Solid-state single photon sources: the nanowire antenna

International audienceWe design several single-photon-sources based on the emission of a quantum dot embedded in a semiconductor (GaAs) nanowire. Through various taper designs, we engineer the nanowire ends to realize efficient metallic-dielectric mirrors and to reduce the divergence of the far-field radiation diagram. Using fully-vectorial calculations and a comprehensive Fabry-Perot model, we show that various realistic nanowire geometries may act as nanoantennas (volume of ≈0.05 λ3) that assist funnelling the emitted photons into a single monomode channel. Typically, very high extraction efficiencies above 90% are predicted for a collection optics with a numerical aperture NA=0.85. In addition, since no frequency-selective effect is used in our design, this large efficiency is achieved over a remarkably broad spectral range, 70 nm at λ=950 nm

Efficient photonic mirrors for semiconductor nanowires

International audienceUsing a fully vectorial frequency-domain aperiodic Fourier modal method, we study nanowire metallic mirrors and their photonic performance. We show that the performance of standard quarter-wave Bragg mirrors at subwavelength diameters is surprisingly poor, while engineered metallic mirrors that incorporate a thin dielectric adlayer may offer reflectance larger than 90% even for diameters as small as lambda/5

Genetic parameters for milk, fat and protein yields in Murrah buffaloes (Bubalus bubalis Artiodactyla, Bovidae)

The objective of the present study was to estimate genetic parameters for test-day milk, fat and protein yields and 305-day-yields in Murrah buffaloes. 4,757 complete lactations of Murrah buffaloes were analyzed. Co-variance components were estimated by the restricted maximum likelihood method. The models included additive direct genetic and permanent environmental effects as random effects, and the fixed effects of contemporary group, milking number and age of the cow at calving as linear and quadratic covariables. Contemporary groups were defined by herd-year-month of test for test-day yields and by herd-year-season of calving for 305-day yields. The heritability estimates obtained by two-trait analysis ranged from 0.15 to 0.24 for milk, 0.16 to 0.23 for protein and 0.13 to 0.22 for fat, yields. Genetic and phenotypic correlations were all positive. The observed population additive genetic variation indicated that selection might be an effective tool in changing population means in milk, fat and protein yields

Design of a novel high¬ efficiency single-mode single photon source

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Solid-state single photon sources: the nanowire antenna

International audienc

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders

A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to n bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution, the simple welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism (in this case, a second price-auction) with one additional bidder extracts at least as much revenue in expectation as the optimal mechanism. The beauty of this theorem stems from the fact that VCG is a prior-independent mechanism, where the seller possesses no information about the distribution, and yet, by recruiting one additional bidder it performs better than any prior-dependent mechanism tailored exactly to the distribution at hand (without the additional bidder). In this work, we establish the first full Bulow-Klemperer results in multi-dimensional environments, proving that by recruiting additional bidders, the revenue of the VCG mechanism surpasses that of the optimal (possibly randomized, Bayesian incentive compatible) mechanism. For a given environment with i.i.d. bidders, we term the number of additional bidders needed to achieve this guarantee the environment's competition complexity. Using the recent duality-based framework of Cai et al. [2016] for reasoning about optimal revenue, we show that the competition complexity of n bidders with additive valuations over m independent, regular items is at most n+2m-2 and at least log(m). We extend our results to bidders with additive valuations subject to downward-closed constraints, showing that these significantly more general valuations increase the competition complexity by at most an additive m-1 factor. We further improve this bound for the special case of matroid constraints, and provide additional extensions as well

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with m heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes and complements. We show that the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together— guarantees a ()-fraction of the optimal revenue, where d is a measure of the degree of complementarity; it extends prior work showing that the same simple mechanism achieves a constant-factor approximation when buyer valuations are subadditive (the most general class of complement-free valuations). Our proof is enabled by a recent duality framework, which we use to obtain a bound on the optimal revenue in the generalized setting. Our technical contributions are domain specific to handle the intricacies of settings with complements. One key modeling contribution is a tractable notion of “degree of complementarity” that admits meaningful results and insights—we demonstrate that previous definitions fall short in this regard

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with m heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation v for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some S, T, v(S ∪ T) v(S) + v(T)). We show that the mechanism first proposed by Babaioff et al. [2014] -- the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together -- guarantees a Θ(d) fraction of the optimal revenue, where $d$ is a measure on the degree of complementarity. Note that this is the first approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer whose valuation exhibits any kind of complementarity. It extends the work of Rubinstein and Weinberg [2015], which proved that the same simple mechanisms achieve a constant factor approximation when buyer valuations are subadditive, the most general class of complement-free valuations. Our proof is enabled by the recent duality framework developed in Cai et al. [2016], which we use to obtain a bound on the optimal revenue in this setting. Our main technical contributions are specialized to handle the intricacies of settings with complements, and include an algorithm for partitioning edges in a hypergraph. Even nailing down the right model and notion of "degree of complementarity" to obtain meaningful results is of interest, as the natural extensions of previous definitions provably fail

Design of a novel high-efficiency single-mode single photon source

International audienc