Aid unpredictability and absorptive capacity: analyzing disbursement delays in Africa.

This paper examines the extent to which aid disbursement delays could be used as an indicator of the aid unpredictability and absorptive capacity in recipient countries. Since many recipient countries are dependent on aid, disbursement delays might matter for its effectiveness. The emphasis is put on the so-called pipeline approach, according to which, in the short run, disbursement constraints may lead to huge delays and weak rates of aid disbursement relative to commitments. After the literature review on disbursement delays, we use the framework of programmable aid to run some econometric estimations through a dynamic model, an ARDL, for a panel of 48 African countries during the period of 1975–2008. We find disbursement constraints mainly at the short-run level, while the main donor's specific factors seem to be the selectivity and the degree of aid fragmentation. Disbursement rates and rhythms are also influenced by the economic performance and governance quality of the recipient countries and the share of grants in aid modalities. Bilateral donors are found to under-perform in comparison with multilateral donors in terms of the rhythm of aid disbursement.Foreign aid, absorptive capacity, disbursement delays, panel ARDL

Environmental Compliance, Corruption and Governance: Theory and Evidence on Forest Stock in Developing Countries

This paper analyses the relationships between environmental compliance, corruption and environmental regulations in the case of forestry. Using a Principal-Agent model, we highlight interrelationships between firm's environmental non-compliance and corruption conditioned to the efficiency of the legal and regulatory framework. Moreover, we show that environmental compliance and judicial efficiency may be complementary or substitutable depending on the level of judicial efficiency to strengthen the forest stock. After having design a new indicator of environmental compliance, we test these predictions using cross section data for 59 developing countries. The empirical results support the predictions of the model. Judicial efficiency reduces corruption and environmental non compliance which are positively correlated and conditioned to judicial efficiency. We also find empirical evidences on the substitutability and complementarity of environmental compliance and judicial efficiency to preserve the forest stock.corruption, Environmental compliance, Forest Stock, political economy, governance

Assessing the World Bank’s influence on the good governance paradigm

What does governance mean for the World Bank and to what extent does the organization succeed in diffusing the paradigm worldwide? The World Bank primarily focused on economic aspects of governance in the 1980s, and progressively moved to its political dimensions towards the end of 1990s. The paper discusses the reasons for this global shift and its consistency with regard to the values of the liberal society. Bibliometric methods are used to evaluate the role of the Bank as a producer of knowledge on this specific issue. The potential influence of the World Bank’s main governance indicators: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and Doing Business, is depicted through what donors claim when allocating aid, and beyond rhetoric, through what correlations suggest. For each of the main international donors, cross-sectional econometric regressions are run on large samples of developing countries (2005-2008). Depending on the donor we look at, empirical results do not reject strong covariations between new aid commitments and the CPIA, and to a lesser extent with the WGI.The World Bank, governance, liberal society, soft power, aid commitments

Assessing the World Bank's influence on the good governance paradigm

What does governance mean for the World Bank (WB) and how far does the organization influence the world community with this concept? The World Bank primarily focused on economic aspects of governance in the 1980s and progressively moved to its political dimensions in the end of 1990s. The paper discusses the reasons for this global shift and its consistency with regard to the values of the liberal society. Bibliometric methods are used to evaluate the role of the Bank as a producer of knowledge on this specific issue. In addition the academic relationships that the organization built to shape the 'good governance' concept are explored. As well as networking, which contributes to the promotion of its worldwide influence, the soft and hard powers of the Bank are seen at work through aid allocation systems. The potential influence of the main WB's governance indicators (CPIA, WGI and Doing Business) is depicted through what donors claim, and beyond rhetoric, through what correlations suggest. For each of the main international donors, cross-sectional econometric regressions are run on large samples of developing countries (2005-2008). According to the donor we look at, empirical results do not reject strong covariations between new commitments and the CPIA or the WGI.The World Bank;governance;liberal society;Knowledge;aid commitments;Soft and Hard power

Does Pervasive Corruption Matter For Firm's Demand for Good Governance in Developing Countries?

