Impacts of Ethanol on Planted Acreage in Market Equilibrium

The magnitude of land conversion caused by biofuels expansion largely determines whether biofuels reduce net greenhouse gas emissions. To examine this issue, we model how equilibrium changes in input use and land allocation decisions respond to market- and policy-induced increases in corn ethanol demand. We demonstrate why total cropland area unambiguously increases with increased ethanol demand. The impact of ethanol price subsidies and consumption mandates are examined in the context of technical change. If ethanol demand is elastic enough, an exogenous increase in corn yields leads to cropland expansion with price subsidies. Yield increases under consumption mandates reduce land use. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

The influence of crop insurance agents on coverage choices: The role of agent competition

We examine how competition among crop insurance agents affects coverage choice in the federal crop insurance program. Agents may influence producers’ insurance decisions to maximize their total compensation. We develop a theoretical model of producer–agent interaction to examine how loss potential, agent compensation mechanisms, and market competition affect the coverage level selected. Using crop insurance unit-level datasets from five states, we find evidence that agent market concentration and agents’ market share matter in the insurance coverage decisions of producers but that the economic significance of the influence is relatively small. Agent influence over coverage level, premium, and liability choice is generally positive but inconsistent across states, which may be attributable to differences in loss risk and agent compensation mechanisms

Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association 199 2 190 196

Nine dairy herds (mean size, 149 cows) with bulk-tank milk somatic cell counts of 80% of cows with Dairy Herd Improvement Association linear somatic cell counts >= 4 were selected for study. Each herd was monitored for 12 consecutive months. Duplicate quarter-milk specimens were collected from each cow for bacteriological culture at the beginning of lactation, cessation of lactation, and at the time of each clinical episode of mastitis. Streptococcus agalactiae was never isolated and Staphylococcus aureus was isolated from <1% of all quarters. There were 554 episodes of clinical mastitis. During the year of study, the incidence rate of clinical mastitis varied from 15.6 to 63.7% of cows among the 9 herds. Mean costs per cow per year in herd for mastitis prevention are given. Mean cost associated with clinical mastitis was $107/episode. Approximately 84$90) of the costs attributed to a clinical episode were associated with decreased milk production and non-saleable milk. Costs of medication and professional veterinary fees per clinical episode varied significantly among the 9 herds. Three of the herds did not have a veterinarian to treat a clinical episode of mastitis during the year of study even though 2 of these herds had the first and third highest incidence rates of clinical mastitis. When calculated on a per cow in herd basis, mean costs of $40/cow/year were attributed to clinical mastitis. It is suggested that herds that have effectively controlled mastitis caused by contagious pathogens may still have substantial economic losses as a result of clinical mastitis and that losses and even rates of clinical mastitis may vary considerably among such herds.