Settling on Violence: Expansion of Israeli Outposts in the West Bank

in Response to Terrorism

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Abstract

How does terrorism affect land control in intrastate conflicts? This paper explores

this question in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the Second Intifada

(2000-2005), and shows that Palestinian attacks lead to an expansion of Israeli

outposts in the disputed territories of the West Bank. Following suicide attacks,

there is an increase in outposts in home districts of the perpetrators. The number of

outposts also increases following deadly attacks against Israelis in West Bank

districts where these attacks take place. These results suggest that Israeli settlers

use outpost expansion as retaliation against Palestinian communities they perceive

to be involved in violence, and this shifts territorial control against Palestinians.

How does terrorism affect land control in intrastate conflicts? Previous studies on

the effects of terrorism have shown that violence reduces political tolerance,[1]

increases exclusionist attitudes,[2] and strengthens support for hawkish policies and

for organizations that are less willing to make concessions to solve the conflict.[3]

Importantly, these studies show that violence has a stronger effect on those who

reside in the vicinity of attacks, thereby suggesting that terrorism has a special

impact on communities that are exposed to violence. This paper contributes to this

literature by analyzing the relationship between Palestinian violence against Israelis

and expansion of Israeli outposts in the West Bank (WB) during the Second Intifada

(2000-2005). The findings reported here show that Palestinian attacks lead to a

proliferation in the number of outposts and to an increase of the size of private

Palestinian land used for outposts' construction. Most notably, the effect of violence

is local: outposts expand in home districts of suicide bombers, and in areas of the

WB where attacks against Israelis take place. This is consistent with the argument

that violence contributes to further radicalization of the target populace, and results

in additional escalation of conflict.[4]

This paper focuses on changes in land control in the WB that is one of the

core issues of contention between Israel and the Palestinians.[5] Figure 1 shows the

map of the pre-1967 Israeli borders, as well as the Palestinian districts in the WB

and in Gaza. Palestinian organizations that use violence against Israeli civilians have

repeatedly declared that land control, and especially the removal of Israeli settlers

from the WB and Gaza, is among their primary goals.[6] On the Israeli side, some also

perceive land control in the WB as a realization of the Jewish claim to the Land of

Israel,[7] or at least as a political card to be used in future negotiations[8] as well as a way of countering Palestinian nationalistic demands.[9]

[Figure 1 about here.]

Land control is measured here using data on outposts' expansion in the WB. Outposts are settlements established by private Israelis without explicit government authorization, but in many cases with tacit approval and even assistance of state institutions.[10] Given that Israel has not established new settlements in the WB since the early 1990 (although existing settlements were significantly expanded), the illegal establishment of outposts provides an observable measure of changes in territorial control in the WB.

The purpose of outposts is to expand the Israeli territorial presence in the WB. Between 1991 and 2005, settlers established 99 outposts, some built on private land owned by Palestinians.[11] About half of the outposts were established during the Second Intifada, after March 2001. Some of them are not inhabited, and involve capture of land by placing containers in remote places. Other outposts resemble residential neighborhoods, and are often constructed adjacent to existing settlements. Several of the outposts were evacuated by the army, but almost immediately reestablished by the settlers. Figure 2 depicts the map of Israeli settlements and outposts.

[Figure 2 about here.]

To explore the effect of violence on outposts, this study uses detailed data on the districts of origin of Palestinian suicide bombers during the Second Intifada (2000-2005). In addition, this paper utilizes an originally coded dataset on

Palestinian attacks against Israelis in the WB, and examines the relationship between outposts' expansion and locations of attacks in the WB.

One possible explanation for the reported correlation between attacks and outposts is that territorial expansion of outposts leads to attacks, and not vice versa. While acknowledging this possibility, this paper provides evidence that causality also runs in the opposite direction. To isolate this causal effect, this paper compares districts with successful attacks to districts with failed attacks, assuming that success and failure are random, conditional on attack being initiated.[12]

The results suggest that home districts of successful suicide attackers experience an addition of 0.5 outposts in the quarter following a successful attack, compared to districts that produced failed attacks. Similarly, the number of outposts increases by 0.7 in WB districts where fatal attacks against Israelis take place in the post-attack quarter. These are substantively significant effects given the high number of attacks during these years. Analysis of the changes in the size of private Palestinian land that lies within the boundaries of these outposts also suggests a significant increase in seizure of land following attacks. Violence in this period, therefore, leads to changes in land control, and at least in the short-term undermines the Palestinian goals of land control.

Several concrete examples illustrate the expansion of outposts following violence. New neighborhoods are often named after people that had been killed by Palestinians. For example, the outpost Ester's Stronghold (Ma'oz Ester) was established to commemorate Ester Ga'aliya, who lived in a nearby settlement, and was killed in an attack in that area in 2006.[13] Likewise, an outpost near Itamar is

called AARYH, which is an abbreviation of the first names of the family members killed in the Itamar attack in 2011.[14] The connection between violence and changes in territorial control are not limited to outposts. On several occasions, the Israeli government approved extensive construction and expansion of existing WB settlements following attacks. One prominent example is the announcement of 500 new housing units in the settlement of Itamar immediately after the murder of five family members by a Palestinian who had infiltrated that settlement in March 2011.[15] At the Government session convened to vote on the extension, the Minister of Interior declared that "1000 units should be approved" for each murdered Israeli.[16] This paper moves beyond these anecdotal cases, and provides a systematic analysis of the relationship between violence and expansion of outposts.

The findings reported here focus on the short-term, local effects of attacks on land control. There is, however, also the question of the long-term effect of violence. For instance, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and from four settlements in the WB in 2005 may be considered as an example of a cumulative effect of attacks that ultimately advance Palestinians' political goals of land control, despite the short-term costs and setbacks. However, empirically identifying the causal effect of violence on these withdrawals is impossible because there is no control case of Palestinian non-violence. This study, therefore, focuses on the local and immediate effects of violence on outposts. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that these short-term effects also shape the long-term patterns of land control. As long as the conflict remains unresolved, local changes in land control are rarely, if ever, reversed. Instead, they create "facts on the ground" that shape any future attempts

at negotiating the permanent peace agreement. That said, it is important to keep in mind the temporal limitations of this analysis, as well as the fact that it is based on a specific time period, between 2000 and 2005.

This paper proceeds as follows. It first situates the question within the existing literature on the effects of exposure to terrorism, and identifies hypotheses that are tested in the empirical section. Then, it presents the data and the descriptive statistics of the main variables. Afterwards, it outlines the methodology and reviews the results. The final section concludes by considering the implications of these findings for theories of civil conflict.

