Human Rights

This casebook provides a comprehensive, accessible, and up-to-date analysis of international human rights law. It emphasizes the relationship between the international, regional, and national legal systems (with a particular focus on the United States), features an intellectual and historical development of the idea of human rights, and analyzes recent developments in areas including corporate responsibility, terrorism and human rights, the rights of refugees, international criminal law, and the role of nongovernmental organizations. The first edition has been comprehensively revised and updated to address important and hot-button issues and topics in international human rights law.https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1055/thumbnail.jp

Human Rights

This casebook provides a comprehensive, accessible, and up-to-date analysis of international human rights law. It emphasizes the relationship between the international, regional, and national legal systems (with a particular focus on the United States), features an intellectual and historical development of the idea of human rights, and analyzes recent developments in areas including corporate responsibility, terrorism and human rights, the rights of refugees, international criminal law, and the role of nongovernmental organizations. The first edition has been comprehensively revised and updated to address important and hot-button issues and topics in international human rights law.https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1055/thumbnail.jp

Ownership and Control: A Small-World Analysis

In this paper we investigate the ownership and control of British firms using recent techniques from computational graph theory. In particular, we analyze the `small-world' properties of UK company ownership and the corporate elite. A `small-world' is characterized by short `path-lengths' (actors are linked by a short chain of acquaintances) and high `clustering' (one's friends tend to be friends in their own right). We find that the network of both ownership and control can be characterized as a small-world. We simulate a set of corporate worlds using newly introduced random-graph models of Chung and Lu. In general, we reject the hypothesis that the corporate world of ownership and control is generated by a random graph model. The network structure of ownership and boards is decidedly more `clubby' than would be expected by chance, suggesting the presence of additional social structure not captured by the random graph model. In addition, we find that financial institutions are important and give rise to different network topologies