This paper investigates empirically the relationships between the corruption climate and the demand for good governance by focusing on firms' behaviors in developing countries. The concept of demand for good governance is conceived in terms of a firm's willingness to comply with regulatory norms measured through the firm's perception of the level of public accountability as well as the firm's behavior in terms of corruption practices. While there is a growing theoretical literature on the importance of externality mechanisms of corruption phenomena, little empirical evidences has been highlighted. This paper contributes to fill this gap by using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey. We show that when corruption is found to be a very important constraint for a firm's business, its willingness to comply decreases and the probability of the firm's corrupting officials increases. These results support arguments according to which the demand for good governance is likely to be influenced by the perception of the existence of pervasive corruption. Moreover, the results are conditioned on countries' institutional features and the type of regulation. Some evidence is also found for firms' environmental overcompliance.Corruption; Compliance; Regulation; Firms

Assessing the World Bank's influence on the good governance paradigm

What does governance mean for the World Bank and to what extent does the organization succeed in diffusing the paradigm worldwide? The World Bank primarily focused on economic aspects of governance in the 1980s, and progressively moved to its political dimensions towards the end of 1990s. The paper discusses the reasons for this global shift and its consistency with regard to the values of the liberal society. Bibliometric methods are used to evaluate the role of the Bank as a producer of knowledge on this specific issue. The potential influence of the World Bank's main governance indicators: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and Doing Business, is depicted through what donors claim when allocating aid, and beyond rhetoric, through what correlations suggest. For each of the main international donors, cross-sectional econometric regressions are run on large samples of developing countries (2005-2008). Depending on the donor we look at, empirical results do not reject strong covariations between new aid commitments and the CPIA, and to a lesser extent with the WGI.The World Bank;governance;liberal society;soft power;aid commitments

Environmental Compliance, Corruption and Governance: Theory and Evidence on Forest Stock in Developing Countries

This paper analyses the relationships between environmental compliance, corruption and environmental regulations in the case of forestry. Using a Principal-Agent model, we highlight interrelationships between firm's environmental non-compliance and corruption conditioned to the efficiency of the legal and regulatory framework. Moreover, we show that environmental compliance and judicial efficiency may be complementary or substitutable depending on the level of judicial efficiency to strengthen the forest stock. After having design a new indicator of environmental compliance, we test these predictions using cross section data for 59 developing countries. The empirical results support the predictions of the model. Judicial efficiency reduces corruption and environmental non compliance which are positively correlated and conditioned to judicial efficiency. We also find empirical evidences on the substitutability and complementarity of environmental compliance and judicial efficiency to preserve the forest stock.corruption;Environmental compliance;Forest Stock;political economy;governance

Environmental Compliance, Corruption and Governance: Theory and Evidence on Forest Stock in Developing Countries

This paper analyses the relationships between environmental compliance, corruption and environmental regulations in the case of forestry. Using a Principal-Agent model, we highlight interrelationships between firm's environmental non-compliance and corruption conditioned to the efficiency of the legal and regulatory framework. Moreover, we show that environmental compliance and judicial efficiency may be complementary or substitutable depending on the level of judicial efficiency to strengthen the forest stock. After having design a new indicator of environmental compliance, we test these predictions using cross section data for 59 developing countries. The empirical results support the predictions of the model. Judicial efficiency reduces corruption and environmental non compliance which are positively correlated and conditioned to judicial efficiency. We also find empirical evidences on the substitutability and complementarity of environmental compliance and judicial efficiency to preserve the forest stock

Assessing the World Bank's influence on the good governance paradigm

What does governance mean for the World Bank (WB) and how far does the organization influence the world community with this concept? The World Bank primarily focused on economic aspects of governance in the 1980s and progressively moved to its political dimensions in the end of 1990s. The paper discusses the reasons for this global shift and its consistency with regard to the values of the liberal society. Bibliometric methods are used to evaluate the role of the Bank as a producer of knowledge on this specific issue. In addition the academic relationships that the organization built to shape the 'good governance' concept are explored. As well as networking, which contributes to the promotion of its worldwide influence, the soft and hard powers of the Bank are seen at work through aid allocation systems. The potential influence of the main WB's governance indicators (CPIA, WGI and Doing Business) is depicted through what donors claim, and beyond rhetoric, through what correlations suggest. For each of the main international donors, cross-sectional econometric regressions are run on large samples of developing countries (2005-2008). According to the donor we look at, empirical results do not reject strong covariations between new commitments and the CPIA or the WGI