Extant Literature on the Effects of Exposure to Violence and Terrorism

The Effect of Violence and Terrorism on the Targets

A growing body of research reports that exposure to political violence has multiple effects on targeted individuals and societies. One of the most documented consequences of terrorism in Israel is the increase in support for right-wing parties among Jewish voters who reside in areas that were previously targeted by terrorists. For example, Berrebi and Klor find that Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli targets lead to a rightward shift in voting patterns in areas that were attacked.[17] Getmansky and Zeitzoff further show that terrorism affects also voters who do not reside in areas that experienced high casualty attacks. Merely being in range of terrorism (for example, residing in Israeli localities within the range of rockets fired from the Gaza strip, but not necessarily being targeted by rockets) is sufficient to make voters more right-wing.[18] Since right-wing parties in Israel are

less supportive of granting political concessions to Palestinians, and more supportive of expansion of settlements in the WB, this effect is perceived as a sign of political ineffectiveness of terrorism as a strategy to extract concessions.[19]

Outside of the Israeli case, Kibris reports that fatal PKK attacks against security forces in Turkey increase vote shares of Turkish nationalistic parties.[20] However, in the case of Spain, Bali as well as Montalvo show that the 2004 Madrid bombings shifted the electoral map to the left against an unpopular foreign policy.[21] Nonetheless, in the United States, Albertson and Kushner-Gadarian find that exposure to news about terrorism increases anxiety that in turn leads to greater support for hawkish policies (including hawkish foreign policy), augments anti-immigrant attitudes, and bolsters trust in Republican candidates.[22] Similarly, Jaeger et al. find that exposure to Israeli violence leads Palestinians to support more hawkish factions and to adopt more radical attitudes towards conflict, especially in the immediate period after witnessing violence (within 90 days). These effects are particularly pronounced among those with high propensity for radicalism.[23]

Furthermore, the effect of terrorism is not limited to voting and political attitudes. Peffley, Hutchinson, and Shamir find that persistent exposure to terrorist attacks in Israel eroded support for democratic values and political tolerance towards Palestinians.[24] Studies in political psychology help explain some of these effects. Central to these studies is the finding that threats (real or perceived) prompt bigotry towards members of the out-group. In this context, Canetti-Nisim et al. propose that personal exposure to death due to terrorism heightens perceived threats and psychological distress that lead to elevated exclusionist attitudes. They

show that Israeli Jews who are personally exposed to Palestinian terrorist attacks (for example, those who know people who were killed in terrorist attacks) are more likely to oppose granting equal rights to Palestinian citizens of Israel.[25] Moreover, threats to abstract aspects of the collective (such as in-group identity, belief system, and worldview) have a greater influence on attitudes towards rights and liberties of the out-group than tangible threats.[26] In sum, this literature presents a pessimistic account whereby exposure to terrorism and continued threats increase negative attitudes among the targeted individuals and bolster their support for retaliatory policies towards the group that the perpetrators claim to represent.

In addition to deepening inter-group divisions, terrorism has been shown in some cases to increase intra-group cohesion and cooperation. In a series of experiments in Israel, Zeitzoff demonstrates that Israeli Jewish civilians who experienced rocket attacks from Gaza are less likely to lash out against a member of their community who behaves uncooperatively (compared to similar civilians who were not exposed to rocket attacks, or exposed to them to a lesser extent).[27] Beyond Israel, studies from over 40 other countries found that exposure to violence during civil wars increased levels of collective action (such as voting and community organization) and pro-social behavior, but mainly towards people from the same community.[28] Thus, while terrorism increases inter-group animosity, it may also contribute to intra-group cohesion and prompt individuals to engage in what they believe to be pro-social behavior for their own group.

The Effect of Violence and Terrorism on the Perpetrators' Communities

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In addition to studies on the effect of violence on the targets, a smaller body of research explores the effects of terrorism on the perpetrators' communities. Most of these studies focus on the economic effects of terrorism, and find that violence causes economic harm to the communities that the terrorists claim to represent. Abadie and Gardeazabal explore the effect of attacks by ETA (a Basque separatist organization) on the economic development of the Basque Country, where most of the violence took place between 1968 and 1997.[29] They find that terrorism lowers the per capita GDP in that area by about 10 percentage points compared to what it would have been in the absence of terrorism. They claim that the economic decline of the Basque region was caused by the decrease in domestic and foreign direct investments, as well as because many Basque entrepreneurs chose to relocate due to concerns over ETA's kidnappings-for-ransom.[30]

In the Palestinian case, Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor find that Palestinian suicide attacks against Israel during the Second Intifada increase unemployment and decrease wages in home districts of Palestinian suicide bombers. Successful suicide attacks also decrease the number of Palestinians from the attackers' home districts who receive permits to work in Israel.[31] This particular study does not explore why Palestinian suicide attacks worsen the economic conditions in communities of origin of the bombers. There may be several reasons for the decline of Palestinian economy, such as tougher counterterrorism measures implemented in home districts of suicide bombers in the aftermath of such attacks. It is also possible that part of the decline in the Palestinian economy is due to construction of outposts. There is evidence that some outposts disrupt Palestinian agricultural

activity.[32] In addition, settlers' encroachment on private Palestinian land creates uncertainty and lowers investment in Palestinian areas.[33] Expansion of outposts, especially those that disrupt Palestinian agriculture and are constructed on private land owned by Palestinians may account for some of the reduction in wages and increase in unemployment that Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor report.

The Effect of Palestinian Attacks on Outposts' Expansion in the WB

Building on these studies, we argue that Palestinian attacks may lead to outposts' expansion due to several reasons. First, if terrorist attacks increase hostility towards the out-group and augment support for aggressive policies, then they may also motivate some Israelis to engage in radical action and to expand outposts.[34] In particular, radical action may be taken against home communities of the terrorists, as a way of punishing them for the attacks. Second, the public opinion in Israel may become more supportive of Israeli presence in the WB and of aggressive policy towards Palestinians, especially those that are perceived to be associated with the attackers. This is also consistent with the finding that violence increases intra-group cohesion in targeted populace. The shift in public opinion against Palestinians may create a window of opportunity for some settlers to expand outposts in the aftermath of violence, especially after spectacular attacks such as suicide bombings that strike within Israel, and affect public opinion of many Israelis.

