Nash Equilibria in Multi-Agent Motor Interactions

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner's dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions

Improperium exspectavit [music] : Offertorium pro Festo S.smi Cordis Jesu (Offertorium totius anni., No. 58) quatuor vocibus inaeqalibus organo comitante /

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A numerical algorithm to find soft-constrained Nash equilibria in scalar LQ-games

In this paper we provide a numerical algorithm to calculate all soft-constrained Nash equilibria in a regular scalar indefinite linear-quadratic game.The algorithm is based on the calculation of the eigenstructure of a certain matrix.The analysis follows the lines of the approach taken by Engwerda in [7] to calculate the solutions of a set of scalar coupled feedback Nash algebraic Riccati equations.