Why Is it so Difficult to Know if National Pride Leads the Way to European Identity or Prevents it ?

For a long time, support for European integration could be analysed without much reference tothe attachments of European citizens to their nations. Beyond the recurring acknowledgement of thestrong social determination of attitudes towards Europe, analysts did observe important differences insupport between European countries, but these were considered as encompassing all sorts ofdifferences between these countries; there was no need to infer major differences in the ways differentpeoples of Europe relate to their own country.Nowadays, most analysts of European Union consider that the growing process of Europeanintegration has changed the very nature of attitudes towards Europe. Since 1994 and the setting up ofEuropean citizenship, support for the European Union should no longer be analysed as tolerantattitudes towards a remote and foreign object, and might be addressed as a European identity buildingprocess. Hence, the question of the relationship between the support for the European Union and thecommitment of European citizens to their own country should not be avoided anymore (Diez Medrano2003). This article will examine over time the relationship between national and Europeancommitments, which we will apprehend through the notion of national and European identifications.European identity; identity; Europeanization; Europeanization

Sur les dynamiques sociologiques et politiques de l’identification à l’Europe

Depuis les débuts de son existence, la Communauté Européenne suscite des inquiétudes quant à sa capacité à faire naître un sentiment d’appartenance de nature suffisamment forte pour asseoir la légitimité de son système politique. Au nombre des explications de la faiblesse de ce qu’on ose à peine désigner comme une « identité » européenne, l’idée que les attachements des Européens à leurs nations respectives feraient écran au développement de cette nouvelle identification figure en bonne place, surtout depuis la ratification du traité de Maastricht. Les données dont on dispose pour tester la validité de cette hypothèse à l’échelle de l’Europe – les enquêtes de l’Eurobaromètre – rendent les choses difficiles à traiter du fait des changements survenus depuis 1994 dans la formulation des questions. Néanmoins, il est possible de faire apparaître un effet de contexte électoral tout à fait intéressant : loin des périodes où le débat public autour de l’Europe est particulièrement soutenu, on n’observe aucun antagonisme dans les mesures d’attachement à l’Europe et à ses nations, alors qu’au moment des consultations européennes, notamment, on observe bien un tel antagonisme. Cet effet de contexte peut être interprété comme la conséquence de la bi-dimensionnalité des attachements territoriaux des Européens, combinant logique politique de choix entre des élites et des communautés politiques pour partie concurrentielles, et logique sociologique d’appartenance à des collectifs imaginaires.The European Community has always – that is, since its beginning – given cause for concern regarding its ability to arouse a feeling of belonging, strong enough to establish the legitimacy of its political system. Many explanations have been given for this weakness. The idea that the commitments of Europeans to their nation form a screen between them and Europe is very widespread, especially since the ratification of the Maastricht’s Treaty. The database available to test this hypothesis is difficult to use, because of the many changes of wording having occurred since 1994. Nevertheless, it shows a very interesting electoral effect : far from the periods of sustained public debate on Europe, no antagonism can be measured between the variables of commitment to Europe and to its nations ; while a negative relationship appears between belonging to Europe and national pride during the European electoral campaigns. This contextual effect can be interpreted as a consequence of the bi-dimensional character of the territorial commitments of the Europeans, which combine a political logic of choice between elites and citizenries partially competitive, and a sociological logic of belonging to any available imaginary community

National And European Identifications:A Dual Relationship

Different authors show opposing results concerning the relationship between national and European identities. This article confirms empirically that identification with Europe is directly and yet paradoxically related to national identifications. It also shows that the relationship established between these two identifications has changed over the last two decades in a consistent way. The changes in this relationship are interpreted as a consequence of the dual process at stake when people identify with a territorially based community. The first process refers to the sociologically and politically determined individual disposition to feel like a member of a community rather than an isolated individual: it is cumulative as far as identification with nations and with Europe is concerned. The other dimension, on the contrary, is exclusive: it results from the sociological and political process of community building which is made easier by the delimitation of the community, and is hence fuelled by pointing out some significant “other” such as the European Union. These two processes interact in such a way that the relationship between the two levels of identification is often difficult to spot which explains why there is considerable debate on whether a strong sense of national identity leads the way to European identity or prevents it

Taking It to the Extreme:The Effect of Coalition Cabinets on Foreign Policy

Institutional constraints have been offered by some scholars as an explanation for why multiparty coalitions should be more peaceful than single-party cabinets. Yet others see the same institutional setting as a prescription for more aggressive behavior. Recent research has investigated these conflicting expectations, but with mixed results. We examine the theoretical bases for these alternative expectations about the effects of coalition politics on foreign policy. We find that previous research is limited theoretically by confounding institutional effects with policy positions, and empirically by analyzing only international conflict data. We address these limitations by examining cases of foreign policy behavior using the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset. Consistent with our observation that institutional constraints have been confounded with policy positions, we find that coalitions are neither more aggressive nor more peaceful, but do engage in more extreme foreign policy behaviors. These findings are discussed with regard to various perspectives on the role of institutions in shaping foreign policy behavior.</p

