Platforms, Power, and the Antitrust Challenge: A Modest Proposal to Narrow the U.S.-Europe Divide

Big platforms dominate the new economy landscape. Colloquially known as GAFA [Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple] or FAANG [Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google], the high tech big data companies are charged with using the power of their platforms to squelch start-ups, appropriate rivals’ ideas, and take and commercialize the personal data of their users. Are the platforms violating the antitrust laws? Should they be broken up? Or are they the agents of progress in the new economy? On these points, the United States antitrust law and the European Union competition law may diverge. The Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission has brought proceedings against or is investigating Google, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook. Germany, under its own competition law, has condemned Facebook’s conduct. Meanwhile, in the United States, authorities are skeptical, but they have commenced investigations. This Article is a comparative analysis of U.S. and EU law regarding monopolization/abuse of dominance as background to understanding why EU law is aggressive and U.S. law may be meek in the treatment of the big tech platforms. First, it examines the factors that underlie the two perspectives. Second, it considers three cases or problems—Google/Comparative Shopping (EU), Facebook-Personal Data (Germany), and dominant platforms’ acquisitions of start-ups that are inchoate competitive threats, such as Facebook’s acquisitions of WhatsApp and Instagram. The Article considers what lessons the latest Supreme Court antitrust decision, Ohio v. American Express (AmEx), holds for the analysis of the big data antitrust issues. Third, it asks what U.S. antitrust law and enforcement should do. It concludes that U.S. antitrust law should reclaim its role as watchdog to stop abuses of economic power, and makes suggestions for U.S. antitrust law to meet the big-platform challenge in a modest but meaningful and practicable way. I. Introduction II. A Brief Comparison of U.S. and EU Law of Monopolization/Abuse of Dominance ... A. The United States ... B. Europe ... C. Presumptions and Divergences III. Implications for High Tech, Big Data IV. Three Examples of Alleged Platform Abuse ... A. Google/Comparative Shopping ... 1. EU Law ... 2. U.S. Law ... B. Facebook—Abuse of Data ... 1. German Law ... 2. U.S. Law ... C. Start-Ups: Nipping Competition in the Bud V. Proposals VI. Conclusio

Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade

The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is complete, and the agenda for the next round is being formulated. It is widely expected that issues of competition, the environment, and possibly labor will be on the agenda for the next round of the GATT. This article examines why it is that the world trading agenda may be thus expanding. Specifically as to competition law, it examines the history of devising world competition rules, the wisdom of revisiting the enterprise of doing so, and alternative approaches to competition in the GATT agenda. The article concludes with a modest proposal for forging the links between competition and trade in the context of the GATT

Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property--TRIPS and its Antitrust Counterparts

This Article examines the interface between TRIPS\u27 protection of intellectual property rights and antitrust law, and the extent to which TRIPS invites a counterpart agreement that would internationalize intellectual property antitrust rules. Professor Fox argues that TRIPS does not call for internationalizing antitrust law, and that even developing countries, which might find a greater need for antitrust protection against abuse of dominance after TRIPS, might be better served by developing and enforcing a national antitrust law of their own. She argues that TRIPS does, however, contemplate some limits to antitrust, lest antitrust enforcement impair protections guaranteed by TRIPS. Professor Fox proposes that this interface develop on a case-by-case basis, and that it be informed by a principle of respect for the scope of antitrust vis-a-vis intellectual property rights in developed bodies of national law. Finally, she urges dialogue to develop principles linking trade and antitrust, with trade-and-competition-restraining uses of intellectual property to be treated as a subset of broader antitrust principles