Rational Hope against Hope? A Pragmatic Approach to Hope and the Ethics of Belief

The aim of this paper is to explore apragmatic approach to hope and the ethicsof belief that allowsrationalhope against hope. Hope against hope is hope thatgoes beyond what the evidence supports by hoping for something that is bothhighlyunlikelyand highlyvaluable.¹However,this could take different forms.One could either hope against the evidence or merelygobeyond it; the evidencecould be inconclusive or conclusive,conflictingorclear ,misleading or plain, ab-sent or neutral. Hope against hope then covers everything from hoping for some-thing thatappears unlikelytohoping for something thatappears impossible,judging by theavailable evidence

Kierkegaard's Use of German Philosophy

This chapter deals with German philosophy from Leibniz to Fichte, which formed an important part of Kierkegaard's intellectual background. In this period German philosophy came to dominate Danish philosophy. However, Kierkegaard's attitude toward his German predecessors is generally ambivalent, involving both critique and admiration. Although Kierkegaard was fluent in German and very familiar with classic German philosophy, his use of this philosophy is somewhat eclectic and assimilated to his own ends. Kierkegaard uses his German predecessors to develop a distinction between the spheres of existence and thought and to reinforce what he took to be genuine Christian faith

Critical remarks on Religion in the public sphere' – Habermas between Kant and Kierkegaard

This article provides a critical assessment of Habermas's recent work on religion and the role of religion in the public sphere by comparing it to Kant's philosophy of religion on the one hand and that of Kierkegaard on the other. It is argued that although Habermas is in many ways a Kantian, he diverges from Kant when it comes to religion, by taking a position which comes closer to the Kierkegaardian view that religiousness belongs to private faith rather than philosophy. This has implications not just for the conception of religion but also for the very roles of communication, validity, rationality, and philosophy

Kierkegaard's Views on Normative Ethics, Moral Agency, and Metaethics

This chapter deals with Kierkegaard's contributions to ethics by focusing on his relation to virtue ethics and deontology, his views of moral agency, and the source of moral obligations. It argues that Kierkegaard presents a critique of Kantian autonomy that favors moral realism and theological voluntarism, and that he gives an account of human agency and selfhood in which morality is inescapable

Kierkegaard's double movement of faith and Kant's moral faith

The present article deals with religious faith by comparing the so-called double movement of faith in Kierkegaard to Kant's moral faith. Kierkegaard's double movement of faith and Kant's moral faith can be seen as providing different accounts of religious faith, as well as involving different solutions to the problem of realizing the highest good. The double movement of faith in Fear and Trembling provides an account of the structure of faith that helps us make sense of what Kierkegaard means by religious faith in general, as well as to understand better the relation between philosophy and Christian thinking in Kierkegaard. It is argued that previous scholarship has described the relation between Kierkegaard and Kant in a misleading manner by interpreting Kant as an ethicist and overlooking the role of grace in Kan