Frank-Wolfe Algorithms for Saddle Point Problems

We extend the Frank-Wolfe (FW) optimization algorithm to solve constrained smooth convex-concave saddle point (SP) problems. Remarkably, the method only requires access to linear minimization oracles. Leveraging recent advances in FW optimization, we provide the first proof of convergence of a FW-type saddle point solver over polytopes, thereby partially answering a 30 year-old conjecture. We also survey other convergence results and highlight gaps in the theoretical underpinnings of FW-style algorithms. Motivating applications without known efficient alternatives are explored through structured prediction with combinatorial penalties as well as games over matching polytopes involving an exponential number of constraints.Comment: Appears in: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS 2017). 39 page

Until Easter Comes

You\u27d better set the table, Diane; the steak is almost done. Mom turned each sizzling T-bone, its aroma altering the three hungry mouths in the kitchen. Better put an extra leaf in the table, too; with everyone home, it\u27s just not big enough

Critical Examination of Peace Agencies Since 1919

I intend to consider the practical value of the various means aiming at the prevention of war that have been suggested or put into effect since 1919. Why since 19197 I do not think that international law was created in 1919. But, whether one wishes it or not, an effort, unprecedented until now, has been devoted to the study of the technique of peace. The struggle against war is no longer limited to sentimental effusions, or fireside dreams: it has become an object of science; even of applied science. The program of the technique of peace is generally formulated today in three words: arbitration, security, disarmament. Under the generic name of arbitration are included, in this case, \u27all means of pacific settlement of international disputes: mediation, conciliation, arbitration properly so-called, and international justice. Under the term, security, the following questions are designated: the prevention of the breaking out of a war if it is being prepared; the throttling of a war if it has already broken out; the prevention, in the event that a war has already broken out, of its achieving results that are held to be unjust. Arbitration and security, must, in this program, open the way to disarmament, the philosopher\u27s stone of politico-judicial alchemy. I shall leave completely aside, within the limits of this article, everything that concerns arbitration and, likewise, everything that concerns disarmament in order to limit myself strictly to the problem of security

