An Integrated Agent Model Addressing Situation Awareness and Functional State in Decision Making

In this paper, an integrated agent model is introduced addressing mutually interacting Situation Awareness and Functional State dynamics in decision making. This shows how a human's functional state, more specific a human's exhaustion and power, can influence a human's situation awareness, and in turn the decision making. The model is illustrated by a number of simulation scenarios. © 2011 Springer-Verlag

Attention control in sequential cognitive operations

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An Integrated Agent Model for Attention and Functional State

Abstract. To provide personalized intelligent ambient support for persons performing demanding tasks, it is important to have insight in their state of attention. Existing models for attention have difficulties in distinguishing between stressed and relaxed states. To solve this problem, this paper proposes to extend an existing model for attention with a model for ‘functional state’. In this integrated agent model, output of a functional state model (experienced pressure) serves as input for the attention model; the overall amount of attention is dependent on the amount of experienced pressure. An experiment was conducted to test the validity of the integrated agent model against the validity of an earlier model based on attention only. Results pointed out that the integrated model had a higher validity than the earlier model and was more successful in predicting attention.

Is there a dysexecutive syndrome?

The role of the frontal lobes has often been described as a ‘paradox’ or a ‘riddle’. Ascribed to this region has been the loftiest of functions (e.g. executive; seat of wisdom); others contested that the frontal lobes played no special role. There has also been controversy about the unity or diversity of functions related to the frontal lobes. Based on the analysis of the effects of lesions of the frontal lobes, we propose that there are discrete categories of functions within the frontal lobes, of which ‘executive’ functioning is one. Within the executive category, the data do not support the concept of an undifferentiated central executive/supervisory system. The results are better explained as impairments in a collection of anatomically and functionally independent but interrelated attentional control processes. Evidence for three separate frontal attentional processes is presented. For each process, we present an operational description, the data supporting the distinctiveness of each process and the evidence for impairments of each process after lesions in specific frontal regions. These processes and their coarse frontal localizations are energization—superior medial, task setting—left lateral and monitoring—right lateral. The strength of the findings lies in replication: across different tasks; across different cognitive modalities (e.g. reaction time paradigms, memory); and across different patient groups. This convergence minimizes the possibility that any of the findings are limited to a specific task or to a specific set of patients. Although distinct, these processes are flexibly assembled in response to context, complexity and intention over real time into different networks within the frontal regions and between frontal and posterior regions