Events, processes, and the time of a killing

The paper proposes a novel solution to the problem of the time of a killing (ToK), which persistently besets theories of act-individuation. The solution proposed claims to expose a crucial wrong-headed assumption in the debate, according to which ToK is essentially a problem of locating some event that corresponds to the killing. The alternative proposal put forward here turns on recognizing a separate category of dynamic occurents, viz. processes. The paper does not aim to mount a comprehensive defense of process ontology, relying instead on extant defenses. The primary aim is rather to put process ontology to work in diagnosing the current state of play over ToK, and indeed in solving it

Seriously misleading results using inverse of Freeman-Tukey double arcsine transformation in meta-analysis of single proportions.

Standard generic inverse variance methods for the combination of single proportions are based on transformed proportions using the logit, arcsine, and Freeman-Tukey double arcsine transformations. Generalized linear mixed models are another more elaborate approach. Irrespective of the approach, meta-analysis results are typically back-transformed to the original scale in order to ease interpretation. Whereas the back-transformation of meta-analysis results is straightforward for most transformations, this is not the case for the Freeman-Tukey double arcsine transformation, albeit possible. In this case study with five studies, we demonstrate how seriously misleading the back-transformation of the Freeman-Tukey double arcsine transformation can be. We conclude that this transformation should only be used with special caution for the meta-analysis of single proportions due to potential problems with the back-transformation. Generalized linear mixed models seem to be a promising alternative

Elementos y esencias

La autora compara los modos en que Aristóteles, los filósofos materialistas antiguos y la ciencia natural moderna explican el término “elemento”. El interés filosófico de este análisis depende del dictum wittgensteiniano: “La esencia es expresada por la gramática”. En la discusión sobre Aristóteles se examinan las nociones de materia prima, forma y sustancia. Se concluye que el uso de los términos técnicos por ciertos grupos humanos —como el de los científicos naturales— produce una “especie-de-esencias” no eternas ni inmutables.The author compares the ways in which the term “element” has been explicated by Aristotle, ancient materialists, and modern natural science. The philosophical interest of this analysis stems from Wittgenstein’s dictum: “essence is expressed by grammar.” In the context of Aristotle’s thought, the ideas of first matter, form, and substance are examined. The conclusion is that the use of technical terms by certain communities—such as natural scientists— produces a “species-of-essences” neither eternal nor immutable

Partial report is the wrong paradigm

Is consciousness independent of the general-purpose information processes known as ‘cognitive access’? The dominantmethodology for supporting this independence hypothesis appeals to partial report experiments as evidence for perceptual consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Using a standard model of evidential support, and reviewing recent elaborations of the partial report paradigm, this article argues that the paradigm has the wrong structure to support the independence hypothesis. Like reports in general, a subject’s partial report is evidence that she is conscious of information only where that information is cognitively accessed. So partial report experiments could dissociate consciousness from cognitive access only if there were uncontroversial evidence forconsciousness which did not imply reportability. There is no such evidence. An alternative, broadly Marrian methodology for supporting the independence hypothesis is suggested, and some challenges to it outlined. This methodology does not require experimental evidence for consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Instead it focuses on a function of perceptual consciousness when a stimulus is cognitively accessed. If the processes best suited to implement this function exclude cognitive access, the independence hypothesis will be supported. One relevant function of consciousness may be reflected in reason-based psychological explanations of a subject’s behaviour

Economics, Agency, and Causal Explanation

The paper considers three questions. First, what is the connection between economics and agency? It is argued that causation and explanation in economics fundamentally depend on agency. So a philosophical understanding of economic explanation must be sensitive to an understanding of agency. Second, what is the connection between agency and causation? A causal view of agency-involving explanation is defended against a number of arguments from the resurgent noncausalist tradition in the literature on agency and action-explanation. If agency is fundamental to economic explanation, it is argued, then so is causation. Third, what is the connection between causal explanation and the natural sciences? It is argued that, though the explanations given in economics and other social sciences are causal explanations, they are different in kind from the causal explanations of the natural sciences. On the one hand, then, the causal explanations of the social sciences are irreducible to those found in the natural sciences. On the other hand, the causal relations described by the social sciences are not completely autonomous; they do not float free of, or operate independently from, the causal relations charted by the natural sciences