Prioritise greenhouse gas neutrality: EU and German climate policy should be more ambitious and more pragmatic

Two years after the climate summit in Paris, the euphoria over the diplomatic break-through and adoption of new targets - holding the temperature increase to well below 2 degrees Celsius, preferably even to 1.5 degrees - has largely evaporated. There has been little sign of additional ambition in climate change mitigation since. One fundamental problem is the global nature of temperature targets, which are little suited for generating concrete national action plans and not at all suited for evaluating emissions reduction measures implemented by governments or businesses. Starting with the "facilitative dialogue" being prepared at the Bonn climate summit for 2018, it is the third Paris mitigation target that should be the benchmark: namely to attain greenhouse-gas neutrality in the second half of the century. The European Commission and member states of the European Union (EU) should make the zero emissions target their central reference point in reformulating the Climate Roadmap 2050 and in adopting a long-term decarbonisation strategy. This could provide the opportunity to redesign the EU’s climate policy so as to make it both more ambitious and more pragmatic. (author's abstract

Ensuring the quality of scientific climate policy advice: in an increasingly pragmatic policy environment, advisors should take a step away from politics

"The UN climate summit in Paris will bring about a new bottom-up type of agreement based on voluntary emissions reduction pledges by individual states. This marks the end of the top-down policy paradigm dominant for more than two decades. Scientific advisors should use the paradigm shift manifesting itself in UN negotiations as an opportunity to critically reassess their role in international climate policy. In the future, it will become even more difficult to present findings that are both politically viable and scientifically sound. In situations where these standards conflict, advisors and advisory bodies must resist both political pressures and incentives that undermine scientific integrity." (author's abstract

Modifying the 2° C target: climate policy objectives in the contested terrain of scientific policy advice, political preferences, and rising emissions

In the 20 years since the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted, progress in global climate policy has been modest. Annual greenhouse gas emissions have increased by over one-third since 1992. Acute conflicts of interest remain a persistent obstacle. One of the few points of general consensus in the international community is on the overarching objective of limiting the temperature increase to two degrees Celsius. If one is to accept key recommendations from scientific policy advisors, emissions will have to be reduced significantly between 2010 and 2020 to stay below the 2°C limit. Yet given that global emissions trends are moving in the opposite direction and will be impossible to reverse in a matter of a few years, this goal is patently unrealistic. And since a target that is obviously unattainable cannot fulfill either a positive symbolic function or a productive governance function, the primary target of international climate policy will have to be modified. The express aim of this paper is to stand apart from the innumerable studies detailing theoretically possible measures to avoid crossing the 2°C threshold. Instead, it provides the first systematic analysis of possible options for modifying the 2°C target. A particular focus is placed here on the relationship between climate science and climate policy. Since the EU brought the objective into the climate policy arena, the modification of the 2°C target carries the risk of damaging the EU's public image. Furthermore, it would lead to a debate over the easing of the EU's internal emissions reduction objectives which are directly derived from the 2°C target. This could become a highly controversial issue in the coming years, when the EU has to decide on its legally binding emissions target for 2030. (author's abstract)Zwanzig Jahre nachdem die Klimarahmenkonvention der Vereinten Nationen verabschiedet wurde, fällt die Bilanz der internationalen Klimapolitik bescheiden aus. Die jährlichen Emissionen sind seit 1992 um gut ein Drittel gewachsen. Die Interessengegensätze zwischen Industrie-, Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern sind anhaltend groß. Einer der wenigen Aspekte, über die Konsens besteht, ist das übergeordnete Ziel, den Temperaturanstieg auf zwei Grad Celsius zu beschränken. Folgt man den Kernaussagen der Klimaforschung, müssten die Emissionen zwischen 2010 und 2020 bereits deutlich reduziert werden, um ein Scheitern des von der EU durchgesetzten 2-Grad-Ziels noch zu verhindern. Angesichts eines gegenläufigen globalen Emissionstrends ist dies völlig unrealistisch. Da ein als unerreichbar geltendes Ziel politisch aber weder eine positive Symbol- noch eine produktive Steuerungsfunktion erfüllen kann, wird das zentrale Ziel der internationalen Klimapolitik unweigerlich modifiziert werden müssen. Vor diesem Hintergrund reiht sich die vorliegende Studie nicht in die Vielzahl von Untersuchungen ein, in denen dargelegt wird, mit welchen Maßnahmen sich das Überschreiten der 2-Grad-Marke theoretisch noch vermeiden ließe. Vielmehr werden hier erstmals systematisch mögliche Varianten einer Veränderung des 2-Grad-Ziels analysiert. Eine politische Diskussion über die Zukunft des 2-Grad-Ziels ist bisher ausgeblieben. Da die Emissionen weltweit immer noch ansteigen, wird die EU dieser Frage aber nicht mehr lange ausweichen können. Die hierbei entscheidenden Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU-Mitgliedstaaten werden sich darüber klarwerden müssen, wie eine Veränderung der Zielformel mit ihren jeweiligen klima-, außen- und wirtschaftspolitischen Interessen in Einklang gebracht werden kann. (Autorenreferat

