The structure of experience, the nature of the visual, and type 2 blindsight

Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural—necessary—features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or more generally perceptually, experience form or movement at a distance from our body, without experiencing colour. The traditional answer, advocated by Aristotle, and some other philosophers, up to and including the present day, is that it is not and hence colour is a structural feature of visual experience. I argue that there is no good reason to think that this is impossible, and provide evidence from four cases—sensory substitution, achomatopsia, phantom contours and amodal completion—in favour of the idea that it is possible. If it is possible then one important reason for rejecting the idea that people with type 2 blindsight do not have visual experiences is undermined. I suggest further experiments that could be done to help settle the matter

Is the sense-data theory a representationalist theory?

Is the sense-data theory, otherwise known as indirect realism, a form of representationalism? This question has been underexplored in the extant literature, and to the extent that there is discussion, contemporary authors disagree. There are many different variants of representationalism, and differences between these variants that some people have taken to be inconsequential turn out to be key factors in whether the sense-data theory is a form of representationalism. Chief among these are whether a representationalist takes the phenomenal character of an experience to be explicable in virtue of the properties of an experience that represent something or explicable in virtue of that which gets represented. Another is whether representationalists hold a non-reductionist, or naturalistically or non-naturalistically reductionist variant of representationalism. In addition, subtle differences in what one takes phenomenal character to be on the sense-data theory – either awareness of sense-data or the sense-data themselves – together with one's account of representation, are crucial factors in determining whether sense-data theory is compatible with representationalism. This paper explores these relationships and makes manifest the complexities of the metaphysics of two central theories of perception

The relationship between cognitive penetration and predictive coding

If beliefs and desires affect perception—at least in certain specified ways—then cognitive penetration occurs. Whether it occurs is a matter of controversy. Recently, some proponents of the predictive coding account of perception have claimed that the account entails that cognitive penetrations occurs. I argue that the relationship between the predictive coding account and cognitive penetration is dependent on both the specific form of the predictive coding account and the specific form of cognitive penetration. In so doing, I spell out different forms of each and the relationship that holds between them. Thus, mere acceptance of the predictive coding approach to perception does not determine whether one should think that cognitive penetration exists. Moreover, given that there are such different conceptions of both predictive coding and cognitive penetration, researchers should cease talking of either without making clear which form they refer to, if they aspire to make true generalisations

Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on Lupyan

No abstract available

Representational theories of phenomenal character

This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential states arise and their nature. After examining the desiderata for naturalistic explanations, I argue that theories which ascribe nonconceptual content to experiences are the most plausible versions of representationalism. Further, causal covariation and teleological theories yield distinctive and interesting representationalist positions, hence, they become the focus of this study. To assess representationalism, I investigate whether all differences in phenomenal character can be correlated with differences in content. I claim that a useful distinction can be drawn between implicit and explicit content, which allows one to best describe the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. I then argue that ambiguous figures show that two experiences can have the same content but different phenomenal character. I explicate the Inverted Earth hypothesis and claim that to identify content and phenomenal character, representationalists either have to condone the possibility of philosophical zombies, or hold that people lack authoritative first-person knowledge of their current experiences. Both these positions are unpalatable. Finally, I argue that representationalists cannot ascribe contents to experiences of novel colours to account for their phenomenal character. I also question, in light of dissociation phenomena, whether there is one distinctive relationship that all experiences bear to the cognitive system. I conclude that phenomenal character cannot be identical with the type of content under investigation, and that naturalistic representationalist theories cannot fully explain conscious experience

Modelling population and disease dynamics in complex ecological systems

Mathematical models are a theoretical tool used to understand ecological processes. In this thesis we create mathematical frameworks to describe and evaluate four ecological systems. In the first case study we extend a host-pathogen framework to include a maternal effect which increases the disease resistance of offspring when the maternal environment is poor. Maternal effects impacting life-history traits have been shown to increase the propensity for population cycles. Our contrasting results show maternal effects acting on disease resistance stabilise host-pathogen systems. The second case study examines the impact infection may have on population estimates using Capture-Mark-Recapture (CMR) studies. We show that the estimates using the statistical Program Capture are accurate when capture rates are infection dependent. The final two case studies use spatial, individual-based, stochastic models to simulate disease spread and the colonisation of the Eurasian red squirrel (Sciurus vul- garis) on real-life landscapes. Using novel techniques we highlight the role habitat connectivity has on the dispersal routes which influence the spread of disease and re-population dynamics. Moreover the inclusion of seasonality shows that squirrel population dynamics are driven by the multi-year signal of resources.Heriot-Watt UniversityScottish Rural University Colleg

After The Storm: Inter-disciplinary Dialogic Discourses with a Post-Fishing Community

This paper is a critical evaluation of a unique cross-disciplinary approach to working with traumatised communities which involved inter-disciplinary collaboration between an Applied Theatre director and a Sociologist. The application of the approach in a post-industrial community provides the case study basis for the evaluation. Between 2014 and 2017 community participants from Eyemouth in south east Scotland worked with an applied theatre director and a Sociologist to develop a creative performance which examined the events of the town’s fishing disaster of 1881.The Eyemouth project was facilitated through dialogic discourses between community participants, applied theatre director and sociologist in which the equalization of relationships, meaning making and active listening were established as shared values and processes.The aim of the paper is threefold. To critically address the degree to which the approach as able to: facilitate a critical evaluation of the practices of applied theatre; make visible otherwise unrecorded sociological insights as a result of the observation and interrogation of the creative performance of shared industrial heritage; facilitate public sociology that supported social activism within a disadvantaged community.Sociological observation of the creative process and its negotiation revealed previously hidden and nuanced social interactions which were then examined in discussion with the director and in focus group discussions with community participants. The creative process revealed insights into the nature and potential of post-industrial communities and enabled public sociology discourse which prompted social activism within the case study community.The approach is labour intensive and time-consuming. It demands high levels of commitment to the shared values associated with dialogic discourses on the part of both community participants and professionals. Despite this, the paper concludes that the approach could be reproduced in other settings and was successful in both facilitating the critical appraisal of AT practice and was effective as a strategy for research with, and empowerment of, disadvantaged and traumatized communities

Is perception cognitively penetrable? A philosophically satisfying and empirically testable reframing

The question of whether perception can be penetrated by cognition is in the limelight again. The reason this question keeps coming up is that there is so much at stake: Is it possible to have theory-neutral observation? Is it possible to study perception without recourse to expectations, context, and beliefs? What are the boundaries between perception, memory, and inference (and do they even exist)? Are findings from neuroscience that paint a picture of perception as an inherently bidirectional and interactive process relevant for understanding the relationship between cognition and perception? We have assembled a group of philosophers and psychologists who have been considering the thesis of cognitive (im)penetrability in light of these questions (Abdel Rahman & Sommer, 2008; Goldstone, Landy, & Brunel, 2011; Lupyan, Thompson-Schill, & Swingley, 2010; Macpherson, 2012; Stokes, 2011). Rather than rehashing previous arguments which appear, in retrospect, to have been somewhat ill-posed (Pylyshyn, 1999), this symposium will present a thesis of cognitive (im)penetrability that is at once philosophically satisfying, empirically testable, and relevant to the questions that cognitive scientists find most interesting

The senses

No abstract available