8 research outputs found

    Space Pseudorandom Generators by Communication Complexity Lower Bounds

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    In 1989, Babai, Nisan and Szegedy gave a construction of a pseudorandom generator for logspace, based on lower bounds for multiparty communication complexity. The seed length of their pseudorandom generator was relatively large, because the best lower bounds for multiparty communication complexity are relatively weak. Subsequently, pseudorandom generators for logspace with seed length O(log^2 n) were given by Nisan, and Impagliazzo, Nisan and Wigderson. In this paper, we show how to use the pseudorandom generator construction of Babai, Nisan and Szegedy to obtain a third construction of a pseudorandom generator with seed length O(log^2 n), achieving the same parameters as Nisan, and Impagliazzo, Nisan and Wigderson. We achieve this by concentrating on protocols in a restricted model of multiparty communication complexity that we call the conservative one-way unicast model and is based on the conservative one-way model of Damm, Jukna and Sgall. We observe that bounds in the conservative one-way unicast model (rather than the standard Number On the Forehead model) are sufficient for the pseudorandom generator construction of Babai, Nisan and Szegedy to work. Roughly speaking, in a conservative one-way unicast communication protocol, the players speak in turns, one after the other in a fixed order, and every message is visible only to the next player. Moreover, before the beginning of the protocol, each player only knows the inputs of the players that speak after she does and a certain function of the inputs of the players that speak before she does. We prove a lower bound for the communication complexity of conservative one-way unicast communication protocols that compute a family of functions obtained by compositions of strong extractors. Our final pseudorandom generator construction is related to, but different from the constructions of Nisan, and Impagliazzo, Nisan and Wigderson

    Two Sides of the Coin Problem

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    In the coin problem, one is given n independent flips of a coin that has bias b > 0 towards either Head or Tail. The goal is to decide which side the coin is biased towards, with high confidence. An optimal strategy for solving the coin problem is to apply the majority function on the n samples. This simple strategy works as long as b > c(1/sqrt n) for some constant c. However, computing majority is an impossible task for several natural computational models, such as bounded width read once branching programs and AC^0 circuits. Brody and Verbin proved that a length n, width w read once branching program cannot solve the coin problem for b < O(1/(log n)^w). This result was tightened by Steinberger to O(1/(log n)^(w-2)). The coin problem in the model of AC^0 circuits was first studied by Shaltiel and Viola, and later by Aaronson who proved that a depth d size s Boolean circuit cannot solve the coin problem for b < O(1/(log s)^(d+2)). This work has two contributions: 1. We strengthen Steinberger\u27s result and show that any Santha-Vazirani source with bias b < O(1/(log n)^(w-2)) fools length n, width w read once branching programs. In other words, the strong independence assumption in the coin problem is completely redundant in the model of read once branching programs, assuming the bias remains small. That is, the exact same result holds for a much more general class of sources. 2. We tighten Aaronson\u27s result and show that a depth d, size s Boolean circuit cannot solve the coin problem for b < O(1/(log s)^(d-1)). Moreover, our proof technique is different and we believe that it is simpler and more natural

    On Communication Complexity of Fixed Point Computation

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    Brouwer's fixed point theorem states that any continuous function from a compact convex space to itself has a fixed point. Roughgarden and Weinstein (FOCS 2016) initiated the study of fixed point computation in the two-player communication model, where each player gets a function from [0,1]n[0,1]^n to [0,1]n[0,1]^n, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the composition of the two functions. They left it as an open question to show a lower bound of 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)} for the (randomized) communication complexity of this problem, in the range of parameters which make it a total search problem. We answer this question affirmatively. Additionally, we introduce two natural fixed point problems in the two-player communication model. ∙\bullet Each player is given a function from [0,1]n[0,1]^n to [0,1]n/2[0,1]^{n/2}, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the concatenation of the functions. ∙\bullet Each player is given a function from [0,1]n[0,1]^n to [0,1]n[0,1]^{n}, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the interpolation of the functions. We show a randomized communication complexity lower bound of 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)} for these problems (for some constant approximation factor). Finally, we initiate the study of finding a panchromatic simplex in a Sperner-coloring of a triangulation (guaranteed by Sperner's lemma) in the two-player communication model: A triangulation TT of the dd-simplex is publicly known and one player is given a set SA⊂TS_A\subset T and a coloring function from SAS_A to {0,…,d/2}\{0,\ldots ,d/2\}, and the other player is given a set SB⊂TS_B\subset T and a coloring function from SBS_B to {d/2+1,…,d}\{d/2+1,\ldots ,d\}, such that SA∪˙SB=TS_A\dot\cup S_B=T, and their goal is to find a panchromatic simplex. We show a randomized communication complexity lower bound of ∣T∣Ω(1)|T|^{\Omega(1)} for the aforementioned problem as well (when dd is large)

    Communication Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium with Small Support

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    We define a two-player N x N game called the 2-cycle game, that has a unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the only correlated equilibrium of the game. In this game, every 1/poly(N)-approximate correlated equilibrium is concentrated on the pure Nash equilibrium. We show that the randomized communication complexity of finding any 1/poly(N)-approximate correlated equilibrium of the game is Omega(N). For small approximation values, our lower bound answers an open question of Babichenko and Rubinstein (STOC 2017)
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