The developmental trajectory of attentional orienting to socio-biological cues.

It has been proposed that the orienting of attention in the same direction as another’s point of gaze relies on innate brain mechanisms which are present from birth, but direct evidence relating to the influence of eye gaze cues on attentional orienting in young children is limited. In two experiments, 137 children aged 3–10 years old performed an adapted pro-saccade task with centrally presented uninformative eye gaze, finger pointing and arrow pre-cues which were either congruent or incongruent with the direction of target presentations. When the central cue overlapped with presentation of the peripheral target (Experiment 1), children up to 5 years old had difficulty disengaging fixation from central fixation in order to saccade to the target. This effect was found to be particularly marked for eye gaze cues. When central cues were extinguished simultaneously with peripheral target onset (Experiment 2), this effect was greatly reduced. In both experiments finger pointing cues (image of pointing index finger presented at fixation) exerted a strong influence on saccade reaction time to the peripheral stimulus for the youngest group of children (<5 years). Overall the results suggest that although young children are strongly engaged by centrally presented eye gaze cues, the directional influence of such cues on overt attentional orienting is only present in older children, meaning that the effect is unlikely to be dependent upon an innate brain module. Instead, the results are consistent with the existence of stimulus–response associations which develop with age and environmental experience

Early domain-specific knowledge? nonlinear developmental trajectories further erode a house of sand

Rakison and Yermolayeva (this issue) argue that domain specificity is difficult to reconcile with U-, N-, or M-shaped developmental trends. They are justified because: 1) There is no compelling evidence that nonlinear trends require mechanisms beyond general, well-known cognitive processes; and 2) epigenetic neuroscience provides no clear evidence of strong domain-specialized representations. Evidence implies pervasive weak (i.e., experience dependent) neural specialization for different kinds of information. © 2011 Taylor &amp; Francis Group, LLC

The Growth of Flexible Problem Solving: Preschool Children Use Changing Verbal Cues to Infer Multiple Word Meanings

Flexible induction is the adaptation of probabilistic inferences to changing problems. Young children's flexibility was tested in a word-learning task. Children 3 to 6 years old were told 3 novel words for each of several novel objects. Children generalized each word to other objects with the same body shape, the same material, or the same part as the first object. Each word was preceded by a different predicate (i.e., "looks like a...," "is made of...," or "has a...") that implies a different attribute (shape, material, or part, respectively). Three-year-olds showed limited use of predicates to infer word meanings, and they used predicates from previous trials to infer the meanings of later words. Four- to 6-year-olds used predicate cues more consistently and made inferences that were implied by the most recent predicate cue. Notably, 3-year-olds performed near ceiling in a control task that eliminated the need to use probabilistic inductive cues (Experiment 3). The results suggest that flexibility develops as a function of (a) sensitivity to between-problem variability and indeterminacy and (b) ability to decontextualize the most recent verbal cue to guide of inductive inferences

Disarming smiles: irrelevant happy faces slow post-error responses

When we make errors, we tend to experience a negative emotional state. In addition, if our errors are witnessed by other people, we might expect those observers to respond negatively. However, little is known about how implicit social feedback like facial expressions influences error processing. We explored this using the cognitive control phenomenon of post-error slowing: the tendency to slow the response immediately following an error. Adult participants performed a difficult perceptual task: estimating which of two lines (horizontal or vertical) was longer. The background showed an irrelevant distractor face with a happy, sad, or neutral expression. Participants slowed after errors only when the subsequent distractor face was happy, but not when the subsequent distractor was sad or neutral nor when a happy face followed a correct response. This suggests that information about others’ affect, even non-interactive, task-irrelevant information, has performance- and valence-dependent effects on adaptive cognitive control

Choose and choose again: Appearance-reality errors, pragmatics and logical ability

In the Appearance/Reality (AR) task some 3- and 4-year-old children make perseverative errors: they choose the same word for the appearance and the function of a deceptive object. Are these errors specific to the AR task, or signs of a general question-answering problem? Preschoolers completed five tasks: AR; simple successive forced-choice question pairs (QP); flexible naming of objects (FN); working memory (WM) span; and indeterminacy detection (ID). AR errors correlated with QP errors. Insensitivity to indeterminacy predicted perseveration in both tasks. Neither WM span nor flexible naming predicted other measures. Age predicted sensitivity to indeterminacy. These findings suggest that AR tests measure a pragmatic understanding; specifically, different questions about a topic usually call for different answers. This understanding is related to the ability to detect indeterminacy of each question in a series. AR errors are unrelated to the ability to represent an object as belonging to multiple categories, to working memory span, or to inhibiting previously activated words. © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,

Disarming smiles: irrelevant happy faces slow post-error responses

When we make errors, we tend to experience a negative emotional state. In addition, if our errors are witnessed by other people, we might expect those observers to respond negatively. However, little is known about how implicit social feedback like facial expressions influences error processing. We explored this using the cognitive control phenomenon of post-error slowing: the tendency to slow the response immediately following an error. Adult participants performed a difficult perceptual task: estimating which of two lines (horizontal or vertical) was longer. The background showed an irrelevant distractor face with a happy, sad, or neutral expression. Participants slowed after errors only when the subsequent distractor face was happy, but not when the subsequent distractor was sad or neutral nor when a happy face followed a correct response. This suggests that information about others’ affect, even non-interactive, task-irrelevant information, has performance- and valence-dependent effects on adaptive cognitive control