Privatization in oligopoly : the impact of the shadow cost of public funds

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare eect of privatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary eect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership not only on the objective function of the rms, but also on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. We show that, absent effciency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large effciency gains are realized, an ineffcient public rm may be preferred

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds

The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economywide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in a mixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both in terms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed- Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that the market performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare

Privatization in oligopoly : the impact of the shadow cost of public funds

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of privatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of raising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership not only on the objective function of the firms, but also on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds : exogenous and endogenous timing

The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economy wide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in amixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both interms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed-Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that themarket performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow cost of public funds

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where a private firm complete in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two inefficiencies of the public sector : a possible cost inefficiency and an allocative inefficiency due to the distortionary effect of taxation (shadow cost of public funds). Furthermore, we analyze the effect of privatization on the timing of competition by endogenezing the determiantion of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The latter is especially relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescription emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. We show that privatization has generally the effect of shifting from Stackelberg to Cournot equilibrium and that, absent efficiency gains privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred.mixed oligopoly, privatization, endogenous timing, distortionary taxes

On Public Inefficiencies in a Mixed Duopoly

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of a change in the public firm's objective function in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of a shift from welfare- to profit-maximizing behaviour of the public firm on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the game with observable delay proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Differently from previous work that assumed the timing of competition, we show that, absent efficiency gains, instructing the public firm to play as a private one never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains result from the shift in public firm's objective, an inefficient public firm that maximizes welfare may be preferred.Mixed oligopoly; Nash equilibria; Endogenous Timing; Distortionary taxes

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow cost of public funds

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where a private firm competes in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two inefficiencies of the public sector: a possible cost inefficiency, and an allocative inefficiency due to the distortionary effect of taxation (shadow cost of public funds). Furthermore, we analyze the effect of privatization on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The latter is especially relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescription emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. We show that privatization has generally the effect of shifting from Stackelberg to Cournot equilibrium and that, absent efficiency gains privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred.mixed oligopoly, privatization, endogenous timing, distortionary taxes.

Le scelte di politica economica fra teoria ed evidenze empiriche: un approccio storicistico

The principal objective of the article is to show how the economic theory is not an exact science. It does no't have universal value and it is not just link to mathematics, because it does not make itself as a scientific discipline. For this economics has not to use too much mathematics to imitate the exact sciences, The approach that we would like to propose in this article is a “historicist” vision of the economic theories. It wants to be more pragmaticas and less dogmatic to  the advantage to deliver unassailable theories from economists, but simply ideas with solid scientific bases and supported by some statistic bases. It represents exactly what a policy maker needs to make decision in a right historical moment

Vedere l'invisibile: la questione filosofica dello sguardo

Nella storia della cultura il concetto di “sguardo” è stato capace di sintetizzare di volta in volta l’ideologia dominante di ogni periodo. Questa tesi ha il proposito di chiarire non solo i momenti più rilevanti dell’evoluzione concettuale del guardare, ma anche e soprattutto di mettere in evidenza il ruolo d’influenza attiva di tale idea sui sistemi culturali coevi. In particolare verranno prese in considerazione tre grandi svolte nella storia dello sguardo, volte a determinarne il ruolo nelle macro aree cronologiche dell’antichità, della modernità e della contemporaneità. Seguendo un percorso che si snoda tra il mito, l’arte e la filosofia si darà conto in primo luogo della rivoluzione attuata da Platone nel X libro della Repubblica, cercando di inquadrarla in un contesto di fobia dello sguardo, tentando al contempo di determinare le ragioni di tale paura. In secondo luogo analizzeremo l’invenzione della prospettiva pittorica rinascimentale, tenendo conto delle influenze medievali che ne hanno permesso lo sviluppo ed in particolare dell’apporto fondamentale della filosofia araba in questa invenzione. Seguendo le teorie del filosofo arabo Alhazen e il loro condizionamento diretto su Leon Battista Alberti, illustreremo come la tecnica prospettica debba essere letta in contrasto con la cultura aniconica araba, affinché si possa dar conto della vera portata di tale svolta non esclusivamente artistica. Infine analizzeremo il periodo contemporaneo considerandolo come post-prospettico, e chiariremo il significativo contributo apportato alla questione dello sguardo dal filosofo francese Maurice Merleau-Ponty, il quale, nell’ontologia delineata nell’opera Il visibile e l’invisibile, pone a fondamento del proprio pensiero il concetto di reversibilità degli sguardi tra l’uomo e il mondo, individuando questi ultimi elementi come pieghe di un Essere unico capace di rendere conto della compossibile esistenza sullo stesso piano ontologico del visibile e l’invisibile, senza che essi perdano le proprie differenze ma anzi diventando l’uno la ragione necessaria dell’altro

A safe transoral surgical approach to parapharyngeal tumor arising from deep lobe of parotid gland

The management of parapharyngeal tumor is surgical, but the approach remains a challenge. Attention should be paid to avoidance intra-operative bleeding or cranial nerves damage. We report a case of a 67-year-old male complaining of left-ear fullness. A submucosal mass arising from the lateral wall of oropharynx on the left side was observed. Magnetic resonance imaging detected a mass arising from the parotid gland, in particular from the deep lobe, and a fine needle biopsy was compatible with "Warthin tumor." We performed a mini-invasive transoral approach under magnification, previous isolation of homolateral vessels. The decision on which surgical approach to be used is determined by site, size vascularity, and histology of the tumor. A literature review of the main surgical approaches was performed. We performed a combined transoral dissection under magnification with cervicotomic exposure of the neck vascular bundle allowing to dissect the tumor and manage any intra-operative complications