Institutional investors and corporate governance

We provide a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance with three main components. First, we establish new stylized facts documenting the evolution and importance of institutional ownership. Second, we provide a detailed characterization of key aspects of the legal and regulatory setting within which institutional investors govern portfolio firms. Third, we synthesize the evolving response of the recent theoretical and empirical academic literature in finance to the emergence of institutional investors in corporate governance. We highlight how the defining aspect of institutional investors – the fact that they are financial intermediaries – differentiates them in their governance role from standard principal blockholders. Further, not all institutional investors are identical, and we pay close attention to heterogeneity amongst institutional investors as blockholders

A targeted next-generation sequencing assay for the molecular diagnosis of genetic disorders with orodental involvement.

BACKGROUND: Orodental diseases include several clinically and genetically heterogeneous disorders that can present in isolation or as part of a genetic syndrome. Due to the vast number of genes implicated in these disorders, establishing a molecular diagnosis can be challenging. We aimed to develop a targeted next-generation sequencing (NGS) assay to diagnose mutations and potentially identify novel genes mutated in this group of disorders. METHODS: We designed an NGS gene panel that targets 585 known and candidate genes in orodental disease. We screened a cohort of 101 unrelated patients without a molecular diagnosis referred to the Reference Centre for Oro-Dental Manifestations of Rare Diseases, Strasbourg, France, for a variety of orodental disorders including isolated and syndromic amelogenesis imperfecta (AI), isolated and syndromic selective tooth agenesis (STHAG), isolated and syndromic dentinogenesis imperfecta, isolated dentin dysplasia, otodental dysplasia and primary failure of tooth eruption. RESULTS: We discovered 21 novel pathogenic variants and identified the causative mutation in 39 unrelated patients in known genes (overall diagnostic rate: 39%). Among the largest subcohorts of patients with isolated AI (50 unrelated patients) and isolated STHAG (21 unrelated patients), we had a definitive diagnosis in 14 (27%) and 15 cases (71%), respectively. Surprisingly, COL17A1 mutations accounted for the majority of autosomal-dominant AI cases. CONCLUSIONS: We have developed a novel targeted NGS assay for the efficient molecular diagnosis of a wide variety of orodental diseases. Furthermore, our panel will contribute to better understanding the contribution of these genes to orodental disease. TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBERS: NCT01746121 and NCT02397824.journal articleresearch support, non-u.s. gov't2016 Feb2015 10 26importe

Nephrocalcinosis (enamel renal syndrome) caused by autosomal recessive FAM20A mutations

Calcium homeostasis requires regulated cellular and interstitial systems interacting to modulate the activity and movement of this ion. Disruption of these systems in the kidney results in nephrocalcinosis and nephrolithiasis, important medical problems whose pathogenesis is incompletely understood

Freedom of choice between unitary and two-tier boards: an empirical analysis

International audienceWe examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms with a potential for private benefits extraction tend to adopt two-tier boards. There is enhanced sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance at firms with two-tier boards, indicating greater monitoring. Our results are broadly consistent with the Adams and Ferreira (2007) model and suggest there are gains from allowing freedom of contract about board structure

Lessons from The French Exception: How Firms Choose Between Unitary and Dual Boards

Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a unitary (passive) board and a dual (monitoring) board. We find firms with greater asymmetric information are likely to adopt a unitary board. Firms with a high potential for private benefit extraction are likely to adopt dual boards. Firms well monitored by financial market and institutional forces are less likely to have dual boards. Our results imply that freedom of contract about board structure is valuable for shareholders