New Turkey\u27s Other Turks Abroad: Erdoğan Regime\u27s Kin-State Policy in North Macedonia

In post-imperial kin-states, the combination of authoritarian rule and selective historical memory in home-states of their kin-minorities leads to a dangerous brand of ethnic politics. Turkey has trouble defining both its kin societies in the Balkans and the policies directed at them. Nonetheless, Erdoğan\u27s kin-state actions since his ruling party came into power in 2002 divide and polarize Balkan Turks and Muslims. In this respect, this article builds on how the religious-oriented and political polarization exported from the kin-state affects the national identity of its kin-minority in ethnically divided society, in the context of Rogers Brubaker\u27s well-known triadic nexus. This article aims to take a brief look at the division and polarization of Balkan Turks and Muslims, especially in North Macedonia, which emerged as a result of Turkey’s transnational identity policies

Europeanization of the Balkans vs. Balkanization of Europe: A Vision Limited by Realities

By the time of the simultaneous collapses of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the European Union (EU) commenced an acute relationship with the post-communist Central and Eastern European Countries. The EU had fully supported transition to more democratic regimes and into capital market of these countries. Finally, 13 Central and Eastern European Countries became members of the EU in last two decades. The most-awaited new Enlargement Strategy for the remaining potential candidate and candidate countries in the Western Balkans, entitled “The Credible Enlargement Perspective for the Western Balkans” was presented earlier this year. The strategy that was presented eighteen years after the launch of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), indicates a clear prospect of accession of Western Balkans countries to the EU by the end of 2025. It’s clear that Western Balkans needs the EU for more stability and less corruption, but according to us, social acceptability of nationalism and far-right in the Western Europe is a danger for Western Balkans countries that were torn by sharp ethnic conflicts until recently. On the other hand, some Central European countries’ descent into authoritarianism is another problem for sensitive stability of Western Balkans countries on the door of the EU. This study aims to take a comprehensive look at how Europe is Balkanizing while Western Balkans countries are Europeanizing. Strategy reports and case studies will be analyzed dealing with the rise of Nationalism in Europe and European Integration of Western Balkans countries

TREATY OF LAUSANNE: THE TOOL OF MINORITY PROTECTION FOR THE CHAM ALBANIANS OF GREECE

Cham Albanians, a predominantly Muslim sub-group of Albanians who originally reside in the coastal region of Southern Epirus in Greece’s border region with Albania, had been expelled from Greece twice.As the majority of Cham Albanians were Muslim, they were treated with the same contempt as ethnic Turks living in Greece. According to official data, 3.000 of them were transferred to Turkey as part of the Greek-Turkish population exchange according to the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations signed at Lausanne on 30 January 1923. Articles 37 to 44 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty attribute substantive rights for exempted Muslims in Greece and non-Muslims in Turkey from the Greek-Turkish population exchange and 17,008 of them wereexempted from the exchange. In this paper, legal status of Muslim Cham Albanians of Greece that were exchanged with Orthodox minority that lived in Turkey after World War I and exiled from Greece after World War II, will be analyzed. This paper aims to emphasize thatMuslim Cham Albanians of Greeceare already recipients of special rights as a subject of law, according to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) that guarantees the rights of the Muslim minority in Greece. We find very important to analyze Cham Question in the context of the Treaty of Lausanne while Greek government insists that the minority is not “Turkish” but “Muslim” to justify banning associations that include the word “Turk”.&nbsp

Granice kontra liczby: między konsolidacją narodu w Kosowie a blokiem Państw Członkowskich Unii Europejskiej; sytuacja albańskiej mniejszości narodowej w południowej Serbii

