Pricing multiple exercise American options by linear programming

We consider the problem of computing the lower hedging price of American options of the call and put type written on a non-dividend paying stock in a non-recombinant tree model with multiple exercise rights. We prove using a simple argument that an optimal exercise policy for an option with h exercise rights is to delay exercise until the last h periods. The result implies that the mixedinteger programming model for computing the lower hedging price and the optimal exercise and hedging policy has a linear programming relaxation that is exact, i.e., the relaxation admits an optimal solution where all variables required to be integral have integer values. © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Stochastic programming approaches to stochastic scheduling

Practical scheduling problems typically require decisions without full information about the outcomes of those decisions. Yields, resource availability, performance, demand, costs, and revenues may all vary. Incorporating these quantities into stochastic scheduling models often produces diffculties in analysis that may be addressed in a variety of ways. In this paper, we present results based on stochastic programming approaches to the hierarchy of decisions in typical stochastic scheduling situations. Our unifying framework allows us to treat all aspects of a decision in a similar framework. We show how views from different levels enable approximations that can overcome nonconvexities and duality gaps that appear in deterministic formulations. In particular, we show that the stochastic program structure leads to a vanishing Lagrangian duality gap in stochastic integer programs as the number of scenarios increases.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/44935/1/10898_2004_Article_BF00121682.pd

Market clearing and price formation

Considered here is decentralized exchange of privately owned commodity bundles. Voluntary transactions take the form of repeated bilateral barters. Under broad and reasonable hypotheses the resulting process converges to competitive equilibrium. Price-taking behavior is not assumed. Prices emerge over time; they need neither be anticipated nor known at any interim stage.