Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing

We study the effects of revenue and investment cost uncertainty, as well non- preemption duopoly competition, on the timing of investments in two complementary inputs, where either spillover-knowledge is allowed or proprietary-knowledge holds. We find that the ex-ante and ex-post revenue market shares play a very important role in firms’ behavior. When competition is considered, the leader’s behavior departs from that of the monopolist firm of Smith (Ind Corp Change 14:639–650, 2005). The leader is justified in following the conventional wisdom (i.e., synchronous investments are more likely), whereas, the follower’s behavior departs from that of the conventional wisdom (i.e., asynchronous investments are more likely)

Optimal policy with dispersed information and uncertain monetary transmission

In a setting with dispersed information, monopolistic competition and sticky-prices, a policy authority uncertain about the monetary transmission mechanism reacts prudently to supply shocks. This induces producers to ascribe an excessive importance to their private information when setting prices. To correct the ensuing inefficiency a state-contingent fiscal policy is required. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Optimal policy with dispersed information and uncertain monetary transmission

In a setting with dispersed information, monopolistic competition and sticky-prices, a policy authority uncertain about the monetary transmission mechanism reacts prudently to supply shocks. This induces producers to ascribe an excessive importance to their private information when setting prices. To correct the ensuing inefficiency a state-contingent fiscal policy is required. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Efficient information acquisition with heterogeneous agents

In a Gaussian-quadratic economy with dispersed information, we correct the inefficiency in information acquisition by making the tax rate on agents own actions contingent on actions themselves. This aligns individual and social evaluations of information quality. Our policy is robust to considering heterogeneous unobservable costs in information acquisition, since agents share a common evaluation of the benefit of information quality

Irreversible investment and R&D spillovers in a dynamic duopoly

Investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of R&D, generating spillovers that lowers the second comer's investment cost. We show that these spillovers substantially affect the equilibrium of the dynamic game. Even for low spillover values, the leader delays her investment until the stochastic fundamental has gone past the level such that the follower's optimal strategy is to invest as soon as he attains the spillover. This bears several interesting implications. First, because the follower invests as he benefits from the spillover, in equilibrium the average time delay between the two investments is short, as it should be expected. Second, in case of a major innovation, an optimal public policy requires an intervention in favor of the investment activity; an increase in uncertainty - delaying the equilibrium - calls for higher subsidization rates. Third, numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader's and the follower's maximum value functions. Accordingly, our model can help generate realistic market betas. \ua9 2011 Elsevier B.V

Monopolistic competition, dynamic inefficiency and asset bubbles

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:3597.9512(2272) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Currency attacks with multiple equilibria and imperfect information The role of wage-setters

Also available via the InternetAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:3597.9512(no 3291) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreSIGLEGBUnited Kingdo

'Crony capitalism', bail-outs and bank runs

Issued under the auspices of the Centre's research programme in Financial Economics and International MacroeconomicsAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:3597.9512(no 2751) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreSIGLEGBUnited Kingdo