The combination of these two arguments leads us to suggest the following hypothesis:

H1: Israeli outposts expand following successful suicide attacks in Palestinian districts of origin of suicide bombers.

In addition, threats that are perceived to be targeting group identity and worldview have particularly strong effects on exclusionist attitudes (see endnote 25). According to this logic, attacks against Israelis in the WB, and especially fatal attacks, may be perceived by some as threats against their worldview that views the consolidation of Jewish presence in the WB as an important goal. These perceptions may in turn trigger radical action, such as establishment and expansion of outposts. Fatal attacks may be especially consequential because death has been demonstrated to have an effect on exclusionist political attitudes.[35] As a symbolic act, outposts are likely to be established in the vicinity of places where fatal attacks happened in order to demonstrate that violence would not end the Israeli presence in these areas. Finally, elevated intra-group cohesion and public sympathy towards settlers following attacks may further encourage expansion of outposts. Thus, our second hypothesis is:

H2: Outposts expand in the aftermath of fatal attacks against Israelis in the WB. This expansion happens in Palestinian districts where these attacks took place.

Data and Descriptive Statistics

Dependent variable – changes in land control

To measure changes in land control, this paper analyzes the establishment of outposts by Israeli settlers in the WB (east Jerusalem is not included in this analysis). According to Sason Report[36], outposts are WB settlements that do not

satisfy at least one of the four conditions: (1) established following a formal resolution by the government; (2) constructed only on State land; (3) developed according to a lawful building scheme; and (4) jurisdiction boundaries were approved by the Commander of the area.

Whereas WB settlements that satisfy all of the four conditions are officially recognized under the Israeli law, outposts are considered illegal by the government. Due to their unauthorized nature, outposts are often established on private Palestinian land and involve destruction of Palestinian property.[37] Unauthorized outposts first emerged in early-1990s, after the Rabin government had frozen the construction of new official settlements in the WB and Gaza, and decreased the rate of construction approvals in existing settlements.[38] Although first outposts appeared during the 1990s, their number significantly increased after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. About half of the outposts that existed during 2000-2005 period were constructed during the Second Intifada. Even though the government does not officially approve outposts, some were established with tacit agreement, and sometimes with active assistance of government authorities, such as the Ministry of Defense, the IDF, the Ministry of Housing and other public and official entities.[39]

The exact number of outposts is unknown since some of them consist of a trailer or a guard tower and might not even be inhabited. According to Sason Report, in 2005 there were 105 outposts: 26 of them were established on State Land, 7 on Survey Land, 15 on Private Palestinian Land, and 39 on mixed land.[40] Land ownership status of the remaining outposts is not specified in the report. In 2002,

the government officially promised to dismantle all outposts established after February 2001, but according to Peace Now, an NGO that monitors the Israeli activities in the WB, of the 50 outposts that were established after February 2001, none have been dismantled so far. This paper relies on the Peace Now list of outposts available online[41], and matches each outpost to a Palestinian district. Most of the outposts on that list (95 out of 99) are inhabited (the estimated number of resident ranges from 1 to 800), and over half have permanent houses. The change in the number of outposts in district quarter is the main dependent variable. As an alternative, and a more nuanced measure of the territorial expansion of outposts, this analysis uses data on the size of Private Palestinian land seized by the outposts. These data are also available from Peace Now. The log of change in square meters of Private Palestinian land used for outposts in district quarter is the alternative measure of the dependent variable. Log transformation is applied to this variable because the distribution of change in land seizure is right-skewed.

Independent variables - violence

Terrorism is the main independent variable measured using data on Palestinian attacks against Israeli targets. This paper uses two types of attacks to address the two hypotheses specified above: 1) Palestinian suicide attacks that originate from the WB, and strike mostly within the pre-1967 Israel; and 2) Palestinian attacks against Israeli targets within the WB. To measure suicide attacks, this paper relies on a detailed and publically available dataset constructed by Benmelech and Berrebi based on the annual reports of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA).[42] This dataset

identifies all Palestinian suicide attacks that were carried out from September 2000 through December 2006, and the home district of the perpetrators, and thus it is more compatible for the purpose of this paper than other existing datasets, such as the Global Terrorism Dataset. It codes the outcome of each attack as either success or failure. As the following section explains, the distinction between successful and failed attacks allows identifying the effect of terrorism. An attack is coded as failed if it results in at least one of the following: (1) an explosive device failed to detonate; (2) an attacker appeared suspicious, and was apprehended before exploding; (3) an attacker exploded prematurely; or (4) an attacker surrendered to the authorities without exploding. The dataset contains 143 suicide attacks, 39 of which are coded as failed. These attempts involved 157 suicide terrorists.

Even though suicide attacks have been the most lethal form of violence, they constitute only a small fraction of all attacks during this period.[43] More common modes of attack are drive-by shootings, ambushes, sniper shootings, infiltrations into settlements, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) activated against vehicles. To investigate the effect of these attacks on outposts, this paper utilizes an original dataset compiled using news archives of Ynet website.[44] The resulting dataset contains 3,657 attacks between September 2000 and December 2005, 772 of which took place against civilian or mixed targets in the WB. The identity and the district of origin of the perpetrators are rarely reported for non-suicide attacks. Instead, this paper examines whether fatal attacks against Israelis in the WB increase the number of outposts in Palestinian districts where these attacks took place. The focus on fatal attacks is useful for the purposes of this investigation because such attacks

provide a symbolic opportunity to expand outposts to commemorate the fatalities.

Indeed, there are several illustrative examples mentioned in the Introduction that

support the possibility that fatal attacks may lead to outposts' expansion. The focus

on fatal attacks is also theoretically motivated. Previous research found that

exposure to death contributes to exclusionist attitudes towards out-group that may

lead to outposts' expansion.[45]

The separate examination of suicide attacks and attacks within the WB

follows from the two hypotheses we outline above. In addition, there are several

advantages to analyze suicide attacks separately from other attack types. First, the

higher lethality of suicide attacks compared to other modes of violence may result in

more outposts following suicide bombings because of stronger revenge or

punishment motivations against home communities of suicide bombers. Second, it is

also possible that attacks against Israelis in the WB may result in outposts'

expansion precisely because they target settlers, who may then retaliate by

expanding outposts. Finally, data considerations also require that suicide attacks are

treated separately from attacks in the WB. This is because unlike with suicide

bombers, the district of origin of non-suicide attackers remains unknown in most

cases. Thus, it is impossible to study the effect of attacks within the WB on the

district of origin of these attackers. However, the location of these attacks allows

exploring whether outposts expand in places where these attacks take place, as

suggested by several anecdotal examples presented in the Introduction section. For

these reasons, the analysis is done separately on suicide attacks and subsequent

expansion of outposts in the attackers' districts of origin; and attacks in the WB and outposts growth in districts where these attacks take place.

