166 research outputs found
Ineffability: The very concept
In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of âsaying somethingâ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term âlanguageâ, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, âineffabilityâ is ambiguous, too, and we should make a distinction between weak and strong ineffability. Weak ineffability is rooted in the deficiencies of a particular language while strong ineffability stems from the structure of a particular cognitive system and its capacities for conceptual mental representation. Mental contents are only sayable if we are able to conceptualize them and then create signs to represent them in communication
The paradox of ineffability
Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical â either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable â or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alstonâs version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hickâs proposal and develop a different account based on some passages from Pseudo-Dionysiusâ Mystica Theologia. âGod is ineffableâ is a metalinguistic statement concerning propositions about God: not all propositions about God are expressible in a human language
Metaphor and Theological Realism
In this paper, I argue that there are indispensable and irreducible
metaphors in religious language and that this does not threaten a realist interpretation of religion. I first sketch a realist theory of religious language and argue that we cannot avoid addressing the problems metaphor poses to semantics. I then give a brief account of what it means for a metaphorical sentence to be true and how metaphors can refer to something even if what they mean is not expressible in literal terms. Finally, I discuss how this realist theory of metaphor influences our understanding of negative theology and gives a new
perspective on religious pluralism
Realismus und unĂŒbersetzbare Sprachen
This paper argues against Davidsonâs claim that there is no distinction between
conceptual schemes and their content and derives the implications for the debate
on realism and antirealism. Starting from a semantic conception of realism,
I discuss Davidsonâs argument against conceptual schemes and untranslatable
languages. I argue that the idea of an untranslatable language is consistent
since language attribution is essentially normative. Untranslatable languages
are metaphysically possible, but epistemically unrecognizable. This leads to a
Berkeleyan argument against antirealism: if antirealism is conceived of as dependence
from a total language (instead of merely some actual language), the
distinction between realism and antirealism vanishes: antirealism is realism
Languages of ineffability. The rediscovery of apophaticism in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion
I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism
and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without
contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God
Languages of ineffability: the rediscovery of apophaticism in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion
I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God
Divine Minds. Idealism as Panentheism in Berkeley and Vasubandhu
This chapter argues that both Berkeley and Vasubandhu accept a kind of metaphysical idealism: while Berkeleyâs theistic idealism claims that all of reality exists only in the mind of God, Vasubandhu teaches that external objects have no intrinsic existence and exist only as objects of perception; mind is the ultimate reality. This chapter explores the possibility of reading both these doctrines as a kind of idealist panentheism. Specifically, it will address two questions: (1) in what sense are Berkeleyâs and Vasubandhuâs theories idealist philosophies? (2) Is it justified to interpret them as panentheists? More precisely, the second question has two parts: (2a) Should Berkeleyâs idealism be regarded as a kind of panentheism? (2b) Can the theism-part of panentheism justly be applied to Vasubandhuâs notion of mind as ultimate reality? The answer will be mostly negative: Berkeley is not a panentheist, and labeling Vasubandhu as a panentheist stretches the concept of God beyond the limits of reasonable application. Finally, though, it is argued that a YogÄcÄrin reading of Berkeleyâs idealism opens an interesting possibility for idealist panentheism
- âŠ