Section 10 Forbearance: Asking the Right Questions to Get the Right Answers

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 aimed to “provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans….” Key to the Federal Communication Commission’s ability to satisfy this deregulatory mandate is Section 10 of the 1996 Act which provides the agency with express legal authority to forbear from enforcing certain portions of the Communications Act. In this paper, we use the agency’s Phoenix Forbearance Order as a template for outlining how the Commission can improve its forbearance analysis. Our analysis focuses on forbearance from the unbundling provisions in the 1996 Act, but we also show how the Phoenix Forbearance Order is relevant to the net neutrality debate. In particular, the Phoenix Forbearance Order rejects the validity of forbearance in the presence of either monopoly or duopolistic competition. Given the Commission’s finding that Broadband Service Providers are “terminating monopolists,” forbearance cannot be used to create what is colloquially referred to as “Title II Lite.” In fact, if the retail broadband service is classified as a Title II service, then the Commission’s stance on broadband competition and the Phoenix Forbearance Order’s conclusions on duopolistic competition likely requires, for the first time, the price regulation of all retail broadband connections

Temporal and Spatial Distribution of Finfish Bycatch in the U.S. Atlantic Bottom Longline Shark Fishery

Bycatch in U.S. fisheries has become an increasingly important issue to both fisheries managers and the public, owing to the wide range of marine resources that can be involved. From 2002 to 2006, the Commercial Shark Fishery Observer Program (CSFOP) and the Shark Bottom Longline Observer Program (SBLOP) collected data on catch and bycatch caught on randomly selected vessels of the U.S. Atlantic shark bottom longline fishery. Three subregions (eastern Gulf of Mexico, South Atlantic, Mid-Atlantic Bight), five years (2002–06), four hook types (small, medium, large, and other), seven depth ranges (300 m), and eight broad taxonomic categories (e.g. Selachimorpha, Batoidea, Serranidae, etc.) were used in the analyses. Results indicated that the majority of bycatch (number) was caught in the eastern Gulf of Mexico and that the Selachimorpha taxon category made up over 90% of the total bycatch. The factors year followed by depth were the most common significant factors affecting bycatch

Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure, and Convergence

In the last few years, U.S. telecoms policy has shifted from encouraging the sharing of existing networks to facilitating the deployment of advanced communications networks. Given the large capital expenditures required for these networks, there can be only a few of such networks. In light of the natural forces that limit the number of facilities-based suppliers, it is vital for policymakers to investigate and implement rules that make markets more conducive to facilities-based entry and eliminate any existing rules that discourage deployment. The purpose of this Article is to provide a simple conceptual framework to evaluate the effect of particular rules and regulation on the construction of advanced communications networks and the expansion of existing networks into new markets. We provide numerical examples and a number of applications to illustrate how the conceptual framework implicates particular rules and regulations as to their effect on facilities-based entry. Applications include an analysis of convergence, regulated limitations on service offerings, the pernicious effects of cable franchising, and the potential for collusion

Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure, and Convergence

In the last few years, U.S. telecoms policy has shifted from encouraging the sharing of existing networks to facilitating the deployment of advanced communications networks. Given the large capital expenditures required for these networks, there can be only a few of such networks. In light of the natural forces that limit the number of facilities-based suppliers, it is vital for policymakers to investigate and implement rules that make markets more conducive to facilities-based entry and eliminate any existing rules that discourage deployment. The purpose of this Article is to provide a simple conceptual framework to evaluate the effect of particular rules and regulation on the construction of advanced communications networks and the expansion of existing networks into new markets. We provide numerical examples and a number of applications to illustrate how the conceptual framework implicates particular rules and regulations as to their effect on facilities-based entry. Applications include an analysis of convergence, regulated limitations on service offerings, the pernicious effects of cable franchising, and the potential for collusion

Market Definition and the Economic Effects of Special Access Price Regulation

Market definition is an essential ingredient to competitive and regulatory analysis. Yet, there is significant disparity regarding the definition of the relevant geographic market for high-capacity circuits, commonly referred to as Special Access services. Given the present debate over expanding price regulation in this sector, the importance of market definition on the expected economic effects of regulation is worth evaluating. In this article, we demonstrate that if geographic markets are “location specific” and supplied by a monopolist as the proponents of regulation claim, then price regulation reduces economic welfare in all instances. That is, even with monopoly supply, regulation offers no improvement in economic welfare, meaning the debates over the extent of competition and profit margins in such markets are irrelevant. The effect of regulation is mostly to transfer profits from sellers to buyers, so the debate appears to be largely a squabble over rents. That said, every $1 of transfer costs more than$1 to society, so regulation reduces welfare. This analysis demonstrates that the present case for regulating high-capacity services is woefully inadequate and poorly conceived