Serbia and Kosovo are the two countries that want to join the EU as their ultimate goal. However, in order for this process to start, Kosovo, still not recognised by five EU member states, should be recognised by many countries including Serbia and these two former enemies have to solve the problems seriously to become allies. While the independence of Kosovo remains unacceptable for Serbia, today one of the main problems facing the parties is the border issues. Despite the fact that Serbia insists there is no state border between Serbia and its former province, the EU-mediated talks on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which include the option of a border correction namely, land swap is taking place behind closed doors. The land swap solution suggests that Kosovo takes control of the Albanian-inhabited Preševo Valley of South Serbia while the Serb-inhabited four northern municipalities of Kosovo would be associated with Serbia. But this controversial step, depending on whom you ask, is a historical matter that can lead to a war or a great compromise. This paper aims to take a comprehensive look at the solution of the land swap between Kosovo and Serbia on the side of Albanian minority in the South Serbia, considering that the balances in this region are very dynamic, and to examine the importance of the EU membership motivation for solving such disputes. The analysis in this study has been conducted based on (a) interviews with political decision-makers in the Preševo Valley involved in talks about swapping land and journalists from the region, (b) author’s observations and field research, (c) objectives and priorities identified in the Brussels Agreement in 2013, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and the instruments concerned with minority rights and the recognition of local autonomy (e.g. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and European Charter of Local Self-Government) compared to comments from the latest country-specific monitoring works by the EU and Council of Europe on the framework of the EU-facilitated Dialogue for the normalisation of relations between two countries.Serbia i Kosowo to dwa kraje, których ostatecznym celem jest przyłączenie się do UE. Jednakże, aby proces ten mógł się rozpocząć, Kosowo, wciąż nieuznawane przez pięć państw członkowskich UE, powinno zostać uznane przez wiele krajów, wliczając w to Serbię, poza tym ci dwaj byli wrogowie muszą rozwiązać problemy w sposób poważny, by stać się sojusznikami. Skoro niepodległość Kosowa pozostaje nie do przyjęcia dla Serbii, dziś jednym z głównych problemów stojących przed stronami są kwestie graniczne. Pomimo faktu, że Serbia obstaje przy tym, iż nie istnieje żadna granica między Serbią a jej poprzednią prowincją, rozmowy prowadzone z mediacją UE w sprawie normalizacji stosunków między Serbią a Kosowem, obejmujące mianowicie opcję korekty granic, za zamkniętymi drzwiami ma miejsce wymiana terenów. Rozwiązanie polegające na wymianie terenów sugeruje, że Kosowo przejmuje kontrolę nad zamieszkałą przez Albańczyków z tzw. Doliny Preszewa w Południowej Serbii, podczas gdy zamieszkałe przez Serbów cztery północne gminy Kosowa połączyłyby się z Serbią. Lecz ten kontrowersyjny krok, w zależności od tego, kogo się pytamy, jest problemem historycznym, który może prowadzić do wojny albo do wielkiego kompromisu. Artykuł ma na celu wszechstronne spojrzenie na rozwiązanie, jakim jest wymiana terenów między Kosowem a Serbią, po stronie mniejszości albańskiej w Południowej Serbii, uwzględniając to, że równowagi w tym regionie są bardzo dynamiczne, oraz zbadanie znaczenia motywacji, jaką jest członkostwo w UE, dla rozstrzygania takich kwestii spornych. Analizę w tym opracowaniu przeprowadzono na podstawie: (a) wywiadów z decydentami politycznymi w Dolinie Preszewa, zaangażowanymi w rozmowy o wymianie terenów, i dziennikarzami z regionu, (b) obserwacji i badań terenowych autora, (c) celów i priorytetów określonych w Porozumieniu Brukselskim z roku 2013, Układzie o Stabilizacji i Stowarzyszeniu oraz instrumentów dotyczących praw mniejszości i uznania autonomii lokalnej (np. Ramowa Konwencja w sprawie Ochrony Mniejszości Narodowych oraz Europejska Karta Samorządów Lokalnych) w zestawieniu z komentarzami pochodzącymi z najnowszych prac monitoringowych odnoszących się do konkretnych krajów prowadzonych przez UE i Radę Europy dotyczących ram dialogu pod auspicjami UE w sprawie normalizacji stosunków między dwoma krajami

Implications of Turkey\u27s Politicized Kin-community-making in the Balkans: Transitive Turkish Identity in North Macedonia

Direct contact and communication with kin abroad has become one of the characteristic features of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) period\u27s foreign policy that is driven by domestic politics. In this period, instrumentalization of religion in kin politics and extraterritorial authoritarian practices by using a civilizational belonging (Islamic civilization) and a transnational historical memory (Ottoman legacy) are causing Turkey to take its place among post-imperial kin-states. Since the early 2010s, Turkish so-called soft power in the Balkans has markedly shifted from charitable undertaking policies of the early 90s and 2000s towards political ambitions of the ruling regime at numerous fronts. These include import of politics with the intense political polarization from Turkey to its kin communities in the sovereign states and employment of Turkish state institutions to intervene in the ethno-politics in ethnically divided nations. In this respect, this article builds on how the religious-oriented and political polarization export from the kin-state affects the national identity of a kin-minority in ethnically divided society. This article aims to take a brief look at the perception of transitive Turkishness in North Macedonia, which emerged as a result of Turkey’s transnational identity policies, in the context of Rogers Brubaker\u27s well-known triadic nexus