War-time military service can affect partisan preferences

Does war-time military service affect partisan preferences? We argue that military service increases the salience and potential costs of war. Therefore, soldiers who serve during mismanaged wars will associate the ruling party with incompetence and be less likely to support the ruling party in the future. To test our argument, we analyze almost 50 years of Israel National Election Studies. Employing a regression discontinuity design, we show that compared with respondents who were too young to serve in the Yom Kippur war, respondents just old enough to serve report lower support for the Labor party well after the war ended. This effect is likely driven by soldiers’ unwillingness to support a party they associate with security incompetence. We further show that the negative effect of military service does not materialize in well-managed wars, contributing to the literature on the political consequences of war and attitude formation

Burden sharing: income, inequality and willingness to fight

What explains citizens’ willingness to fight for their country in times of war? Using six waves of the World Values Survey, this study finds that individual willingness to fight is negatively related with country-level income inequality. When income inequality is high, the rich are less willing to fight than the poor. When inequality is low, the poor and rich differ little in their willingness to fight. This change in the willingness to fight between low and high inequality countries is greater among the rich than among the poor. This article explores several explanations for these findings. The data are consistent with the argument that high inequality makes it more attractive for the rich to buy themselves out of military service

Settling on Violence: Expansion of Israeli Outposts in the West Bank in Response to Terrorism

How does terrorism affect land control in intrastate conflicts? This article explores this question in the case of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), and shows that Palestinian attacks led to an expansion of Israeli outposts in the disputed territories of the West Bank. Following suicide attacks, there is an increase in outposts in home districts of the perpetrators. The number of outposts also increases following deadly attacks against Israelis in West Bank districts where these attacks take place. These results suggest that Israeli settlers use outpost expansion as retaliation against Palestinian communities they perceive to be involved in violence, and this shifts territorial control against Palestinians

The Allure of Distant War Drums: Refugees, Geography, and Foreign Policy Preferences in Turkey

Previous research argues that countries often intervene in the conflicts that cause refugees to flow across their borders. Public opinion against refugees may pressure states to intervene to ‘solve the refugee problem.’ We study what shapes public support for such intervention using a survey experiment in Turkey against the backdrop of the Syrian refugee crisis. We survey over 1,200 respondents with varied exposure to refugees, and randomize information about the consequences of hosting refugees to examine its effects on support for intervention in Syria. Emphasizing the negative externalities of hosting refugees, including their connection with militants, increases support for intervention among respondents who reside far from the Turkish-Syrian border. Closer to the border, this information reduces support for intervention in Syria. These findings highlight that vulnerability to the costs of intervention (proximity to the border) shapes public support for intervening. We also find that public opinion towards intervention is correlated with partisan identity and respondents' daily exposure to refugees

Who Gets What from International Organizations? The Case of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Technical Cooperation

What affects the allocation of aid by international organizations to their member states? Using data on nuclear assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), I demonstrate that political considerations affect the likelihood of receiving aid, and the amount of aid countries receive. Specifically, I find that membership in the IAEA Board of Governors or acceptance of tougher IAEA inspections increase the likelihood of IAEA assistance, and in some cases the amounts of assistance, but only for countries that do not share policy preferences with the US. This finding is consistent with theories that foreign aid is given in exchange for cooperation and concessions to recipients that are not likely to be cooperative without aid. I also examine whether nuclear assistance is given to countries that need it the most and that can make effective use of this aid, and find only partial support for need-based explanations of aid allocation

Who Gets What from International Organizations? The Case of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Technical Cooperation

How and on what grounds do international organizations allocate aid to their member states? I answer this question in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I find that political considerations affect the likelihood of receiving aid, as well as the amount of aid that countries receive. In particular, membership in the IAEA board of governors and the acceptance of tougher IAEA inspections increase the likelihood of IAEA assistance. These factors also increase the amounts of assistance, but only for countries with divergent policy preferences from those of the United States. In consequence, those states that receive IAEA assistance are not always those most in need of it. My findings track with theories that countries receive foreign aid in exchange for cooperation and concessions to donors

Interstate conflict can reduce support for incumbents: evidence from the Israeli electorate and the Yom Kippur War

Does war affect support for incumbent leaders and parties? The literature is divided with studies reporting negative, positive, or null-effects. Many studies analyze the consequences of foreign intervention, and less is known about the political costs of wars fought close to home. Building on theories of retrospective voting, we theorize that wars inform voters about leader’s competence, and in turn affect mass attitudes and behaviors. Leveraging the unexpected onset of the 1973 Yom Kippur war which interrupted an ongoing Israeli public opinion poll, and voting records from four national elections linked with Israeli military fatality data, we demonstrate that despite the ultimate military victory, the war and its casualties reduced support for incumbent parties and leaders, and increased support for the opposition. By moving beyond foreign interventions, we provide strong evidence that wars over a country’s core territory can be politically costly for incumbent leaders and parties