When the powerful drag their feet

We examine the timing of group decisions that are taken by weighted voting. Decision-making is in two stages. In the second stage, players vote on a policy restriction. In the first stage, players vote to determine the timing of the second-stage decision: “early”, before players’ types are revealed, or “late”. Players differ in both size and voting power. We show that players with greater power tend to prefer a late vote, whereas less powerful players tend to want to vote early. By contrast, large players tend to prefer an early vote and small players a late vote. We present evidence from the literatures on corporate governance, international relations, European Union governance, and oil extraction. We examine an extension in which players choose the qualified majority threshold besides the timing of the second-stage vote

A multilevel finite element-multibody approach to design the suspension system for the road transportation of SSR1 cryomodule

Cryomodules (CM) represents edge-frontier assemblies in particle physics research field. The road transportation of CM is a critical phase during which the structures can be subjected to significant dynamic loads. It is therefore necessary to design a Transportation Tool (TT) equipped with an appropriate suspension system. This work describes the approach adopted for the design of the TT for the CM PIP-II SSR1 (Proton Improvement Plan-II – Single Spoke Resonators 1), which is firstly introduced in the CM research field. Initially a Finite Element (FE) model was developed, considering the main sub-assemblies of the CM. However, this model was not suitable for the design of the TT due to the high computational burden. For this reason the model was exported as a Modal Neutral File and imported into a MultiBody software (MB) where the remaining components were modeled as concentrated stiffnesses or rigid bodies. The MB model thus obtained has drastically reduced the calculation time, proving to be fundamental in the TT iterative design phase, which involves the use of Helical Isolators (HI) performing the function of mechanical filters. To validate the effectiveness of TT in reducing dynamic loads, a 3D acceleration profile measured during the transport of a similar cryomodule (Linear Coherent Light Source II, LCLS-II) was used. Furthermore, the results of the MB model were used to perform the structural verification of some critical components of the CM

Regulation Versus Taxation

We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the activity, and a proportional tax on it. For all instruments the majority chooses levels which are too restrictive when the activity is performed mainly by a small fraction of the population, and when costs for reducing activities or paying taxes are sufficiently convex. Also a majority may prefer an instrument different than what a social planner would choose; for instance a rule when the social planner would choose a tax.

Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as Determinants of Majority Thresholds

We study, both theoretically and experimentally, the relation between preferred majority thresholds and behavioral traits such as the degree of risk aversion and the subjective confidence on others preferences over the alternative to vote. The main theoretical findings are supported by experimental data. The majority threshold chosen by a subject is positively and significantly correlated with her degree of risk aversion while it is negatively and significantly associated to her confidence on others’ votes. Moreover, in a treatment in which each subject can privately observe the distribution of preferences over a sub-group of participants, we find that the quality of information crowds-out subject's confidence

Integration Contracts and Asset Complementarity: Theory and Evidence from US Data

Firms sign an integration contract with the purpose of increasing their expected profits from trade and competition with third parties. Gains depend on how the contract improves the partners' production function (e.g. better synergies, organization, etc.), and how it increases their power in the marketplace. We investigate three bilateral integration contracts under different ownership allocations over resources: M&A, Minority Stake purchase and Joint Venture. We study them theoretically with a cooperative game approach. We derive some profitability conditions that we test empirically on a sample of about 9000 US firms. In order to estimate the link between ownership, asset complementarity and profits over time, we propose a novel multiproduct and time-varying complementarity index. Empirical results fully support our theoretical predictions

Integration Contracts and Asset Complementarity: Theory and Evidence from US Data

Firms sign an integration contract with the purpose of increasing their expected profits from trade and competition with third parties. Gains depend on how the contract improves the partners' production function (e.g. better synergies, organization, etc.), and how it increases their power in the marketplace. We investigate three bilateral integration contracts under different ownership allocations over resources: M&A, Minority Stake purchase and Joint Venture. We study them theoretically with a cooperative game approach. We derive some profitability conditions that we test empirically on a sample of about 9000 US firms. In order to estimate the link between ownership, asset complementarity and profits over time, we propose a novel multiproduct and time-varying complementarity index. Empirical results fully support our theoretical predictions

Voting chances instead of voting weights

We study political distortions that emerge in situations where agents’ political power is disproportionate with respect to their economic power. We use the Shapley value to evaluate both the economic and the political power. We show that usual weighted majority voting cannot prevent political distortions from emerging in a huge mass of situations. Distortions are less severe if partners can leave the union at low cost. We propose an alternative voting method based on random assignments of voting rights. Agents are given chances to vote instead of weights. If chances are computed according to a specific formula, no political distortion occurs. As an application, we analyze the rotation voting system recently adopted by the European Central Bank. We find that this system yields an enormous amount of political distortion. Then we compute the voting chances that should be assigned to Eurozone countries in order to eliminate it