This paper also adopts an innovative approach compared to many prior quantitative studies of the effects of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many of these studies either exclusively focus on suicide attacks[46], or pool all attacks together.[47] This analysis examines more than one attack mode, while also looking into possibly different effects of suicide attacks as opposed to other forms of violence.

Control variables

The empirical tests control for several alternative explanations of outposts' expansion. In particular, the models control for changes in the size of the settler population: growth in the number of settlers may increase demand for new housing and contribute to the establishment of outposts. Additional controls pertain to the composition of the settler population – changes in the percent of secular, religious, and orthodox settlers. Religious settlers tend to be more nationalistic, and increase in this population may lead to more outposts. Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, and Eiran show that religious Israeli settlers in the WB are more likely than secular settlers to participate in radical action (such as establishment of illegal outposts)[48]. The data on settler demographics are from Peace Now.[49] Each settlement is classified by Peace Now as either secular, nationalistic-religious, orthodox, or mixed using census data from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. This paper adopts this classification, and aggregates these numbers at district level. The empirical tests

also control for changes in the Palestinian population and unemployment in district-quarter to make sure the results are not driven by developments in the Palestinian society. These data are obtained from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.[50]

As explained below, the empirical model used in this paper allows controlling for time-invariant district-level factors, such as distance from Israel, elevation, and religious importance.

Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables.

[Table 1 about here.]

Empirical Approach to Identifying the Effect of Terrorism

Empirical Model

The unit of analysis is district-quarter[51], and the main specification is an OLS regression of the form:

$$\Delta y_{i,t} = \beta Success_{i,t-1} + \gamma \Delta X_{i,t} + \mu_t + \varepsilon_i, \qquad (1)$$

where i,t indexes a Palestinian district-quarter, $\Delta y_{i,t}$ is the change in the number of outposts between $t+1$ and $t-1$ (or the change in square meters of Private Palestinian land used for outposts in a district between $t+1$ and $t-1$). $Success_{i,t}$ is a dummy equal to 1 if there was a successful attack in quarter t, and 0 if it failed (successful suicide attacks according to the definitions presented above, and fatal attacks in the WB). $\Delta X_{i,t}$ is a vector of the change in other, district-level and time-varying characteristics (settler and Palestinian population size, and Palestinian unemployment level). μ_t are year fixed effects that account for time trends in land control. ε_i is the standard error

clustered at the district level to capture non-systematic determinants of changes in outposts.

Due to its first-difference nature, this model controls for time-invariant factors and reduces the risk of omitted variable bias, such as distance, topography, and history. The key identification assumption of this approach is that $Success_{i,t}$ is exogenous, conditional on $X_{i,t}$. Formally, this means that $E[\varepsilon_{i,t} \mid Success_{i,t}, X_{i,t}]=0$, and the treatment effect of interest is:

$$\beta = E[y_{i,t} \mid Success_{i,t} =1, X_{i,t}] - E[y_{i,t} \mid Success_{i,t} =0, X_{i,t}] \qquad (2)$$

If β is statistically-different from zero, this means that attacks affect the establishment of outposts.

Identification Assumptions

This paper estimates the local effect of attacks on outposts (β) using a variation in success of terrorism. For this strategy to work, success and failure of attacks should be uncorrelated with the error term in (1). Substantively, this means that district-years with successful and failed attacks should not be different from each other, and that characteristics that might affect land control ($X_{i,t}$) should be balanced across the success and failure cases. If success and failure cases are different with respect to determinants of land control, then identifying the causal effect of terrorism on outposts using this approach is not possible. This is because a positive correlation between successful attacks and subsequent changes in the number of outposts might also occur because successful attacks are more likely in districts with more

outposts due to such factors as religious importance, settler population, or Palestinian population-related characteristics.

To investigate whether this assumption indeed holds, Table 2 presents the mean values of district-level variables in district-quarters from which failed and successful suicide attackers originate, conditional on observing an attempted attack, and reports a *t*-test for the equality of these means. Similarly, Table 3 reports the comparison of means for districts where failed and successful attacks against Israelis occurred, conditional on observing an attempted attack.

<div align="center">[Table 2 about here.]</div>

<div align="center">[Table 3 about here.]</div>

These tables demonstrate that overall there is a good balance in terms of these characteristics, except for the size of the Palestinian population. The empirical tests control for these variables.

Results

To assess the effect of attacks on outposts, this paper estimates equation (1) using OLS with robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level to account for serial correlation of the error term. This section first presents the results with respect to suicide attacks and subsequent changes in the number of outposts in the districts of origin of successful attackers. Then, it presents similar analysis with respect to expansion of outposts in districts where attacks take place.

The Effect of Suicide Attacks on Outposts' Expansion in Attackers' Home Districts

Table 4 presents the test of H1 (effects of successful suicide attacks from a district at year *t* on the change in the number of outposts in that district between *t-1* and *t+1*). Model 1 presents the results for all district quarters and without controls. Model 2 focuses only on districts from which attempted suicide attackers originate, and compares home districts of failed and successful attackers. Model 3 adds control variables and examine all districts, and Model 4 focuses on comparison of failed and successful attackers while controlling for district-level characteristics.

[Table 4 about here.]

The results in Table 4 support H1 and show that outposts are more likely to be established in districts of origin of successful attackers. Comparison between districts of origin of successful attackers and other districts from which failed attackers or no attackers emerged (columns 1 and 3) reveals that the former experience an increase of 0.39 in the number of outposts (controlling for district-level characteristics; 95% CI: [0.037, 0.744]). When the sample is restricted to districts with at least one attempted attack, disregarding districts from which no suicide bomber emerged, the sample size becomes smaller. However, this finding still holds, and the marginal effect increases: districts of successful suicide bombers experience an increase of 0.52 in the number of outposts compared to districts of failed suicide attackers (95% CI: [0.018, 1.038]). This is a substantively important finding: as shown in Table 2, there are 54 district-quarters from which suicide bombers emerge.

The Effect of Fatal Attacks in the WB on Outposts' Expansion in Districts Where

Attacks Take Place

The tests in Table 5 examine the effect of fatal attacks against Israelis in the WB on

outposts' growth in districts where these attacks take place (H2). Recall that in

these tests successful attack is defined as a fatal attack.

