Warming and Ocean Acidification Effects in the Seaweed Community of West Spitsbergen

Global change-related warming and ocean acidification (OA) are major threats to the Svalbard coastal ecosystem. Rock bottom areas are mainly dominated by dense forests of a multi-species community of seaweeds. Different species are shown to respond to warming and OA in different ways and degrees, posing a potential shift in community structure as the new scenario develops. An increase in CO2 is shown to modify the carbon balance of two representative species in opposing ways. Growth rate of Desmarestia aculeata was negatively affected by CO2 enrichment, while Alaria esculenta was positively affected, as a result of a different reorganization of the cellular carbon budget in both species. D. aculeata showed increased respiration, enhanced accumulation of storage biomolecules and elevated release of dissolved organic carbon, whereas A. esculenta showed decreased respiration and lower accumulation of storage biomolecules. Moreover, incubation of 6 species from Kongsfjorden at different CO2 and temperature levels indicated that temperature affected mainly the photosynthetic performance as measured by PAM fluorescence, particularly the initial slope of ETR curves, the light saturation parameter (Ek), and Fv/Fm values, as well as the protein content, especially in the phaeophytes. On the other hand, CO2 affected mainly the internal accumulation of carbohydrates and lipids. The C:N balance was largely unaffected. The resulting growth rate was not altered by the treatments in three out of the six species studied. For example, Phycodris rubens showed a positive effect of increasing temperature, while Saccorhiza dermatodea was positively affected by CO2. Significant interactions between CO2 and temperature were found in 20 % of the analyses. Whether additive or synergistic, the co-occurrence of a higher temperature with other stressors such as elevated CO2 increases the probability of community changes by modifying the performance of these species. To test whether this kind of responses was characteristic of Arctic populations, Saccharina latissima from Kongsfjorden was compared to the population from Helgoland (Germany). Ecotypic variations were revealed by a significantly higher O2 production rate and an increase in Chl a, Rubisco, and D1 protein content in the Arctic population thalli, but a lower growth rate, in comparison to the Atlantic population. At 10 °C, the Arctic population had a higher content of total C, soluble carbohydrates, and lipids, whereas the N- and protein content was lower. Conclusively, the Arctic ecotype was more resilient to increased CO2 than the temperate one, and both ecotypes differed in their response pattern to temperature. Overall, Arctic ecotypes of seaweeds have shown an array of responses pointing to an altered community as the “atlantification” and acidification of the West Spitsbergen coastal system take place. Further research will focus on potential alteration of the nutrient regime due to increased discharge from land and its consequences on seaweeds metabolic performance.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

Session 3-2-F: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Baccara Chemin de Fer

Baccara chemin de fer — review of main contributions Baccara was first mentioned in print by Van Tenac in 1847. It was analyzed by Dormoy in 1872 and Bertrand in 1889. Borel called Bertrand’s study “extremely incomplete,” but it motivated Borel to develop game theory in the 1920s. Von Neumann planned to study baccara after proving the minimax theorem in 1928, but he didn’t. The first game-theoretic solution was by Kemeny and Snell in 1957. In 1964, Foster gave a solution based on a new algorithm, unaware of the Kemeny–Snell solution. A solution under more realistic assumptions was found by Downton and Lockwood in 1975 using Foster’s algorithm. Based on the extensive form of the game, the Kemeny–Snell solution was rederived by Deloche and Oguer in 2007

Can we prove that there are computational correlates of consciousness in the brain?

Scientific research on consciousness is attempting to gather data about the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. The basic procedure is to measure consciousness through first-person reports, measure the physical world and look for correlations between these sets of measurements. While most of this work has focused on neural correlates of consciousness, it has also been proposed that consciousness is linked to the computations that are being executed by the brain. If this is the case, we would expect there to be a high level of correlation between some of the brain’s computations and consciousness. This could be scientifically tested if a plausible method for measuring computations could be found. This paper investigates whether Chalmers’ method for identifying computations could be used to measure computations during an experiment on the correlates of consciousness. A number of arguments are used to show that Chalmers’ account of implementation fails for a desktop computer, which makes it unlikely that it could be used to identify computational correlates of consciousness in the brain. While a different account of implementation might be able to rescue computational approaches to consciousness, the problems raised in this paper suggest that it is going to be difficult to develop a method for measuring computations that could be used to test whether there are computational correlates of consciousness in the brain

