Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations

Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority system. Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting models, which generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision, or in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters, and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance, both across organizations and over time.

International agreements on product standard: an incomplete contracting theory

We propose a theory of international agreements on product standards. The key feature of the model is that agreements are viewed as incomplete contracts. In particular, these do not specify standards for products that may arise in the future. One potential remedy to contractual incompleteness is a dispute settlement procedure (DSP) that provides arbitration in states of the world that are not covered by the ex ante agreement. We identify conditions under which a DSP can provide ex-ante efficiency gains, and examine how these gains depend on the fundamentals of the problem. Another potential remedy to contractual incompleteness is given by rigid rules, i.e. rules that are not product-specific. We argue that the nondiscrimination rule is the only rule of this kind that increases ex ante efficiency for any probability distribution over potential products. Finally we show that, under relatively weak conditions, the optimal ex-ante agreement is structured in three parts: (i) a set of clauses that specify standards for existing products; (ii) a rigid nondiscrimination rule, and (iii) a dispute settlement procedure. Although the model focuses on the case of product standards, the analysis suggests a more general incomplete-contracting theory of trade agreements.

A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements

This paper presents a theory of trade agreements where "politics" play an central role. This stands in contrast with the standard theory, where even politically-motivated governments sign trade agreements only to deal with terms-of-trade externalities. We develop a model where governments may be motivated to sign a trade agreement both by the presence of standard terms-of-trade externalities and by the desire to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. The model is rich in implications. In particular, it predicts that trade agreements result in deeper trade liberalization when governments are more politically motivated (provided capital mobility is sufficiently high) and when capital can move more freely across sectors. Also, governments tend to prefer a commitment in the form of tariff ceilings rather than exact tariff levels. In a fully dynamic specification of the model, trade liberalization occurs in two stages: an immediate slashing of tariffs and a subsequent gradual reduction of tariffs. The immediate tariff cut is a reflection of the terms-of-trade motive for the agreement, while the domestic-commitment motive is reflected in the gradual phase of trade liberalization. Finally, the speed of trade liberalization is higher when capital is more mobile across sectors.

Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements

We provide a simple but novel model of trade agreements that highlights the role of transaction costs, renegotiation and dispute settlement. The model allows us to characterize the appropriate remedy for breach and whether the agreement should be structured as a system of "property rights" or "liability rules." We then study how the optimal rules depend on the underlying economic and contracting environment. Our model also delivers predictions about the outcome of trade disputes, and in particular about the propensity of countries to settle early versus "fighting it out."International trade agreements, Breach remedies, Dispute settlementLength: 52 pages

Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts

We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. Inspite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements.Trade Agreement; WTO; GATT; Endogenously Incomplete Contracts

Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts

We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements.

Work analysis for prevention according to the "Organization and Well-being" Program / L’analyse du travail pour la prévention selon le Programme « Organization and Well-being » / L’analisi del lavoro per la prevenzione secondo il Programma “Organization and Well-being”

A case study concerns a public health service where work analysis, oriented towards primary prevention, is repeatedly performed over a long period of time. The goal is to present the approach of the Interdisciplinary Research Program “Organization and Well-Being”, that has been active for three decades. This approach is based on the Organizational Action Theory and concerns the analysis of work processes’ regulation. It takes care of the well-being of people at work and implies that the analysis, carried out by the workers themselves, coincides with the transformation of the work processes. The debate is open about the possible connections between this approach and the ones that share the same epistemological premises

Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship

We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly and can contract at any point in time, but writing enforceable contracts is costly. A contract can describe contingencies and actions at a more or less detailed level, and the cost of writing a contract is proportional to the amount of detail. We consider both formal (externally enforced) and informal (self-enforcing) contracts. The presence of writing costs has important implications both for the optimal structure of formal contracts, particularly the tradeoff between contingent and spot contracts, and for the interaction between formal and informal contracting. Our model sheds light on these implications and generates a rich set of predictions about the determinants of the optimal mode of contracting

Insecticidal Activity of Plant Secondary Metabolites

Dear Colleagues, Plant secondary metabolites display a plethora of biological functions, among which the biochemical defense against insects and other organisms is one of the most important ones. For this purpose, they synthesize alkaloids, terpenoids, and phenolics which act as allelochemicals through highly diverse modes of action leading to major changes on the arthropods’ physiology and behavior. Thus, they represent a complementary and alternative strategy to manage populations of pests and vectors. In this framework, the present Special Issue welcomes original research articles and reviews shedding light on recent advancements about the use of plant secondary metabolites and related formulations against arthropod targets of health and agricultural importance. This Special Issue welcomes contributions on the following topics: - Phytochemical analysis and biological evaluation of plant-borne secondary metabolites; - Lethal and sub-lethal effects of plant-borne insecticides and acaricides; - Repellent effects of plant-borne secondary metabolites on insects and mites; - Modes of action of green insecticides, acaricides, and repellents; - Toxicity of green insecticides and acaricides on non-target species, including aquatic organisms; - Structure–activity relationships characterizing green insecticides and acaricides; - Synergistic and antagonistic studies focusing on green insecticides and acaricides; - Development of insecticidal and acaricidal formulations with extended shelf-life and prolonged bioactivity in the field. Prof. Dr. Filippo Maggi Dr. Giovanni Benelli Guest Editor

Endocrinologic Control of Men's Sexual Desire and Arousal/Erection

Several hormones and neurotransmitters orchestrate men's sexual response, including the appetitive (sexual desire) and consummative (arousal and penile erection) phases. AIM: To provide an overview and recommendations regarding endocrinologic control of sexual desire and arousal and erection and their disturbances. METHODS: Medical literature was reviewed by the subcommittee of the International Consultation of Sexual Medicine, followed by extensive internal discussion, and then public presentation and discussion with other experts. The role of pituitary (prolactin, oxytocin, growth hormone, and α-melanocyte-stimulating hormone), thyroid, and testicular hormones was scrutinized and discussed. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Recommendations were based on grading of evidence-based medical literature, followed by interactive discussion. RESULTS: Testosterone has a primary role in controlling and synchronizing male sexual desire and arousal, acting at multiple levels. Accordingly, meta-analysis indicates that testosterone therapy for hypogonadal individuals can improve low desire and erectile dysfunction. Hyperprolactinemia is associated with low desire that can be successfully corrected by appropriate treatments. Oxytocin and α-melanocyte-stimulating hormone are important in eliciting sexual arousal; however, use of these peptides, or their analogs, for stimulating sexual arousal is still under investigation. Evaluation and treatment of other endocrine disorders are suggested only in selected cases. CONCLUSION: Endocrine abnormalities are common in patients with sexual dysfunction. Their identification and treatment is strongly encouraged in disturbances of sexual desire and arousal