Asymmetric synthesis of 2-substituted oxetan-3-ones via metalated SAMP/RAMP hydrazones

2-Substituted oxetan-3-ones can be prepared in good yields and enantioselectivities (up to 84% ee) by the metalation of the SAMP/RAMP hydrazones of oxetan-3-one, followed by reaction with a range of electrophiles that include alkyl, allyl, and benzyl halides. Additionally, both chiral 2,2- and 2,4-disubstituted oxetan-3-ones can be made in high ee (86–90%) by repetition of this lithiation/alkylation sequence under appropriately controlled conditions. Hydrolysis of the resultant hydrazones with aqueous oxalic acid provides the 2-substituted oxetan-3-ones without detectable racemization

Climate negotiations in times of multiple crises: credibility and trust in international climate politics after COP 27

The 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) to the United Nations Framework Conven­tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, was marked by multiple crises and the shaken confidence of developing countries in the multilateral process. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached on the critical issue of loss and damage, even though many key aspects still need to be fleshed out. With regard to emission reduc­tions, there is a credibility crisis that threatens to worsen, not only because political priorities have shifted following Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In order to strengthen international climate cooperation in the coming years, it will be crucial to honour existing commitments, adhere to agreed processes, and show diplomatic tact in deal­ing with partner countries. (Autorenreferat

Climate neutrality as long-term strategy: the EU's net zero target and its consequences for member states

As a traditional frontrunner in international climate policy, the European Union (EU) is under great pressure to meet global expectations. In 2020, it must present its long-term decarbonisation strategy to the United Nations. Political attention has so far focussed on the lack of consensus among the Member States on whether they should adopt the European Commission's proposed goal of "greenhouse gas neutrality" by 2050. Two aspects of this decision have hardly been debated so far - first, the ques­tion of whether this will herald the end of differentiated reduction commitments by Member States, and second, the tightening of the EU climate target for 2030. National governments and climate policymakers will have to take both issues into account. (author's abstract

After the Paris agreement: new challenges for the EU's leadership in climate policy

In December 2015, 195 countries adopted a new global climate agreement in Paris. It provides an expanded regulatory framework and specifies the goals of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). A significant number of states including the U.S. are expected to ratify the Paris Agreement (PA) within the year. Industrialized nations have a strong obligation to keep up the momentum that was generated in Paris. If the European Union (EU) wants to maintain its leadership role, it should focus on two key tasks in 2016. First, it should speed up legislation to implement the climate and energy targets for 2030 adopted by the European Council, a political prerequisite for Member States' ratification of the PA. Second, it should expand and strengthen cooperation with the developing countries. For the immediate future, an increase in EU climate ambitions for 2030 or 2050 is not likely to become part of the political agenda. (author's abstract

Moving targets: negotiations on the EU’s energy and climate policy objectives for the post-2020 period and implications for the German energy transition

"Since 2007, energy and climate policy has occupied a prominent place on the agenda of the European Union. The so-called '20-20-20 targets' negotiated during the German Council Presidency were the first step towards an integrated policy approach. Because of the long investment cycles in the energy industry and the time needed for the EU to reach agreement on its position in the international climate negotiations, debate on the policy framework for the period beyond 2020 has already begun. In January 2014, the Commission proposed targets of a 40 percent reduction in emissions and a 27 percent share of renewable energy by 2030. However, any decision on a new EU energy and climate strategy ultimately lies with the European Council, in which the 28 heads of state and government have to reach consensus. If one compares the present situation with that before 2007, a shift in priorities becomes evident. Since the onset of the global economic crisis, energy price trends have substantially increased in importance. Negative experiences in global climate negotiations have led to disagreements within the EU over whether unilateral commitments should be made prior to an international agreement. Already it seems likely that the project of long-term transformation to a low-carbon economy will face major difficulties when it comes to practical implementation. By analyzing the decision-making process primarily from the negotiators’ perspective this study considers the plausible and probable outcomes of negotiations to establish a new EU energy and climate policy framework. In addition, it explores how the likely scenario of an unambitious EU compromise would affect Germany's 'Energiewende' (energy transition) policy." (author's abstract