Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decisions

A famous tale talks about three baseball umpires who were asked how they rule on a ball. One said, “I call it like I see it.” Another said, “I call it like it is.” And the last one (and this is attributed to umpire Bill Klem) said, “It ain’t nothin’ till I call it.” While the first umpire admitted he was an imperfect human observer, the second and third umpires claimed they were infallible and judged cases only based on their objective merits. So, what can be said about court judges? Are court judges such impartial rulers that they can “call it like it is”? Or, as the first umpire humbly confessed, are they limited human observers confined by the boundaries of human cognition? In this article, we briefly review some of the accumulating evidence suggesting that in some cases judges could be prone to cognitive fallacies and biases that might affect their judicial decisions. We review several studies on cognitive biases relating to elements of the hearing process (considering evidence and information), ruling, or sentencing. These findings suggest that irrelevant factors that should not affect judgment might cause systemic and predictable biases in judges’ decision-making processes in a way that could be explained using known cognitive heuristics and biases

Too reliable to be true? Response bias as a potential source of inflation in paper-and-pencil questionnaire reliability

When respondents answer paper-and-pencil (PP) questionnaires, they sometimes modify their responses to correspond to previously answered items. As a result, this response bias might artificially inflate the reliability of PP questionnaires. We compared the internal consistency of PP questionnaires to computerized questionnaires that presented a different number of items on a computer screen simultaneously. Study 1 showed that a PP questionnaire\u27s internal consistency was higher than that of the same questionnaire presented on a computer screen with one, two or four questions per screen. Study 2 replicated these findings to show that internal consistency was also relatively high when all questions were shown on one screen. This suggests that the differences found in Study 1 were not due to the difference in presentation medium. Thus, this paper suggests that reliability measures of PP questionnaires might be inflated because of a response bias resulting from participants cross-checking their answers against ones given to previous questions. Accessed 17,831 times on https://pareonline.net from June 20, 2011 to December 31, 2019. For downloads from January 1, 2020 forward, please click on the PlumX Metrics link to the right

Cohen\u27s d vs Alternative Standardized Mean Group Difference Measures

Standardized effect size measures typically employed in behavioral and social sciences research in the multi-group case (e.g., η2, f2) evaluate between-group variability in terms of either total or within-group variability, such as variance or standard deviation – that is, measures of dispersion about the mean. In contrast, the definition of Cohen’s d, the effect size measure typically computed in the two-group case, is incongruent due to a conceptual difference between the numerator – which measures between-group variability by the intuitive and straightforward raw difference between the two group means – and the denominator - which measures within-group variability in terms of the difference between all observations and the group mean (i.e., the pooled within-groups standard deviation, SW). Two congruent alternatives to d, in which the root square or absolute mean difference between all observation pairs is substituted for SW as the variability measure in the denominator of d, are suggested and their conceptual and statistical advantages and disadvantages are discussed. Accessed 14,413 times on https://pareonline.net from June 28, 2011 to December 31, 2019. For downloads from January 1, 2020 forward, please click on the PlumX Metrics link to the right

Pace yourself: Improving time-saving judgments when increasing activity speed

The time-saving bias describes people’s tendency to misestimate the time they can save by increasing the speed in which they perform an activity such as driving or completing a task. People typically underestimate time saved when increasing from a low speed and overestimate time saved when increasing from an already high speed. We suggest that this bias is the result of people’s failure to recognize the curvilinear relationship between increasing speed and reducing activity time: As initial speed rises, the same speed increases will yield smaller reductions in time. We explore a new technique to de-bias these faulty estimations: converting measurements of speed to a pace measure (e.g., minutes per fixed distance). Utilizing common driving scenarios, we show that participants who received pace data made more accurate estimations of journey duration at various speeds, time-savings at various speed increases and the required speed to complete a journey

Is a picture worth a thousand words? The interaction of visual display and attribute representation in attenuating framing bias

