitution while stoking unrest and violating borders, the Kremlin has resorted to war in eastern Ukraine as a means to exert pressure on the Kyiv government. What matters for Moscow is probably to prevent democracy from taking root in Ukraine, or in Western Ukraine for that matter. To the Kremlin, a failed state would be preferable to a democratic state, divided or not. If this interpretation is correct, to what extent can the conflict be resolved? Must the interests claimed by the Kremlin be taken into account in order to bring peace in Ukraine and reset EU– Russia relations? What can the EU – and the West otherwise, i.e. the United States – do? This Policy Brief argues that a solution to the conflict is beyond reach, because the conflict concerns two opposing worlds. If the war is eventually a means for Vladimir Putin to stifle democracy in Ukraine and to strengthen his hold over Russia, there is no room for compromise. The history of EU–Russia relations and the structure that has characterized them since the demise of the USSR underline the how difficult it is for the EU to maintain, or indeed establish, a balanced relationship with an increasingly authoritarian and predatory regime based on one-man rule. The EU may have inadvertently played into the hand of the Kremlin – through lack of imagination and strategy, rather than contempt for a wounded power, as Putin has contended. Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2014, however, the EU has mustered the capacity to target sanctions at Russian individuals that bear responsibility for the war in Ukraine, and at specific sectors crucial to the Russian economy, all the while attempting to pursue political dialogue with the authorities – a ‘double-track approach’. But we must ask: What is the purpose of sanctions that do not bring about changes in the opponent’s political behaviour? or of a dialogue that does not lead to a solution? And is there anything that the EU and its member states can do