Corporation taxes in the European Union: Slowly moving toward comprehensive business income taxation?

This paper is a substantial revision of a paper presented at the 71st Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (Dublin, 20–23 August, 2015), which was issued under the title Tackling Spillovers by Taxing Corporate Income in the European Union at Source, as CPB Discussion Paper 324 (February 2016) and as CESifo Working Paper No. 5790 (March 2016).This paper surveys and evaluates the corporation tax systems of the Member States of the European Union on the basis of a comprehensive taxonomy of actual and potential regimes, which have as their base either profits; profits, interest and royalties; or economic rents. The current regimes give rise to various instate and interstate spillovers, which violate the basic tenets—neutrality and subsidiarity—of the single market. The trade-offs between the implications of these tenets—harmonization and diversity, respectively—can be reconciled by a bottom-up strategy of strengthening source-based taxation and narrowing differences in tax rates. The strategy starts with dual income taxation, proceeds with final source withholding taxes and rate coordination, and is made complete by comprehensive business income taxation. Common base and cash flow taxation are not favored.http://link.springer.com/journal/10797am2017Economic

On labour standards and free trade

We investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative measures to increase standards in low-income countries in a two-country framework where (a) trade and standards in low-income countries are negatively related, and (b) free trade is not longer optimal for the high-income country due to a negative psychological externality that low standards in low-income countries exert. We find that any uncoordinated, unilateral action by the high-income country to decrease the psychological externality is dominated by coordinated action; both with respect to the psychological externality as with respect to the welfare consequences for both countries. Coordination is also shown to be feasible and incentive compatible, provided that standards are objectively verifiable. (JEL D62, F13)psychological externalities, coordination, trade intervention,

Parallelisms and Paralogisms in the European Court of Justice

The ECJ has managed to go beyond its mission of stewardship. Behind the ever-enlarging power of the ECJ’s judges lies the political logic of appointment based on one country-one judge criterion. As a consequence, sentences and opinions are patterned upon political will tossed with judicial gloss. It is no wonder, therefore, that judges interpret judicial action in terms of centralization and use it as a weapon to protect against external competition. What such an attitude may lead to is brought out in the cases of assignment of competences, parallel imports and tax competition

Should mobile capital pay for public infrastructure investment?

Fiscal competition, Public inputs, Infrastructure, H21, H73,