[Table 5 about here.]

Like in Table 4, the results here also confirm that past violence has a positive

effect on outposts' expansion, and the substantive effects are even larger. When

comparing districts with fatal attacks to other districts that have non-fatal or no

attacks, the former experience an increase of 0.79 outposts in the quarter following

an attack (95% CI: [0.372, 1.210]). Exclusion of districts without attacks, and

comparison between districts with fatal and non-fatal attack suggests that the

former experience an increase of 0.70 in the number of outposts following fatal

attacks (95% CI: [0.282, 1.126]), in accordance with H2.

Outposts Expansion Measured Using Private Palestinian Land Captured for Outposts

Table 6 reports results of analysis using the change in the area of private Palestinian

land within outposts as a measure of the dependent variable (outposts' expansion).

The findings here support the main results that successful attacks lead to outposts'

growth, as well as increase the usage of private Palestinian land for outposts'

expansion, in home districts of suicide bombers, as well as in WB districts where

fatal attacks against Israelis take place.

[Table 6 about here.]

Overall, the findings in Tables 4, 5, and 6 suggest that violence increases outposts' construction – both in terms of additional outposts as well as Private Palestinian land seizure, in districts of origin of successful suicide bombers, and in districts where violence takes place in the WB.

Robustness Checks

This section reports robustness tests using additional functional forms, namely a negative binomial model and a linear model with lagged dependent variable. The results are in Table 7. The coefficient signs remain positive, suggesting outposts' expansion following successful attacks. In some models, due to the small number of observations, the statistical significance drops slightly below the acceptable levels. However, overall the direction of the relationship holds.

[Table 7 about here.]

Conclusion

This paper examines the effect of violence on land control in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the Second Intifada (2000-2005), and finds that successful Palestinian attacks against Israelis have a positive effect on the subsequent establishment of illegal Israeli outposts in the WB during this period. The results suggest that successful suicide attacks during these years increased the number of outposts in suicide bombers' districts of origin. Similarly, fatal attacks against Israelis within the WB during this wave of violence lead to an expansion of outposts in districts where the attacks took place. This effect is statistically and substantively significant. It is also an immediate effect that can be measured three

months after an attack. The immediacy of the effect echoes Jaeger et al.'s findings

with respect to the increase in radical attitudes among Palestinians exposed to

Israeli violence.[52]

There are several mechanisms that can explain why successful attacks lead to

more outposts. First, it is possible that outposts' expansion is a form of punishment

or revenge that is inflicted by settlers, even with government's tacit approval, on

Palestinian communities they perceive to be related to violence in order to deter

Palestinians in these areas from collaborating with the hardliners in the future. This

explanation is consistent with previous studies that document an increase in inter-

group animosity and intra-group cohesion following exposure to violence.[53] If this

mechanism is at work, then it is important for policy makers also to consider the

possibility that outposts themselves can lead to radicalization and mobilization of

the local Palestinian population. In fact, the primary goal of the attacks may be to

provoke the government or the settlers into a forceful response that in turn would

radicalize the Palestinian population and increase their support for the hardline

factions.[54]

Successful attacks may also provide an opportunity to expand the Israeli

territorial control in the WB, given that the public moves rightward following

terrorism.[55] Indeed, very often following deadly Palestinian attacks, right wing

leaders vow to expand settlements – statements that may signal to settlers that they

are free to expand outposts. This explanation fits the sons of the soil account of civil

conflict[56], whereby settlers as members of the dominant majority group, backed by

the state, move into territories that belong to the minority group and expand their

territorial presence that further prolongs the conflict, and makes it more difficult to reach a solution.

Whether outposts' growth following attacks is motivated by revenge or by the public and elite support for territorial expansion, these results suggest that violence may have substantial effects on land control and beyond. Outposts not only attract radical settlers who further contribute to escalation, but are also used as launch pads for the so-called 'price tag' operations that result in Palestinian casualties, damage to property, spark tensions, and may even lead to violence.[57] Thus, by illuminating the connection between violence and the expansion of outposts, this paper contributes to the understanding of cycles of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The findings reported here are also consistent with studies that highlight the cost that violence imposes on the perpetrators' communities.[58] Likewise, these findings contribute to the body of works that find that terrorism does not promote the political goals of groups that use it[59] because they highlight that, at least in the short term, Palestinians lose land following attacks.

The results of this paper may appear at odds with some other recent works, such as Thomas who reports that rebel groups who use terrorism are more likely to be invited to a negotiating table and offered more concessions.[60] One difference between this analysis and Thomas is that this paper does not focus on the political process, but on changes in land control. Furthermore, the analysis here looks at the short term (comparison of quarter before and after an attack), and within a specific time frame of this particular conflict. Thus, it is not entirely inconsistent with

Thomas because it is possible that the government tacitly supports outposts'

expansion to weaken the Palestinian position in negotiations. Likewise, it is possible

that settlers build outposts to establish ``facts on the ground'' in anticipation of

future negotiations.

Figure 1: Map of Israel and the Palestinian districts in the WB and Gaza strip

Figure 2: Map of Israeli settlements (blue) and outposts (orange) in the WB

Source: Peace Now

http://peacenow.org.il/eng/sites/default/files/SWBSide%20June%202009.pdf

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of outposts	264	4.8	6.0	0	24
Private Palestinian land in outposts (in square meters)	264	244,830	472,202	0	2,159,010
Attempted suicide attacks	264	0.5	1.1	0	8
% district-quarters with successful suicide attacks	264	20%	40	0%	100%
Attempted attacks in the WB	264	1.9	3.5	0	25
% district-quarters with successful attacks in the WB	264	30%	40	0%	100%
Settler population	264	19,839	18,331	9900	61,613
% Secular settlers	264	26.1%	22.4	1.3%	75.2%
% Religious-nationalistic settlers	264	33.7%	24.6	0%	78.9%
% Orthodox settlers	264	11.2%	20.8	0%	62.5%
Palestinian population	264	188,213	133,205	34,188	507,611
Palestinian unemployment rate	264	21.5%	7.9	7.3%	45.1%

Note: This table presents summary statistics of the main variables at district-quarter level.

Table 1: Summary Statistics.

