Debt Financing of High-growth Startups

We study the business model of venture debt firms, specialized institutions that provide loans to high-growth startups. Venture debt represents an apparent contradiction with traditional debt theory since startups have negative cash flows and lack tangible assets to secure the loan. Yet, we estimate that the U.S. venture debt industry provides at least one venture debt dollar for every seven venture capital dollars invested. We aim to provide the first empirical evidence on the determinants of the lending decision. Building on existing field interviews and case studies, we design a choice experiment of the lending decision and conduct experiments with 55 senior venture lenders. We find support for the hypothesis that backing by venture capital firms substitutes for startups’ cash flow. Furthermore, we illustrate the signaling effect of patents and their role as collateral to facilitate the lending decision.Venture capital; startups; patents

Selection bias in innovation studies : a simple test

The study of the innovative output of firms often relies on a count of patents filed at one single office of reference such as the European Patent Office (EPO). Yet, not all firms file their patents at the EPO, raising the specter of a selection bias. Using a novel dataset of the whole population of patents by Belgian firms, we show that the single-office count results in a selection bias that affects econometric estimates of innovation production functions. We propose a methodology to evaluate whether estimates that rely on the single-office count are affected by a selection bias

Do Patents Enable Disclosure?:Evidence from the Invention Secrecy Act

This paper provides empirical evidence suggesting that patents may facilitate knowledge disclosure. The analysis exploits the Invention Secrecy Act, which grants the U.S. Commissioner for Patents the right to prevent the disclosure of new inventions that represent a threat to national security. Using a two-level matching approach, we document a negative and large relationship between the enforcement of a secrecy order and follow-on inventions, as captured with patent citations and text-based measures of invention similarity. The effect carries over to after the lift of the secrecy period, suggesting a lost generation of inventions. The results bear implications for innovation and intellectual property policy

The R&D-patent relationship: An industry perspective

This paper re-visits the empirical failure to establish a clear link between R&D efforts and patent counts at the industry level. It is claimed that the “propensity-to-patent” concept should be split into an “appropriability propensity” and a “strategic propensity”. The empirical contribution is based on a unique panel dataset composed of 18 industries in 19 countries over 19 years. The results confirm that the R&D-patent relationship is affected by research productivity, appropriability propensity and strategic propensity factors. The observed increase in the propensity to file for patents is much stronger for supranational (that is, triadic or regional) patents than for priority filings, suggesting that the current patent hype is essentially the result of a globalization phenomenon.Propensity to patent; strategic propensity; appropriability; research productivity

Buyers' role in innovation procurement: Evidence from US military R&D contracts

This study provides the first quantification of buyers' role in the outcome of R&D procurement contracts. We combine together four data sources on US federal R&D contracts, follow-on patented inventions, federal public workforce characteristics, and perception of their work environment. By exploiting the observability of deaths of federal employees, we find that managers' death events negatively affect innovation outcomes: a 1% increase in the share of relevant public officer deaths causes a decline of 32.3% of patents per contract, 20.5% patent citations per contract, and 34.3% patent claims per contract. These effects are driven by the deaths occurring in the 6 months before the contract is awarded, thereby indicating the relevance of the design and award stage relative to ex post contract monitoring. Lower levels of self-reported within-office cooperation also negatively impact R&D outcomes