From procedural chore to political prestige: historic development and recent reforms of the Presidency of the Council

'Die Ratspräsidentschaft wurden in den 1950er Jahren als administrative Pflicht auf der Basis strikter Gleichheit zwischen den damals zehn Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften eingeführt. Heute stellt es ein Amt von hohem politischem Prestige dar, das in einer tieferen und weiteren Union wichtige Rechte und Verantwortlichkeiten mit sich bringt, auch wenn viele davon sowohl formell als auch informell beschränkt sind. Dieser Beitrag verfolgt die Veränderungen, die das Amt im Lauf der Zeit erfahren hat, als Folge unter anderem einer Schwächung der Kommission, der zunehmenden Rolle des Europäischen Rates, Änderungen der Abstimmungsregeln, Abweichungen von der sog. Gemeinschaftsmethode, Erweiterungen und neuen Regeln der Transparenz. Die historische Entwicklung und jüngste Reformen des Amtes werden nachgezeichnet, indem dessen vier zentrale Funktionen (Administration und Koordination, das Setzen politischer Prioritäten, Mediation sowie interne und externe Repräsentation) und die Organisation der Präsidentschaft sowohl aus der Perspektive der EU insgesamt als auch aus der Perspektive des den Vorsitz innehabenden Mitglieds untersucht werden. Die vordringliche Beschäftigung jüngerer Präsidentschaften mit den Themen Öffentlichkeit und Information mag als Versuch gewertet werden, es der Öffentlichkeit zu erleichtern, eine Präsidentschaft von der anderen zu unterscheiden.' (Autorenreferat)'The Council presidency was conceived in the 1950s as an administrative chore to be shared on the basis of strict equality among the member states of the then European Communities. Today, it is a politically prestigious office, carrying with it important rights and responsibilities in a wider and deeper European Union, although many of the office's rights and responsibilities are constrained both formally and informally. This article tracks the changes which have occurred to the office over time as a result inter alia of the weakening of the Commission, the burgeoning role of the European Council, changes in voting rules, deviations from the so-called 'Community method', enlargement and new transparency rules. The historic development and recent reforms of the office are traced by examining its four main functions (administration and coordination, the setting of political priorities, mediation, and internal and external representation) and the organisation of the presidency from the point of view both of the EU as a whole and of the member state in the chair. The preoccupation of recent presidencies with issues of publicity and information may be an attempt to help the public to distinguish one presidency from another.' (author's abstract)

"When and Why the Council of Ministers of the EU Votes Explicitly"

This paper reports newly collected empirical data sets on explicitly contested voting at ministerial level in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. These data sets cover the period 1994-2004, with more detail for the years 1998-2004. They provide us with rather steady patterns of explicitly contested voting across the period in terms of: proportions of decisions taken where contested voting was recorded; the different levels of contestation by country; and the issue areas in which explicit voting occurred more often. The data sets draw on the material available on the Council's own website, but they have been supplemented by hand-collected data, in particular as regards issue areas and types of decision. Once arranged appropriately the data sets will be posted on the web, so that other researchers can have access to the material. The initial analysis of the data is reported in the second edition of Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, The Council of Ministers, Palgrave, forthcoming, Chapter 10. The data show that explicit voting on agreed decisions at ministerial level is rather rare, that in nearly half the roll calls dissent is expressed only by singleton member states, that nearly half the cases concern 'technical' decisions on agriculture and fisheries, and that Germany more often votes 'no' or abstains than any other member state. The data confirm that ministers generally endorse collective decisions by consensus, even on the 70% or so cases where they could activate qualified majority voting (QMV). To the extent that voting takes place in these latter cases, it occurs implicitly rather than explicitly, operates mostly at the level of officials rather than ministers, and is not recorded systematically in publicly accessible form. These patterns are consistent with earlier accounts based on qualitative interview evidence

When and Why the Council of Ministers of the EU Votes Explicitly

This paper reports newly collected empirical data sets on explicitly contested voting at ministerial level in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. These data sets cover the period 1994-2004, with more detail for the years 1998-2004. They provide us with rather steady patterns of explicitly contested voting across the period in terms of: proportions of decisions taken where contested voting was recorded; the different levels of contestation by country; and the issue areas in which explicit voting occurred more often. The data sets draw on the material available on the Council's own website, but they have been supplemented by hand-collected data, in particular as regards issue areas and types of decision. Once arranged appropriately the data sets will be posted on the web, so that other researchers can have access to the material. The initial analysis of the data is reported in the second edition of Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, The Council of Ministers, Palgrave, forthcoming, Chapter 10. The data show that explicit voting on agreed decisions at ministerial level is rather rare, that in nearly half the roll calls dissent is expressed only by singleton member states, that nearly half the cases concern 'technical' decisions on agriculture and fisheries, and that Germany more often votes 'no' or abstains than any other member state. The data confirm that ministers generally endorse collective decisions by consensus, even on the 70% or so cases where they could activate qualified majority voting (QMV). To the extent that voting takes place in these latter cases, it occurs implicitly rather than explicitly, operates mostly at the level of officials rather than ministers, and is not recorded systematically in publicly accessible form. These patterns are consistent with earlier accounts based on qualitative interview evidence.Council of Ministers; majority voting

Svet Evropske unije in širitev

The article reviews and outlines the challenges the Council of the European Union has been and is still facing today, especially as regards the efficiency and transparency of decision-making. A special emphasis is put on organisational challenge, e.g. the question of how to effectively deal with the multiplicity of languages, meet demands as regards transparency, and to ensure maintaining efficiency in decision-making, especially in view of the forthcoming major rounds of enlargement.Članek povzema in prikazuje izzive, s katerimi se je in se še srečuje Svet Evropske unije, še posebej izzive učinkovitosti in preglednosti pri odločanju. Posebej poudarja organizacijski izziv: na primer vprašanja, kako učinkovito obvladati množico jezikovzadostiti zahtevam po preglednosti in kako zagotoviti ohranjanje učinkovitosti odločanja v luči prihodnjih krogov širitve

The Council of Ministers of the European Union

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Double versus triple majorities : will the new voting rules in the council of the European Union make a difference?

What impact will the Lisbon Treaty’s new system of voting in the Council have? After describing the new voting rules, this study develops a modelling approach to assess their likely impact. The first part of the analysis examines the extent to which proce- dural rules have affected the decision-making process in the recent past, since this will help assess the likely impact of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty. The second part of the analysis presents a counter-factual analysis of recent decisions, exploring what would have happened had the Lisbon rules been applied. The main finding is that even under the strong and unrealistic assumption that formal rules define the decision- making process, decision outcomes would have been the same in most cases. The paper concludes by discussing the features of Council decision-making that soften the impact of these rule changes

Analysing the links between national capitals and Brussels in EU foreign policy

The article contributes to the study of EU foreign policy decision-making processes by analysing the links between national officials working in the committees of the Council of the EU and their capitals. Through an original dataset of 138 questionnaires (and 20 interviews) with national representatives, it explores the micro-foundations of the formulation of EU foreign policy. It first shows how, even in this most intergovernmental field, diplomats in Brussels play a very important role in the policy process: only 30 per cent claim to always have a mandate and half state that they do not feel constrained by their capital. Next, it reveals that if (larger) member states attempt to retain control of CFSP/CSDP negotiations, the effective discretion/autonomy these officials enjoy depends on the experience accumulated in the decision-making process, and knowledge of the (formal and informal) links between Brussels and the home department