The intelligence of sheep

This commentary suggests how recent theories about the predictive brain could help us understand the evidence put forward by Marino & Merskin for intelligence in sheep. I contrast predictive intelligence in sheep with automatic behaviors that do not require intelligence, and I consider the flexibility of sheep intelligence

The relationships between intelligence and consciousness in natural and artificial systems

This paper explores some of the potential connections between natural and artificial intelligence and natural and artificial consciousness. In humans we use batteries of tests to indirectly measure intelligence. This approach breaks down when we try to apply it to radically different animals and to the many varieties of artificial intelligence. To address this issue people are starting to develop algorithms that can measure intelligence in any type of system. Progress is also being made in the scientific study of consciousness: we can neutralize the philosophical problems, we have data about the neural correlates and we have some idea about how we can develop mathematical theories that can map between physical and conscious states. While intelligence is a purely functional property of a system, there are good reasons for thinking that consciousness is linked to particular spatiotemporal patterns in specific physical materials. This paper outlines some of the weak inferences that can be made about the relationships between intelligence and consciousness in natural and artificial systems. To make real scientific progress we need to develop practical universal measures of intelligence and mathematical theories of consciousness that can reliably map between physical and conscious states

The informational mind and the information integration theory of consciousness

According to Aleksander and Morton’s informational mind hypothesis, conscious minds are state structures that are created through iconic learning. Distributed representations of colors, edges, objects, etc. are linked with proprioceptive and motor information to generate the awareness of an out-there world. The uniqueness and indivisibility of these iconically learnt states reflect the uniqueness and indivisibility of the world. This article summarizes the key claims of the informational mind hypothesis and considers them in relation to Tononi’s information integration theory of consciousness. Some suggestions are made about how the informational mind hypothesis could be experimentally tested, and its significance for work on machine consciousness is considered

The measurement of consciousness: a framework for the scientific study of consciousness

Scientists studying consciousness are attempting to identify correlations between measurements of consciousness and the physical world. Consciousness can only be measured through first-person reports, which raises problems about the accuracy of first-person reports, the possibility of non-reportable consciousness and the causal closure of the physical world. Many of these issues could be resolved by assuming that consciousness is entirely physical or functional. However, this would sacrifice the theory-neutrality that is a key attraction of a correlates-based approach to the study of consciousness. This paper puts forward a different solution that uses a framework of definitions and assumptions to explain how consciousness can be measured. This addresses the problems associated with first-person reports and avoids the issues with the causal closure of the physical world. This framework is compatible with most of the current theories of consciousness and it leads to a distinction between two types of correlates of consciousness

Four preconditions for solving MC4 machine consciousness

A machine is MC4 conscious if it has phenomenal experiences that are comparable to human conscious experiences. From an ethical point of view it is important to know whether we have created MC4 consciousness in a machine. MC4 consciousness research can also contribute to the development of general theories of human consciousness. This paper discusses four problems that have to be solved before we will be able to address MC4 machine consciousness in a systematic way: We need more clarity about the measurement of consciousness, we need better ways of describing the physical world and consciousness, and we need to reach agreement about the final form that a theory of consciousness should take. When these problems have been addressed we will be able to develop scientific theories of consciousness that can make accurate believable predictions about MC4 consciousness in machines

Fish consciousness [commentary on Woodruff on Fish Feel]

Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuroanatomy has similarities with the structures in the human brain that support consciousness. (2) The complexity and flexibility of fish behaviour suggest that they are conscious. This commentary will argue that neither the neuroanatomical nor the behavioural argument can provide conclusive evidence for consciousness in fish. We should suspend judgement until we have discovered mathematical theories of consciousness that can reliably map between states of consciousness and states of the physical world

From baconian to popperian neuroscience [Opinion]

The development of neuroscience over the past 50 years has some similarities with the development of physics in the 17th century. Towards the beginning of that century, Bacon promoted the systematic gathering of experimental data and the induction of scientific truth; towards the end, Newton expressed his principles of gravitation and motion in a concise set of mathematical equations that made precise falsifiable predictions. This paper expresses the opinion that as neuroscience comes of age, it needs to move away from amassing large quantities of data about the brain, and adopt a popperian model in which theories are developed that can make strong falsifiable predictions and guide future experimental work