Patent characteristics and patent ownership change in agricultural biotechnology

We examine the effect of various patent characteristics on changes in patent ownership that occurred due to mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs in the agricultural biotechnology industry in the 1980s and 1990s. Our goal is to shed light on the role that certain patent qualities may play in the transfer of knowledge and technology that takes place through merger and acquisition activity. Specifically, we empirically measure the effect of patent value, scope/breadth, strength, and the nationality of the patent owner on the occurrence and frequency of patent ownership change in the agricultural biotechnology sector during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that the greater is the patent breadth and the less valuable and 'weaker' is the patent, the greater is the likelihood and the frequency of patent ownership change. Also, the nature of patent ownership affects patent ownership change, with patents owned by multiple owners of different nationalities most likely to change hands

Nash bargaining and risk aversion

It is widely accepted among axiomatic bargaining theorists that if one bargainer is more risk averse than a second, the second will be a tougher bargaining opponent than the first against all opponents. We argue that this relationship between risk aversion and bargaining toughness is both highly fragile, and more nuanced than previously articulated. In the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining frameworks, we establish that when a bargainer is compared with a second who is "almost globally" more risk averse than the first, the supposedly immutable relationship between bargaining effectiveness and risk aversion evaporates. Specifically, we identify an upper-hemicontinuity failure of a correspondence which maps the power set of all lotteries to those utility pairs that satisfy our "almost global" comparative risk aversion relation on these subsets. We trace the consensus view that tougher bargainers are less risk-averse to an exclusive focus on precisely the point at which this correspondence implodes

Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

We study an information aggregation game in which each of a finite collection of “senders” receives a private signal and submits a report to the center, who then makes a decision based on the average of these reports. The integration of three features distinguishes our framework from the related literature: players’ reports are aggregated by a mechanistic averaging rule, their strategy sets are intervals rather than binary choices, and they are ex ante heterogeneous. In this setting, players engage in a “tug-of-war,” as they exaggerate and counter-exaggerate in order to manipulate the center’s decision. While incentives to exaggerate have been studied extensively, the phenomenon of counter-exaggeration is less well understood. Our main results are as follows. First, the cycle of counter-exaggeration can be broken only by the imposition of exogenous bounds on the space of admissible sender reports. Second, in the unique pure-strategy equilibrium, all but at most one player is constrained with positive probability by one of the report bounds. Our third and fourth results hold for a class of “anchored” games. We show that if the report space is strictly contained in the signal space, then welfare is increasing in the size of the report space, but if the containment relation is reversed, welfare is independent of the size of the space. Finally, the equilibrium performance of our heterogeneous players can be unambiguously ranked: a player’s equilibrium payoff is inversely related to the probability that her exaggeration will be thwarted by the report bounds

Disruption and Continuity in Bulgaria’s Agrarian Reform

The Bulgarian land reform process is burdened by a fundamental tension between disruption and continuity. This tension arises from the dual roles played by the nomenklatura in the transition to a market economy. Both roles stem from their privileged status in the old order. While the nomenklatura have the potential to provide the agricultural sector with indispensable human capital, they also have the' potential to extract rents from the sector, thus undermining its competitiveness. Both the productivity of nomenklatura capital and their capacity to extract rents are diminished to the extent that the reform disrupts the established agrarian order. Thus in order to succeed, the agrarian reform process must sail between Scylla and Charybdis. Too much disruption degrades economic productivity, possibly to the extent of threatening the viability of the reform movement itself. Too much continuity skews the distribution of political power in favor of the nomenklatura, which may undermine the competitiveness of the nascent free market institutions. This chapter develops a formal political-economic model of this trade-off. The model challenges the conventional political economic wisdom that decoupling politics from economics will improve economic performance. In particular, we identify conditions under which the quality of the transition is enhanced by coupling the nomenklatura's acquisition of political power to the magnitude of the rents that they extract

Commodity storage and the market effects of biofuel policies

Legislation passed in 2007 by the U.S. Congress increased by about 1.3 billion bushels the net amount of corn required to be processed annually into ethanol for motor-fuel use. We estimate that corn prices were about 30% higher from 2006 to 2014 than they would have been without this demand increase. We develop a partially identified structural vector autoregression model. Our identification strategy is unique in the literature because it enables us to estimate the effects of transitory shocks, such as weather, separately from the effects of persistent shocks, such as the increased ethanol mandate. Moreover, by only partially identifying our model, we show how to generate robust conclusions without strong identifying assumptions