Variable	Failed suicide bombers	Successful suicide bombers	Diff.	p-Value of Diff
Outposts	11	6.4	4.6***	0.00
	(1.11)	(0.72)	(1.75)	
Private Palestinian land in outposts (square meters)	693,065	342,710	350,355**	0.02
	(127,623)	(61,378)	(172,785)	
Settler population	10,902	16,008	-5,107	0.18
	(3.91)	(2.28)	(5.58)	
Secular settler population	14.5%	24.3%	-9.7%	0.09
	(5.80)	(2.89)	(7.18)	
%Nationalistic-religious settlers	48.2%	35.8%	12.4%	0.09
	(5.93)	(3.63)	(8.84)	
%Orthodox-religious settlers	5.1%	11.5%	-6.4%	0.18
	(4.71)	(2.89)	(7.05)	
Palestinian population	303,860	230,208	73,652**	0.03
	(24.53)	(15.52)	(37.71)	
Palestinian unemployment rate	24%	26.2%	-2.2%	0.19
	(2.57)	(0.99)	(2.55)	
N	10	54		

Note: This panel compares the means of district-quarters from which failed and successful suicide bombers originated (standard deviations are in parentheses). *p*-values are from one-sided t-tests. ** Difference of means is statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Difference of means is statistically significant at the 1% level.

Table 2: Comparison of district-quarters of origin of failed and successful suicide bombers.

Variable	Failed attacks within district	Successful attacks within district	Diff.	p-Value of Diff
Outposts	5.7 (0.76)	6.8 (0.80)	1.1 (1.10)	0.17
Private Palestinian land in outposts (square meters)	295,453 (62,311)	394,797 (74,645)	-99,344 (96,580)	0.15
Settler population	21,970 (2.08)	19,886 (2.26)	2,084 (3.07)	0.25
Secular settler population	22.8% (2.55)	22.0% (2.56)	0.8% (3.63)	0.41
%Nationalistic-religious settlers	31.8% (2.74)	35.7% (2.71)	-3.9% (3.88)	0.15
%Orthodox-religious settlers	14.1% (2.70)	14.1% (2.27)	0.0% (3.87)	0.49
Palestinian population	189,166 (14.50)	241,821 (17.19)	52,655*** (22.32)	0.01
Palestinian unemployment rate	23.2% (0.88)	23.7% (1.05)	-0.5% (1.36)	0.37
N	75	65		

Note: This panel compares the means of district-quarters in which failed and successful attacks against Israelis in the WB took place (standard deviations are in parentheses). *p*-values are from one-sided t-tests. *** Difference of means is statistically significant at the 1% level.

Table 3: Comparison of district-quarters with failed and successful attacks against Israeli civilian and mixed targets.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$Success_{t-1}$	0.547*** (0.185)	0.852*** (0.244)	0.390** (0.159)	0.528** (0.221)
ΔSettler population$_t$			0.03 (0.100)	-0.486 (0.300)
%ΔSecular settlers$_t$			-0.031 (0.045)	0.380 (0.371)
%ΔReligious-nationalistic settlers$_t$			-0.046 (0.057)	-0.155 (0.364)
%ΔOrthodox settlers$_t$			0.469** (0.176)	0.939** (0.379)
ΔPalestinian population$_t$			0.067*** (0.009)	0.152*** (0.029)
ΔPalestinian unemployment$_t$			0.056* (0.026)	0.134** (0.045)
Intercept	0.305 (0.141)		0.103 (0.056)	-0.098 (0.061)
R^2	0.04	0.05	0.30	0.50
F test	8.72	12.21	50.46	54.67
N	264	64	264	64

Note: OLS regression of the change in the number of outposts between *t-1* and *t+1* in suicide bombers' districts on attack outcome in quarter *t* (success indicator). Columns (1) and (3) present results using all districts (comparing the effect of successful attacks to fails and no attacks). Columns (2) and (4) use only districts-quarters with attempted attacks, and compare success to failure conditional on an attack. Standard errors and p-values are computed using robust standard errors clustered at district level. The shaded row highlights the variable of interest.
*$p<0.1$, **$p<0.05$, ***$p<0.01$

Table 4: Suicide attacks and outposts' expansion in attackers' home districts

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Success$_{t-1}$	0.998***	0.849***	0.791***	0.704***
	(0.258)	(0.242)	(0.188)	(0.189)
ΔSettler population$_t$			-0.011	-0.061
			(0.084)	(0.122)
%ΔSecular settlers$_t$			0.031	0.051
			(0.048)	(0.098)
%ΔReligious-nationalistic settlers$_t$			-0.039	-0.096
			(0.053)	(0.153)
%ΔOrthodox settlers$_t$			0.489**	0.715**
			(0.164)	(0.263)
ΔPalestinian population$_t$			0.057***	0.072***
			(0.010)	(0.015)
ΔPalestinian unemployment$_t$			0.048*	0.053*
			(0.023)	(0.027)
Intercept	0.171**	0.320***	0.018	0.058
	(0.061)	(0.101)	(0.046)	(0.099)
R^2	0.17	0.10	0.38	0.39
F test	14.96	12.36	69.02	98.66
N	264	140	264	140

Note: OLS regression of the change in the number of outposts between *t-1* and *t+1* in WB districts where attacks take place in quarter *t* (success indicator)*.* Columns (1) and (3) present results using all districts (comparing the effect of successful attacks to fails and no attacks). Columns (2) and (4) use only districts-quarters with attempted attacks, and compare success to failure conditional on an attack. Standard errors and p-values are computed using robust standard errors clustered at district level. The shaded row highlights the variable of interest.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 5: Suicide attacks and outposts' expansion in districts where attacks take place

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Success$_{t-1}$	2.120**	3.408**	3.512***	2.777***
	(0.800)	(1.270)	(0.766)	(0.696)
ΔSettler population$_t$	-0.263	-3.400**	-0.363	-0.520
	(0.428)	(1.167)	(0.362)	(0.557)
%ΔSecular settlers$_t$	0.060	1.744	0.091	0.285
	(0.326)	(1.763)	(0.315)	(0.478)
%ΔReligious-nationalistic settlers$_t$	0.168	-0.295	0.194	0.324
	(0.367)	(1.527)	(0.335)	(0.766)
%ΔOrthodox settlers$_t$	2.067**	4.523*	2.170***	3.027**
	(0.681)	(2.040)	(0.623)	(1.002)
ΔPalestinian population$_t$	0.170**	0.481***	0.145	0.186
	(0.057)	(0.150)	(0.083)	(0.109)
ΔPalestinian unemployment$_t$	0.142*	0.468**	0.110	0.126
	(0.075)	(0.150)	(0.065)	(0.071)
Intercept	0.872*	0.021	0.549*	1.136
	(0.395)	(0.361)	(0.295)	(0.681)
R^2	0.19	0.38	0.27	0.26
F test	11.21	36.20	7.47	16.83
N	243	57	243	132

