Humanitarian actors' engagement with accountability mechanisms in situations of armed conflict : workshop report

The Individualisation of War Project explores the tensions arising from the increased prominence of the individual in the theory and practice of armed conflict133. One manifestation of this process of individualisation are the endeavours to enhance accountability for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). These include the establishment of international and national tribunals and non‑judicial mechanisms such as commissions of inquiry, and the imposition of targeted sanctions. These are important measures for promoting compliance with the law and, consequently, enhancing the protection of civilians, but their implementation can give rise to tensions with humanitarian actors’ activities to provide protection and assistance, often to the same civilians. Humanitarians frequently have valuable first‑hand information on violations or are in direct contact with affected communities. However, the risk exists that if they share this information with accountability mechanisms – or are suspected of doing so – this may undermine their operations (and those of others) and put their staff and beneficiaries at risk. This is not a new tension, but it has become more prominent following the establishment of a number of international criminal tribunals in the 1990s.The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement No 340956 - IOW - The Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict

Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict

This article examines the requirement under international humanitarian law (IHL) that consent to humanitarian relief operations must not be arbitrarily withheld. It begins with a brief outline of the rules of IHL regulating humanitarian assistance in armed conflict. The article then considers the origin of the rule prohibiting arbitrary withholding of consent to humanitarian relief operations before proceeding to set out the circumstances when consent will be considered to have been withheld arbitrarily under international law. It proposes three tests for arbitrariness in this context, and also examines how international human rights regulates humanitarian assistance in armed conflict

Humanitarian action and non-state armed groups : the international legal framework

Published online: 2 February 2017The UN Security Council should be encouraged to systematically include humanitarian exemption clauses in sanctions regimes, as this is the best way of ensuring they are replicated in national law

Recommendations for reducing tensions in the interplay between sanctions : counterterrorism measures and humanitarian action

Published online: 23 August 2017This paper sets out a series of steps for systematically gathering information on the adverse impact of sanctions on humanitarian action and bringing it to the attention of Security Council members as well as the broader UN membership

The Oxford guidance on the law relating to humanitarian relief operations in situations of armed conflict : an introduction

Published on 27 Oct 2016In many, if not most, armed conflicts, far more deaths occur as a result of the humanitarian crisis created by the conflict rather than from hostilities or the use of force. In addition to those who die as a result of a lack of food, water, access to medical care or adequate sanitation, untold suffering is caused in conflicts across the globe to millions of other civilians. However, in many recent conflicts humanitarian actors have faced serious challenges in delivering much -needed relief supplies and services to civilians in need. Humanitarian access has become a central challenge to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Belligerants often impede the delivery of much needed humanitarian relief supplies exacerbating hunger, disease and want. The United Nations Secretary -General, in his recent reports to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians, has identified improving access for humanitarian operation as one of the five “core challenges” to enhancing the protection of civilians in armed conflict.The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement No 340956 - IOW - The Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict

Protection of civilians in the conduct of hostilities

International humanitarian law is based on the premise that war must be fought between combatants. Individual civilians and civilian populations enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations and in the conduct of military operations constant care must be taken to spare them.The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement No 340956 - IOW - The Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict

Some reflections on the 'incidental harm' side of proportionality assessments

The prohibition of attacks expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated lies at the heart of the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) regulating the conduct of hostilities. According to Article 51(5)(b) of the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I), a disproportionate attack is an attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement No 340956 - IOW - The Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict

Proportionality in the conduct of hostilities : the incidental harm side of proportionality assessments

Published online on 01 December 2018Military operations are taking place with increasing frequency in densely populated areas. Such operations result in loss of life and harm to civilians, as well as damage to civilian objects, (including infrastructure providing essential services). In order to protect civilians, it is imperative that armed forces and groups comply with the rules of international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities, including the rule of proportionality. • The rule of proportionality prohibits attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This research paper analyses the key steps that belligerents must take to give effect to the rule, with a particular focus on one side of proportionality assessments – the expected incidental harm. • Those undertaking proportionality assessments before or during an attack must consider whether the expected harm will be caused by the attack, and whether that harm could be expected (that is, was it reasonably foreseeable). • For the purpose of proportionality assessments, injury to civilians includes disease, and there is no reason in principle to exclude mental harm, even though it is currently challenging to identify and quantify it. Damage to civilian objects includes damage to elements of the natural environment. • Once the incidental harm to be considered has been identified, a value or weight must be assigned to it. This is then balanced against the value or weight of the military advantage anticipated from the attack to determine whether the harm would be excessive. • In the determination of whether the expected incidental harm would be excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage, ‘excessive’ is a wide but not indeterminate standard. • Belligerents should develop methodologies so that those planning and deciding attacks are provided with all necessary information on expected incidental harm, and to assist them in assigning weight to the incidental harm to be considered. • If it becomes apparent that the rule of proportionality will be contravened, the attack in question must be cancelled or suspended. • Clarification of the law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups, inculcated by their leaders, is also crucial.The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement No 340956 - IOW - The Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict

Recommendations for reducing tensions in the interplay between sanctions, counterterrorism measures and humanitarian action

This paper sets out a series of steps for systematically gathering information on the adverse impact of sanctions on humanitarian action and bringing it to the attention of Security Council members as well as the broader UN membership.The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement No 340956 - IOW - The Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict

'Safe areas' : the international legal framework

In recent years there have been repeated calls for the establishment of so-called “safe areas” to protect civilians from the effects of hostilities in a number of contexts. The present article presents the international law framework relevant to the establishment and operation of such areas: the provisions of international humanitarian law on protected zones; the rules regulating resort to armed force, Security Council authorization and mandates for the establishment of such areas by multinational forces in the absence of agreement between belligerents; and the refugee and international human rights issues raised by such zones. Using the example of the “protection of civilians sites” in South Sudan, the article then highlights some of the operational challenges raised by safe areas. It concludes with some reflections on how to enhance the likelihood that belligerents will establish such protected zones in the future.The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement No 340956 - IOW - The Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict