Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and Bargaining

A fixed wage is inefficient in a standard search model when workers endogenously separate from employment. We derive an efficient employment contract that involves agents paying a hiring fee (or bond) upon the formation of a match. We estimate the fixed wage and efficient contract assuming the hiring fee is unobservable, and find evidence to reject the efficient contract in favor of the fixed wage rule. A counterfactual experiment reveals the current level of labor force participation to be 9% below the efficient level, and a structural shift to the efficient contract improves welfare by nearly 4%.labor supply, unemployment, matching, efficiency wages

Crying wolf: concluding that wolves were not restored

In 2007, the USA removed (delisted) the grey wolf (Canis lupus) in the upper Midwest from the Endangered Species List. After 35 years of being considered endangered, these wolves had increased from 750 in 38 400 km2 of Minnesota (Fuller et al. 1992) to over 4100 inhabiting 110 000 km2 of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Conservationists celebrated this event as a most significant success. Suddenly, however, this milestone was challenged by Leonard & Wayne (2007) based on preliminary genetic findings that wolves of the upper Midwest 100 years ago were different from 69 per cent of the current population. There are, however, both technical and logical problems with this challenge

Monopoly Power with a Short Selling Constraint

We show if a speculator can benefit from reducing a monopoly’s rents through short selling, then a speculator may take a short position in a monopoly, overcome the barriers to entry, and compete with the monopoly. The competition drives down the monopoly’s rents, and as a result, the short position becomes profitable and covers the cost of entry. If entry is impossible, then the speculator may coordinate and pay the firm’s counter-parties to stop trading with the monopoly rather than entering. Either way, increasing a speculator’s ability to short a firm’s rents results in a constraint on the monopoly and forces it to act more like a price taker. The mechanism is a market based approach to antitrust

Wolf Population Dynamics

A LARGE, DARK WOLF poked his nose out of the pines in Yellowstone National Park as he thrust a broad foot deep into the snow and plowed ahead. Soon a second animal appeared, then another, and a fourth. A few minutes later, a pack of thirteen lanky wolves had filed out of the pines and onto the open hillside. Wolf packs are the main social units of a wolf population. As numbers of wolves in packs change, so too, then, does the wolf population (Rausch 1967). Trying to understand the factors and mechanisms that affect these changes is what the field of wolf population dynamics is all about. In this chapter, we will explore this topic using two main approaches: (1) meta-analysis using data from studies from many areas and periods, and (2) case histories of key long-term studies. The combination presents a good picture-a picture, however, that is still incomplete. We also caution that the data sets summarized in the analyses represent snapshots of wolf population dynamics under widely varying conditions and population trends, and that the figures used are usually composites or averages. Nevertheless, they should allow generalizations that provide important insight into wolf population dynamics

Labor force participation and pair-wise efficient contracts with search and bargaining

A “constant” wage is pair-wise inefficient in a standard search model when workers endogenously separate from employment. We derive a pair-wiseefficient employment contract that involves workers paying a hiring fee (or bond) upon the formation of a match. We estimate the constant wage and pair-wiseefficientcontract assuming the hiring fee is unobservable, and find evidence to reject the pair-wiseefficientcontract in favor of the constant wage rule. A counterfactual experiment reveals the current level of laborforceparticipation to be 9.6% below the efficient level, and a structural shift to the pair-wiseefficientcontract improves welfare by roughly 3.5%

Theology, News and Notes - Vol. 13, No. 04

Theology News & Notes was a theological journal published by Fuller Theological Seminary from 1954 through 2014.https://digitalcommons.fuller.edu/tnn/1027/thumbnail.jp

Unemployment Insurance Take-up Rates in an Equilibrium Search Model

From 1989-2012 on average 23% of those eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in the US did not collect them. To understand the implications of these “unclaimed” benefits, we develop a directed search model with an endogenous UI take-up rate. In equilibrium, UI collectors have longer unemployment durations relative to non-collectors. The difference results from two forces, a consumption effect and a private information effect, as UI collection histories are unobservable. We characterize both effects analytically and quantitatively. With an endogenous take-up rate, the unemployment rate and average duration of unemployment respond significantly slower to changes in the UI benefit level, relative to the standard model with a 100% take-up rate. The private information effect on non-collector job finding rates plays an important role in this result

Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring

An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current US system. (JEL D82, H24, J64, J65) </jats:p

Using Group Model Building to Understand Factors That Influence Childhood Obesity in an Urban Environment

Background: Despite increased attention, conventional views of obesity are based upon individual behaviors, and children and parents living with obesity are assumed to be the primary problem solvers. Instead of focusing exclusively on individual reduction behaviors for childhood obesity, greater focus should be placed on better understanding existing community systems and their effects on obesity. The Milwaukee Childhood Obesity Prevention Project is a community-based coalition established to develop policy and environmental change strategies to impact childhood obesity in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The coalition conducted a Group Model Building exercise to better understand root causes of childhood obesity in its community. Methods: Group Model Building is a process by which a group systematically engages in model construction to better understand the systems that are in place. It helps participants make their mental models explicit through a careful and consistent process to test assumptions. This process has 3 main components: (1) assembling a team of participants; (2) conducting a behavior-over-time graphs exercise; and (3) drawing the causal loop diagram exercise. Results: The behavior-over-time graph portion produced 61 graphs in 10 categories. The causal loop diagram yielded 5 major themes and 7 subthemes. Conclusions: Factors that influence childhood obesity are varied, and it is important to recognize that no single solution exists. The perspectives from this exercise provided a means to create a process for dialogue and commitment by stakeholders and partnerships to build capacity for change within the community

Theology, News and Notes - Vol. 24, No. 01

Theology News & Notes was a theological journal published by Fuller Theological Seminary from 1954 through 2014.https://digitalcommons.fuller.edu/tnn/1062/thumbnail.jp