Note: OLS regression of the change in the area of Private Palestinian land seized for outposts between *t-1* and *t+1* in WB districts. Only results with control variables are presented for brevity purposes. Columns (1) and (2) present the effect of successful suicide attacks on outposts' expansion in the perpetrators' districts of origin. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of fatal attacks in the WB on outposts growth in districts where these attacks take place. Columns (1) and (3) use all districts, and columns (2) and (4) only districts from which or in which attacks were attempted. Standard errors and p-values are computed using robust standard errors clustered at district level. The shaded row highlights the variable of interest.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 6: Outposts expansion measured in square meters on Private Palestinian land used for outposts

Variable	Negative binomial model		OLS with lagged DV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Suicide attack success$_{t-1}$	1.040 (0.038)		0.281** (0.097)	
WB attack success$_{t-1}$		1.10* (0.058)		0.200 (0.118)
Intercept	0.011** (0.006)	0.007*** (0.005)	-0.795 (0.875)	-0.134 (0.590)
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
R^2	0.47	0.49	0.99	0.99
N	61	135	61	135

Note: Model 1 reports the results of a negative binomial regression of the number of outposts in district *i* on a binary indicator (lag) of a successful suicide attacks coming from district *i.* Model 2 reports the same model, only this time the number of outposts in district *i* is regressed on a binary indicator (lag) of fatal attacks in district *i.* The coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratios (IRR). Models 3 and 4 report the same models, only this time using an OLS with lagged dependent variable instead of the negative binomial model. All models include controls. The sample is limited to districts with attempted attacks. Robust standard errors clustered at district levels are in parentheses.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 7: Robustness checks.

[1] Mark Peffley, Marc Hutchison, and Michal Shamir, "The Impact of Persistent Terrorism on Political Tolerance: Israel, 1980 to 2011," *American Political Science Review* 109(4) (2015), pp. 817-832.

[2] Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Eran Halperin, Keren Sharvit, and Stevan E. Hobfoll, "A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3) (2009), pp. 363-389.

[3] For the effect of terrorism on Israeli voters see Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate," *American Political Science Review* 102(3) (2008), pp.279-301; Anna Getmansky and Thomas Zeitzoff, "Terrorism and Voting: The Effect of Rocket Threat on Voting in Israeli Elections," *American Political Science Review* 108(3), pp.588-604. The following study explores the effect of exposure to Israeli violence on political attitudes of Palestinians: David A. Jaeger, Esteban Klor, Sami H. Miaari, and M. Daniele Paserman, "The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada", *Journal of Public Economics* 96(3-4) (2012), pp. 354-368.

[4] Thomas Zeitzoff, "Using Social Media to measure Conflict Dynamics: An Application to the 2008-2009 Gaza Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(6) (2011), pp. 938-969.

[5] Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza strip in August 2005, but still maintains presence in the West Bank.

[6] For a recent example, see an interview with the Hamas political leader, Khalid Mashal, in which he declared that "Our battle is on Palestinian land, because this is where the occupation and the settlements are." In Adam Ciralsky, "Hamas' Leader Mashal on the Gaza War, Tunnels, and ISIS," *Vanity Fair*, October 21, 2014, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/10/khalid-mishal-hamas-interview

[7] An example of this approach are the statements of Naftali Bennet (the current Minister of Education and the head of the Jewish Home party), who declared that the "dream is that Judea and Samaria will be part of sovereign Israel." "Bennett: Israel must make 'sacrifices' to annex the West Bank," *The Times of Israel*, October 7, 2016. http://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-israel-must-make-sacrifices-to-annex-west-bank/

[8] See Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p.6.

[9] For example, Matityahu Drobles, a former Israeli politician and a chairman of the settlement department of the World Zionist Organization from 1978 until 1992 stated that "[I]f enough Jewish settlements could be established and enough land seized and placed under Jewish control, the Palestinians would wake up one day and discover that they had lost their country." in Geoffrey Aronson, *Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank* (London: Kegan Paul International Limited, 1990), pp. 62.

[10] Sason Report, "Summary of Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts," March 10, 2005, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/law/pages/summary%20of%20opinion%20concerning%20unauthorized%20outposts%20-%20talya%20sason%20adv.aspx

[11] Peace Now, "Settlements and Outposts Numbers and Data," http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/settlements-and-outposts

[12] This research design is used by Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken, "Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1(2) (2009), pp. 55-87 to identify the effects of leaders' assassination on democratization and war participation. Additionally, Efraim Benmelech, Claud Berrebi, and Esteban Klor, "The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(2) (2010), pp. 331-353 employ this design to study the economic consequences of suicide attacks for the communities of the suicide bombers.

[13] Maoz Ester website (in Hebrew): http://www.maozester.022.co.il/BRPortal/br/P102.jsp?arc=16675

[14] Yehushua Breiner, "New Outpost Established in Itamar," *Walla!News*, March 14, 2011(in Hebrew). http://news.walla.co.il/item/1804340

[15] According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, there were 1,101 residents in Itamar at the end of 2010, thus an addition of 500 housing units constitutes a substantial expansion of this settlement. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, various years, "Local Authorities in Israel", *Locality, Population, and Codes Files*. (in Hebrew). http://www.cbs.gov.il/ishuvim/ishuvim_main.htm

[16] Barak Ravid, "Yishai: Israel Mist Build 1,000 New Units in Settlements for Every Person Murdered," *Haaretz*, March 13, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/yishai-israel-must-build-1-000-new-units-in-settlements-for-every-person-murdered-1.348879

[17] Berrebi and Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism?"

[18] Getmansky and Zeitzoff, "Terrorism and Voting"

[19] Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* 31(2) (2006), pp. 42-78.

[20] Arzu Kibris, "Funerals and Elections: The Effects of Terrorism on Voting Behavior in Turkey," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(2) (2011), pp. 220-247.

[21] Valentina Bali, "Terror and Elections: Lessons from Spain," *Electoral Studies* 26(3) (2007), pp. 669-687. Jose G. Montalvo, "Voting After the Bombings: A Natural Experiment on the Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Democratic Elections," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93(4) (2011), pp. 1146-1154.

[22] Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner-Gadarian, *Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in Threatening World* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[23] Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, and Paserman, "The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds."