Multi-player games in the era of machine learning

Parmi tous les jeux de société joués par les humains au cours de l’histoire, le jeu de go était considéré comme l’un des plus difficiles à maîtriser par un programme informatique [Van Den Herik et al., 2002]; Jusqu’à ce que ce ne soit plus le cas [Silveret al., 2016]. Cette percée révolutionnaire [Müller, 2002, Van Den Herik et al., 2002] fût le fruit d’une combinaison sophistiquée de Recherche arborescente Monte-Carlo et de techniques d’apprentissage automatique pour évaluer les positions du jeu, mettant en lumière le grand potentiel de l’apprentissage automatique pour résoudre des jeux. L’apprentissage antagoniste, un cas particulier de l’optimisation multiobjective, est un outil de plus en plus utile dans l’apprentissage automatique. Par exemple, les jeux à deux joueurs et à somme nulle sont importants dans le domain des réseaux génératifs antagonistes [Goodfellow et al., 2014] ainsi que pour maîtriser des jeux comme le Go ou le Poker en s’entraînant contre lui-même [Silver et al., 2017, Brown andSandholm, 2017]. Un résultat classique de la théorie des jeux indique que les jeux convexes-concaves ont toujours un équilibre [Neumann, 1928]. Étonnamment, les praticiens en apprentissage automatique entrainent avec succès une seule paire de réseaux de neurones dont l’objectif est un problème de minimax non-convexe et non-concave alors que pour une telle fonction de gain, l’existence d’un équilibre de Nash n’est pas garantie en général. Ce travail est une tentative d'établir une solide base théorique pour l’apprentissage dans les jeux. La première contribution explore le théorème minimax pour une classe particulière de jeux non-convexes et non-concaves qui englobe les réseaux génératifs antagonistes. Cette classe correspond à un ensemble de jeux à deux joueurs et a somme nulle joués avec des réseaux de neurones. Les deuxième et troisième contributions étudient l’optimisation des problèmes minimax, et plus généralement, les inégalités variationnelles dans le cadre de l’apprentissage automatique. Bien que la méthode standard de descente de gradient ne parvienne pas à converger vers l’équilibre de Nash de jeux convexes-concaves simples, il existe des moyens d’utiliser des gradients pour obtenir des méthodes qui convergent. Nous étudierons plusieurs techniques telles que l’extrapolation, la moyenne et la quantité de mouvement à paramètre négatif. La quatrième contribution fournit une étude empirique du comportement pratique des réseaux génératifs antagonistes. Dans les deuxième et troisième contributions, nous diagnostiquons que la méthode du gradient échoue lorsque le champ de vecteur du jeu est fortement rotatif. Cependant, une telle situation peut décrire un pire des cas qui ne se produit pas dans la pratique. Nous fournissons de nouveaux outils de visualisation afin d’évaluer si nous pouvons détecter des rotations dans comportement pratique des réseaux génératifs antagonistes.Among all the historical board games played by humans, the game of go was considered one of the most difficult to master by a computer program [Van Den Heriket al., 2002]; Until it was not [Silver et al., 2016]. This odds-breaking break-through [Müller, 2002, Van Den Herik et al., 2002] came from a sophisticated combination of Monte Carlo tree search and machine learning techniques to evaluate positions, shedding light upon the high potential of machine learning to solve games. Adversarial training, a special case of multiobjective optimization, is an increasingly useful tool in machine learning. For example, two-player zero-sum games are important for generative modeling (GANs) [Goodfellow et al., 2014] and mastering games like Go or Poker via self-play [Silver et al., 2017, Brown and Sandholm,2017]. A classic result in Game Theory states that convex-concave games always have an equilibrium [Neumann, 1928]. Surprisingly, machine learning practitioners successfully train a single pair of neural networks whose objective is a nonconvex-nonconcave minimax problem while for such a payoff function, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed in general. This work is an attempt to put learning in games on a firm theoretical foundation. The first contribution explores minimax theorems for a particular class of nonconvex-nonconcave games that encompasses generative adversarial networks. The proposed result is an approximate minimax theorem for two-player zero-sum games played with neural networks, including WGAN, StarCrat II, and Blotto game. Our findings rely on the fact that despite being nonconcave-nonconvex with respect to the neural networks parameters, the payoff of these games are concave-convex with respect to the actual functions (or distributions) parametrized by these neural networks. The second and third contributions study the optimization of minimax problems, and more generally, variational inequalities in the context of machine learning. While the standard gradient descent-ascent method fails to converge to the Nash equilibrium of simple convex-concave games, there exist ways to use gradients to obtain methods that converge. We investigate several techniques such as extrapolation, averaging and negative momentum. We explore these techniques experimentally by proposing a state-of-the-art (at the time of publication) optimizer for GANs called ExtraAdam. We also prove new convergence results for Extrapolation from the past, originally proposed by Popov [1980], as well as for gradient method with negative momentum. The fourth contribution provides an empirical study of the practical landscape of GANs. In the second and third contributions, we diagnose that the gradient method breaks when the game’s vector field is highly rotational. However, such a situation may describe a worst-case that does not occur in practice. We provide new visualization tools in order to exhibit rotations in practical GAN landscapes. In this contribution, we show empirically that the training of GANs exhibits significant rotations around Local Stable Stationary Points (LSSP), and we provide empirical evidence that GAN training converges to a stable stationary point, which is a saddle point for the generator loss, not a minimum, while still achieving excellent performance

Reducing Noise in GAN Training with Variance Reduced Extragradient

We study the effect of the stochastic gradient noise on the training of generative adversarial networks (GANs) and show that it can prevent the convergence of standard game optimization methods, while the batch version converges. We address this issue with a novel stochastic variance-reduced extragradient (SVRE) optimization algorithm, which for a large class of games improves upon the previous convergence rates proposed in the literature. We observe empirically that SVRE performs similarly to a batch method on MNIST while being computationally cheaper, and that SVRE yields more stable GAN training on standard datasets.Comment: latest NeurIPS'19 versio