Coalition governance and foreign policy decision making

This article explores processes of coalition governance in foreign policy. Specifically, it argues that such processes are shaped by two interrelated dimensions of coalition set-up: first, the allocation of the foreign ministry to the senior or a junior coalition partner and, second, the degree of policy discretion which is delegated to that ministry. Bringing these two dimensions together, the article distinguishes four types of coalition arrangement for the making of foreign policy, which are expected to have predictable implications for the process of foreign policy-making and, ultimately, for the foreign policy outputs of multi-party coalitions and their quality

Partitocracy and the future of Belgium. Revisiting Does Belgium (still) exist?

In 2006, Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens and André-Paul Frognier raised the question: Does Belgium (still) exist? And they explored the differences in political culture between Flemings and Walloons (Billiet, Maddens, & Frognier, 2006). 15 years later, we continue their journey and seek to uncover whether these differences have increased or by contrast declined. Because the general endeavour of the volume is to disentangle partitocracy in Belgium, we focus on political differences or similar- ities between the two main language groups and add to the perspective of voters, the perspective of candidates. This allows us to grasp possible differences not only between Dutch-speakers and French-speakers but also between political elites and masses. Billiet and colleagues started their exploration from the gradual cultural and social divergence between Flanders and Wallonia that led to two separate political systems in Belgium. They came to the conclusion that “quite a few differences in public opinion still exist between Flemings and francophone Belgians” (Billiet et al., 2006, p. 929). In particular, the former have a stronger regional – i.e. Flemish – iden- tity whereas the latter a stronger national – i.e. Belgian – identity, which goes hand in hand with preferences for further regionalization in Flanders but less in Wallonia, even though emotional ties to Belgium do still exist in each region, albeit more wide- spread in Wallonia than in Flanders. In order to explain these differences, the researchers concluded that “contextual characteristics are more important than national character” (Billiet et al., 2006, p. 929). In 15 years, the political and social context in Belgium has quite dramatically changed and centrifugal but also centripetal dynamics can be observed (De Winter & Baudewyns, 2009; Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2015; 2020; 2022). Such dynamics can be seen both between language groups and between so-called ‘elite’ and ‘mass’ (De Winter & Van Wynsberghe, 2015). The objective of this chapter is therefore to look at the evolution of political attitudes and opinions over the last 15 years regarding the future of Belgium. Beside voter surveys, we can rely on candidate surveys that offer insightful data to grasp the evolution of this question in both language groups and between masses and elites. In this chapter, we first look at the left-right dimension, before focusing on ethno-territorial identities and finally turn to state reform prefer- ences. In so doing, we seek to revisit the underlying twofold question: does Belgium (still) exist and will it continue to do so

Roflumilast in moderate-to-severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease treated with longacting bronchodilators: two randomised clinical trials

Background Patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) have few options for treatment. The efficacy and safety of the phosphodiesterase-4 inhibitor roflumilast have been investigated in studies of patients with moderate-to-severe COPD, but not in those concomitantly treated with longacting inhaled bronchodilators. The effect of roflumilast on lung function in patients with COPD that is moderate to severe who are already being treated with salmeterol or tiotropium was investigated. Methods In two double-blind, multicentre studies done in an outpatient setting, after a 4-week run-in, patients older than 40 years with moderate-to-severe COPD were randomly assigned to oral roflumilast 500 mu g or placebo once a day for 24 weeks, in addition to salmeterol (M2-127 study) or tiotropium (M2-128 study). The primary endpoint was change in prebronchodilator forced expiratory volume in 1s (FEV(1)). Analysis was by intention to treat. The studies are registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT00313209 for M2-127, and NCT00424268 for M2-128. Findings In the salmeterol plus roflumilast trial, 466 patients were assigned to and treated with roflumilast and 467 with placebo; in the tiotropium plus roflumilast trial, 371 patients were assigned to and treated with roflumilast and 372 with placebo. Compared with placebo, roflumilast consistently improved mean prebronchodilator FEV(1) by 49 mL (p<0.0001) in patients treated with salmeterol, and 80 mL (p<0.0001) in those treated with tiotropium. Similar improvement in postbronchodilator FEV(1) was noted in both groups. Furthermore, roflumilast had beneficial effects on other lung function measurements and on selected patient-reported outcomes in both groups. Nausea, diarrhoea, weight loss, and, to a lesser extent, headache were more frequent in patients in the roflumilast groups. These adverse events were associated with increased patient withdrawal. Interpretation Roflumilast improves lung function in patients with COPD treated with salmeterol or tiotropium, and could become an important treatment for these patients