"The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" on Large and Small Clients:Experiences from Two Large Bank Failures in Japan"

A "shock therapy" might have different impacts between large and small firms. In this paper, we focus on the clients of two large failed Japanese banks - the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB). We first show that subsequent events after the bank failures allowed the new LTCB to adopt a "shock therapy" but kept the new NCB to face "soft budget constraints". We then show that the different therapies made performances of these two banks' customers very different. Under the shock therapy, large firms showed significant recovery of their profits but small firms did not. In contrast, under the soft budget constraints, large firms did not show recovery and small firms experienced significant decline in their profits when the new bank terminated the banking relationship.

The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" on Large and Small Clients:Experiences from Two Large Bank Failures in Japan (Forthcoming in "Pacific-Basin Finance Journal". )

A "shock therapy" might have different impacts between large and small firms. In this paper, we focus on the clients of two large failed Japanese banks - the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB). We first show that subsequent events after the bank failures allowed the new LTCB to adopt a "shock therapy" but kept the new NCB to face "soft budget constraints". We then show that the different therapies made performances of these two banks' customers very different. Under the shock therapy, large firms showed significant recovery of their profits but small firms did not. In contrast, under the soft budget constraints, large firms did not show recovery and small firms experienced significant decline in their profits when the new bank terminated the banking relationship.

The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" under a Banking Crisis: Experiences from Three Large Bank Failures in Japan (Subsequently published in "Japanese Economic Review" Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jan. 2006), pp.232-246. )

A bank failure can have various adverse consequences for the clients. The adverse impacts might, however, differ depending on who takes over the operation of the failed banks. In this paper, we show that how to manage the new banks is important in mitigating the short-run and long-run consequences of bank failures. In the analysis, we focus on clients of three large failed Japanese banks - Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB), and the Nippon Credit Bank. We examine when the number of bankruptcies increased and how the market valuation changed for the client firms after the banks' operations were taken over by new banks. As for the clients of LTCB, there were dramatic increases of bankruptcies in the short-run but the surviving clients showed significant recovery of their stock prices. In contrast, as for the clients of the other two banks, there was neither dramatic increase of bankruptcies nor significant recovery of their stock prices. The result implies that "shock therapy" or "soft budget constraints" had dramatically different consequences in solving bad loan problems in Japan.

"The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" under a Banking Crisis : Experiences from Three Large Bank Failures in Japan"

A bank failure can have various adverse consequences for the clients. The adverse impacts might, however, differ depending on who takes over the operation of the failed banks. In this paper, we show that how to manage the new banks is important in mitigating the short-run and long-run consequences of bank failures. In the analysis, we focus on clients of three large failed Japanese banks - Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB), and the Nippon Credit Bank. We examine when the number of bankruptcies increased and how the market valuation changed for the client firms after the banks' operations were taken over by new banks. As for the clients of LTCB, there were dramatic increases of bankruptcies in the short-run but the surviving clients showed significant recovery of their stock prices. In contrast, as for the clients of the other two banks, there was neither dramatic increase of bankruptcies nor significant recovery of their stock prices. The result implies that "shock therapy" or "soft budget constraints" had dramatically different consequences in solving bad loan problems in Japan.

The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" on Large and Small Clients: Experiences from Two Large Bank Failures in Japan

A "shock therapy" might have different impacts between large and small firms. In this paper, we focus on the clients of two large failed Japanese banks - the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB). We first show that subsequent events after the bank failures allowed the new LTCB to adopt a "shock therapy" but kept the new NCB to face "soft budget constraints". We then show that the different therapies made performances of these two banks' customers very different. Under the shock therapy, large firms showed significant recovery of their profits but small firms did not. In contrast, under the soft budget constraints, large firms did not show recovery and small firms experienced significant decline in their profits when the new bank terminated the banking relationship.bank failure, shock therapy, soft budget constraints, banking relationship

Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs

Abstract This paper formalizes common belief among players with no underlying assumption on their individual beliefs. Especially, players may not be logically omniscient, i.e., they may not believe logical consequences of their beliefs. The key idea is to use a novel concept of a common basis: it is an event such that, whenever it is true, every player believes its logical consequences. The common belief in an event obtains when a common basis implies the mutual belief in that event. If players' beliefs are assumed to be true, then common belief reduces to common knowledge. The formalization nests previous axiomatizations of common belief and common knowledge which have assumed players' logical monotonic reasoning. Under this formalization, unlike others, if players have common belief in rationality then their actions survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions even if their beliefs are not monotonic

Are the Players in an Interactive Belief Model Meta-certain of the Model Itself?

In an interactive belief model, are the players "commonly meta-certain" of the model itself? This paper formalizes such implicit "common meta-certainty" assumption. To that end, the paper expands the objects of players' beliefs from events to functions defined on the underlying states. Then, the paper defines a player's belief-generating map: it associates, with each state, whether a player believes each event at that state. The paper formalizes what it means by: "a player is (meta-)certain of her own belief-generating map" or "the players are (meta-)certain of the profile of belief-generating maps (i.e., the model)." The paper shows: a player is (meta-)certain of her own belief-generating map if and only if her beliefs are introspective. The players are commonly (meta-)certain of the model if and only if, for any event which some player i believes at some state, it is common belief at the state that player i believes the event. This paper then asks whether the "common meta-certainty" assumption is needed for an epistemic characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts. The paper shows: if each player is logical and (meta-)certain of her own strategy and belief-generating map, then each player correctly believes her own rationality. Consequently, common belief in rationality alone leads to actions that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2021, arXiv:2106.1088