[24] Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir, "The Impact of Persistent Terrorism on Political Tolerance".

[25] Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Eran Halperin, Keren Sharvit, and Stevan E. Hobfoll, "A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3) (2009), pp. 363-389; Eran Halperin, Daphna Canetti, Stevan E. Hobfoll, and Robert J. Johnson, "Terror, Resource Gains, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes among New Immigrants and Veteran Israelis," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35(6) (2009), pp. 997-1014.

[26] Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, and Hobfoll, "A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism", p. 367.

[27] Thomas Zeitzoff, "Anger, Exposure to Violence and Intragroup Conflict: A 'Lab in the Field' Experiment in Southern Israel," *Political Psychology* 35(3) (2014), pp. 309-335.

[28] For an overview of recent studies on the effect of exposure to violence on intra-group cohesion see Michal Bauer, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel, Tamar Mitts, "The Legacy of War on Social and Political Behavior," *VOX CERP's Policy Portal (2016)*, http://voxeu.org/article/legacy-war-social-and-political-behaviour

[29] Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country," *American Economic Review*, 93(1) (2003), pp. 113-132.

[30] Abadie and Gardeazabal, "The Economic Costs of Conflict," p. 115.

[31] Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor, "The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism."

[32] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *"The Besieged Palestinian Agricultural Sector,"* (2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsapp2015d1_en.pdf, p. 15.

[33] World Bank, *"The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank,"* (2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/EconomicEffectsofRestrictedAccesstoLandintheWestBankOct.20,08.pdf.

[34] Radical action is defined in literature as "willingness and readiness to use violent and illegal means", see Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, Dafna Canetti, and Ehud Eiran, "Radicalizing Religion? Religious Identity and Settlers' Behavior, " Studies *in Conflict and Terrorism* 39(6) (2016), pp. 500-518.

[35] Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, and E. Hobfoll, "A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism" and Halperin, Canetti, Hobfoll, and Johnson, "Terror, Resource Gains and Exclusionist Political Attitudes."

[36] Sason Report, "Summary of Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts". This report is an official document endorsed by the Government of Israel that examined the unauthorized outposts phenomenon in 2005. It is named after its author, Talya Sason, who served as a prosecutor at the Israeli Ministry of Justice, and conducted this official investigation upon the request of the then-Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon.

[37] Amona outpost is a case in point. Amona is the most populous outpost, home to about 50 families, and was established entirely on private Palestinian land. The outpost is located near the Ofra settlement, northeast of Ramallah. In December 2014, the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) ordered removal of the outpost, following petition by Palestinian landowners. In addition, the HCJ ordered the State to compensate the landowners for the loss of their agricultural land due to the construction of the outpost. For details in English see Yesh Din, *Petition to Remove the Unauthorized outpost of Amona* (http://www.yesh-din.org/en/petition-to-remove-the-unauthorized-outpost-of-amona/).

[38] Outposts were originally conceived in the early 1990s in response to the Oslo Accords and the difficulties that the settlers faced in approving construction of new settlements and expansion of existing ones. In 1993, a right-wing activist, Moshe

Feiglin, initiated the so-called "Doubling Campaign" to establish a satellite settlement alongside every existing settlement. This campaign intended to double in one fell swoop the number of settlements in the WB. See Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007* (New York, NY: Nation Books, 2007), pp. 145-146.

[39] Sason Report explicitly identifies two Government entities involved in establishing outposts: the Ministry of Construction and Housing and The Ministry of Defense together with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). According to the report, the Ministry of Construction and Housing funded the development of infrastructure (roads, electricity, water) in unauthorized outposts, and purchased caravans that were subsequently placed in outposts. In addition, architects from the Ministry participated in planning outposts. The IDF's Civil Administration, according to the report, provided building permits and authorized the connection of outposts to water and electricity grid. The Ministry of Defense has continuously avoided the execution of demolition orders issued against outposts.

[40] Survey Land refers to land that is in the process of becoming State Land. Mixed Land combines State Land, Survey Land, and Private Palestinian Land.

[41] Peace Now, "Settlements and Outposts Numbers and Data."

[42] Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, "Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21(3) (2007), pp. 223-238.

[43] According to Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (p.334), suicide attacks constitute about 0.5 percent of the total number of Palestinian attacks against Israel during this period, but they are responsible for more than one half of the total number of casualties sustained by Israel (over 1,000 casualties between 2000 and 2006).

[44] The military and security section of Ynet archive was used to identify all attacks between September 2000 and December 2005: http://www.ynet.co.il/home/0,7340,L-4269-141-344,00.html

[45] Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, and Hobfoll, "A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism", p. 366; and Halperin, Canetti, Hobfoll, and Johnson, "Terror, Resource Gains and Exclusionist Political Attitudes."

[46] For example, Berrebi and Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism?" and Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor, "The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism" only examine the effects of suicide attacks.

[47] For example, Canetti-Nissim, Halperin, Sharvit, and Hobfoll, "A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes" and Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir,

"The Impact of Persistent Terrorism on Political Tolerance" pool together all types of attacks, without distinguishing among different modes of violence. Getmansky and Zeitzoff, "Terrorism and Voting" examine only the effect of exposure to rockets threat.

[48] Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, and Eiran, "Radicalizing Religion? Religious Identity and Settlers' Behavior."

[49] See the file with the complete list of settlements: http://www.peacenow.org.il/node/297.

[50] Data on population by Governorate (district) are available here: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang__en/803/default.aspx. Unemployment data are available here: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang__en/763/default.aspx.

[51] There are 11 Palestinian districts in the WB (see Figure 1), each appears 24 times, once every quarter between January 2000 and December 2005.

[52] Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, and Paserman, "The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds."

[53] Canetti-Nissim, Halperin, Sharvit, and Hobfoll, "A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes" and Bauer et al., "The Legacy of War on Social and Political Behavior."

[54] Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2) (2007), pp. 364-381; Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, and Paserman, "The struggle for Palestinian hearts and minds".

[55] Berrebi and Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism?"; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, "Terrorism and Voting."

[56] James Fearon and David Latin, "Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War." *World Development* 39(2) (2011), pp. 199-211.

[57] Ehud Eiran and Peter Krause, "Old (Molotov) Cocktails in New Bottles? 'Price-Tag' and Settler Violence in Israel and the West Bank," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Forthcoming.

[58] Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor, "The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism."

[59] Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work."

[60] Jakana Thomas, "Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4) (2014), pp. 808-814.