Convicting Politicians for Corruption:The Politics of Criminal Accountability

Why are politicians more likely to be prosecuted and convicted for corruption in some contexts rather than in others? Pulling together disparate threads of the literature on what we call the politics of criminal accountability, this review organizes current explanations along three levels of inquiry: (1) micro, encompassing characteristics of individual criminal-accountability agents and defendants, such as their partisanship and ideology, professional ethos, enforcement costs and judicial corruption; (2) meso, emphasizing the independence, capacities and coordination degrees of criminal-accountability institutions; and (3) macro, including the impact of political regimes, political competition, support from civil society, corruption levels and international norms. In doing so, we draw attention to methodological shortcomings and opportunities for research on the topic, providing a roadmap for this field of inquiry that also includes unexplored questions and tentative answers. Furthermore, we present new systematic data set that reveals a substantial increase in the conviction of former heads of government for corruption since 2000, underscoring the importance of the phenomenon and highlighting the need for further research into the politics of criminal accountability

Subdesenvolvimento, dependência e neo-colonialismo no Quênia

08

Teste da existência de ciclos políticos no período populista

08

Digital technology, citizens’ engagement and electoral corruption in Colombia

This chapter examines innovations by Colombia’s civil society to counter electoral corruption. Like many countries, electoral corruption is a long-standing problem in Colombia. Illegal campaign financing, vote buying, voter intimidation, voter impersonation, and ballot-box stuffing are frequent practices in many parts of the country. I examine the effect of digital technologies on the activities performed by the Mission of Electoral Observation (Misión de Observación Electoral, MOE as a Spanish acronym), an organisation created by Colombian activists in 2006. MOE’s ability to gather and process data on electoral corruption from multiple sources, including citizens’ reports of corruption using crowdsourcing technology, and thousands of observers in polling stations, has allowed it to push forward the agenda on electoral integrity in Colombia. Like other organisations working on anti-corruption, the MOE faces challenges to engage citizens in online and offline activities, and its proposals of reform of electoral administration face substantial backlash by political elites

Elections and Corruption in Brazilian Municipal Governments

Este capítulo apresenta um panorama sobre a corrupção política nas prefeituras brasileiras, partindo do que foi escrito por cientistas políticos e economistas na última década. Além de propor uma organização do debate sobre a punição da corrupção por parte dos eleitores, exponho alguns dados sobre o nível de corrupção e as sanções a prefeitos e ex-prefeitos por parte do judiciário, que entendo serem úteis para o debate. O foco é em pesquisas empíricas que usam métodos quantitativos para estudar questões ligadas à corrupção nos executivos municipais em que há a responsabilização do prefeito. Não se trata, portanto, de uma revisão exaustiva da literatura sobre o tema, cuja diversidade de abordagens sem dúvida enriquece a compreensão do fenômeno

Elections and Corruption in Brazilian Municipal Governments

Este capítulo apresenta um panorama sobre a corrupção política nas prefeituras brasileiras, partindo do que foi escrito por cientistas políticos e economistas na última década. Além de propor uma organização do debate sobre a punição da corrupção por parte dos eleitores, exponho alguns dados sobre o nível de corrupção e as sanções a prefeitos e ex-prefeitos por parte do judiciário, que entendo serem úteis para o debate. O foco é em pesquisas empíricas que usam métodos quantitativos para estudar questões ligadas à corrupção nos executivos municipais em que há a responsabilização do prefeito. Não se trata, portanto, de uma revisão exaustiva da literatura sobre o tema, cuja diversidade de abordagens sem dúvida enriquece a compreensão do fenômeno

Gênese e precursores do desenvolvimentismo no Brasil

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Subdesenvolvimento, dependência e neo-colonialismo no Quênia

08

How Politicians React to Anti-Corruption Investigations and Enforcement. Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities

This dissertation examines how reactions by political elites moderate the efficacy of anti-corruption policies. The focus is on how their reactions explain the resilience of corruption and the limit the functioning of different tools of democratic systems: electoral accountability, legislative oversight of the executive branch and the sanctioning of corruption by judicial authorities. I study these in the context of policies to curb corruption in Brazilian municipal governments that have been implemented since the beginning of the 2000s.Professional and independent audits uncovered substantial evidence of corruption in most municipal governments but did not lead to substantial electoral consequences. I demonstrate that one ways through which Brazilian mayors avoid damages to their careers by changing their rent-sharing strategies. After an audit, they share more of the spoils of holding office with council members who are crucial for their short-term survival in government. If the share of legislators from their own party is low, council members benefit from a larger increase in their wealth. This makes council members less likely to defect from the mayors' coalition and helps mayors to get the support from other political parties in the subsequent election. This suggest that short-term gains targeted at specific individuals might come at the expense of long-run transformations in municipal governments.In addition, mayors and potential participants in corrupt transactions respond to the removal from office of neighboring mayors, a visible form of punishment for corruption, by engaging less in activities that might latter result in their own conviction. My findings corroborate the resilience of the political elites to interventions that might undermine the status quo as well as their ability to adapt their behavior to new circumstances