The attribute framing bias is a well-established phenomenon, in which an object or an event is evaluated more favorably when presented in a positive frame such as “the half full glass” than when presented in the complementary negative framing. Given that previous research showed that visual aids can attenuate this bias, the current research explores the factors underlying the attenuating effect of visual aids. In a series of three experiments, we examined how attribute framing bias is affected by two factors: (a) The display mode—verbal versus visual; and (b) the representation of the critical attribute—whether one outcome, either the positive or the negative, is represented or both outcomes are represented. In Experiment 1 a marginal attenuation of attribute framing bias was obtained when verbal description of either positive or negative information was accompanied by corresponding visual representation. In Experiment 2 similar marginal attenuation was obtained when both positive and negative outcomes were verbally represented. In Experiment 3, where the verbal description represented both positive and negative outcomes, significant attenuation was obtained when it was accompanied by a visual display that represented a single outcome, and complete attenuation, totally eliminating the framing bias, was obtained when it was accompanied by a visual display that represented both outcomes. Thus, our findings showed that interaction between the display mode and the representation of the critical attribute attenuated the framing bias. Theoretical and practical implications of the interaction between verbal description, visual aids and representation of the critical attribute are discussed, and future research is suggested

The Role of Private Label Brands in Enhancing Service Satisfaction in the Hotel Industry: Comparing Luxury and Boutique Hotels

This research proposes private label branding as a strategy that can have a positive effect on guest satisfaction and loyalty in hotels that cater to travelers seeking a special hotel experience. We test this using the well-established SERVQUAL model of service quality, based on a sample of guests in two hotels: a five-star luxury hotel (N=225) and a boutique hotel (N=101). The findings show that in the luxury hotel but not the boutique hotel, perception of a private label had a direct impact on loyalty, and an indirect impact on loyalty through its effect on guest satisfaction. The theoretical implications and recommendations for hoteliers based on the findings are discussed

On the Importance of Context in Sequential Search

We experimentally investigate whether framing an individual-choice decision in a market setting results in a different outcome than when the decision is described in a context-free frame. We further explore whether the context effect is triggered solely by the frame or whether a richer descriptive content is required to establish familiarity with the decision-making environment. Understanding what constitutes context is central to formulating practical recommendations aiming to improve the quality of individual decisions. Our results show that framing a sequential search problem as selling houses leads to better decisions than a context-free frame. Manipulating whether or not the framed decision-making scenario includes a description of the house, which would be naturally available in a real estate market, does not impact the length of search or the value of accepted offers

Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decisions

A famous tale talks about three baseball umpires who were asked how they rule on a ball. One said, “I call it like I see it.” Another said, “I call it like it is.” And the last one (and this is attributed to umpire Bill Klem) said, “It ain’t nothin’ till I call it.” While the first umpire admitted he was an imperfect human observer, the second and third umpires claimed they were infallible and judged cases only based on their objective merits. So, what can be said about court judges? Are court judges such impartial rulers that they can “call it like it is”? Or, as the first umpire humbly confessed, are they limited human observers confined by the boundaries of human cognition? In this article, we briefly review some of the accumulating evidence suggesting that in some cases judges could be prone to cognitive fallacies and biases that might affect their judicial decisions. We review several studies on cognitive biases relating to elements of the hearing process (considering evidence and information), ruling, or sentencing. These findings suggest that irrelevant factors that should not affect judgment might cause systemic and predictable biases in judges’ decision-making processes in a way that could be explained using known cognitive heuristics and biases

Pace yourself: Improving time-saving judgments when increasing activity speed

The time-saving bias describes people's tendency to misestimate the time they can save by increasing the speed in which they perform an activity such as driving or completing a task. People typically underestimate time saved when increasing from a low speed and overestimate time saved when increasing from an already high speed. We suggest that this bias is the result of people's failure to recognize the curvilinear relationship between increasing speed and reducing activity time: As initial speed rises, the same speed increases will yield smaller reductions in time. We explore a new technique to de-bias these faulty estimations: converting measurements of speed to a pace measure (e.g., minutes per fixed distance). Utilizing common driving scenarios, we show that participants who received pace data made more accurate estimations of journey duration at various speeds, time-savings at various speed increases and the required speed to complete a journey